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ABSTRACT 
In 1982, the New Zealand Meat Producers Board1 took control of all 
New Zealand sheep producers' meat2 for export. Although the Board had 
the statutory authority to control meat marketing when it was formed in 
1922, this authority had not been exercised previously. 3 The move 
raised a number of questions, both with regard to the desirability of 
monopoly control over export sheepmeat · marketing, and the degree to 
which the Board took account of producers' interests in this decision. 
i. 
The stimulus for this thesis came from a well-qualified analyst of 
the meat industry who commented that the one group within the meat 
industry with the least understanding of, or influence upon, the Board's 
decision to become the sole marketer of meat, was the producers. This 
seems ironical when the Board is commonly perceived to represent 
producers' interests. Thus, this thesis represents an attempt to examine 
the evolving relationship between the Board representatives, and their 
constituents, all sheep and beef producers of meat for export, between 
1922 and 1985. In particular, it reviews the question of whether 
the Meat Board's decision-making structure has provided primarily for a 
representation of producers' interests and if not, why not? If not, 
what other interest groups have influenced the Board? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, it is argued that the Meat 
Producers Board has, since its formation in 1922, developed in such a 
way that it has been less able to fully represent the interests of its 
constituents, meat producers. As Mascarenhas commented of producer boards 
generally: 'though they derive their authority by statute, and have been 
1. Hereafter referred to as the Meat Board or Board. 
2. Hereafter referred to as producers or farmers. 
3. Section 10 of the Meat Export Control Act, 1922. 
ii. 
established by government, they are less amenable to either the interests 
of primary producers or the public interest'. 1 
It will be argued that this development is partially the result of 
the Board's evolving status as a corporate interest group where it has 
had a close and continuing relationship with government. A useful 
definition of corporatism as it applies to interest groups is offered by 
Caws on: 'An organisation's capacity to represent its members' interests 
and to discipline them as part of a negotiated interaction with other 
groups'. 2 
The Meat Board is formally recognised by government as the central 
representative institution in the meat industry, but increasingly in 
return, it has been required to consider a range of interests in the 
industry before formulating its policy to present to government. This 
is associated with the declining political influence of producers 
generally, the Board's increasing commercial activities, and the 
increasing political influence of certain vertically integrated meat 
companies. Therefore while the formal responsibility and accountability 
of the Meat Board has remained primarily to farmers, in reality they .are 
only one of' a number of groups which the Board is obliged to take into 
account in its dectsion-making process. Other groups with potential to 
influence the Board include shipping lines, meat processors, and 
exporting meat companies (see Appendix 1). 
As one Australian writer has noted: 
Even though the (statutory) authorities are likely to have 
been created at the behest of farmers, there is no presump-
tion that decisions will always be those that could advance 
farmers interests ... The discretionary powers possessed by 
statutory marketing authorities enable them to effect wealth 
transfers among rival economic interests ... Unconstrained by 
the necessity to meet well-specified objectives, such 
authorities shape the fine detail of agricultural policy in 
1. R.Mascarenhas, Public Enterprise in New Zealand, Wellington, 
New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1982, p.22. 
2. Alan Cawson, "Introduction", in A.Cawson (ed), Organised 
Interests and the State - Studies in Mesa Corporatism, London, 
Saqe Publications Ltd, 1985, o.5. 
the process of adjudicating the competing claims of growers, 
processors, and marketing authorities. It is practical to 
assume a statutory authority will endeavour to make a 
decision which achieves a balance among these interest 
groups favourable to its own survival and where possible to 
the advancement of its power and influence.I 
While the Meat Board's corporatist nature has strengthened since 
i; i. 
the Second World War under the predominantly National governments, recent 
formal and informal challenges by the 1984 Labour government to the 
concept of 'producer control 1 of the various agricultural sectors, through 
the producer boards, suggests the corporatist trend in the meat industry 
could be in danger of breaking down. 
It is not the function of this thesis to debate the political and 
commercial advantages of 'producer control 1 • Rather it is to challenge 
the common assumption of sheep and beef producers, that the mere existence 
of a producer board secures their control of the meat industry. 
E. Sieper, "Statutory Marketing in Agriculture: Some Uses and 
Abuses", Australia, Australian National University, Department of 
Economics, August 1983, p.16. (Paper presented at AGPOL Conference, 
Wellington, 22-26 August 1983) 
It should be noted that Australian marketing boards, unlike New Zealand 
marketing boards, have, since 1970s included processor and exporter 
representatives and in some cases boards have been replaced by 
corporations, eg Meat Livestock Corporation. Nevertheless, they are 
still perceived as producer boards, as producer representation is 
dominant, and the legislative functions and objectives enhance producer 
control philosophy.' 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
THE MEAT BOARD AS A CORPORATE INTEREST GROUP 
1. Interest Group or PubliC Corporation? 
1. 
Before beginning to assess the Meat Board's accountability to meat 
producers, it is necessary to show that the Board has formal primary 
responsibility to farmers. 1 The Meat Board is one of a number of producer, 
or marketing boards in agriculture, whether in New Zealand or inter-
nationally. 2 Although these boards are found in both Commonwealth and 
developing countries, such as Brazil and Israel, they differ widely in 
their structure and functions between and within countries. 
Producer boards are statutory bodi.es so that their existence and 
operations are based upon and authorised by legislative structures. They 
usually include some government representation. 3 In Commonwealth 
countries however, the board has generally been formed at producers' 
requests and a majority of the board members are producer representatives. 
Producer boards then are responsible in some degree to both governments 
and producers and contain both public and private elements. 
Writers differ as to where the dominant responsibility of the boards 
lies. As they are established by statute, many writers claim they are 
primarily responsible to the public interest through government, 
constituting a public corporation or government agency. This view is 
evident in much of the literature referring to New Zealand producer boards. 
1. The definition of accountability as it applies to the Meat Board's 
accountability to meat producers is given in chapter 4. 
2. In New Zealand, the three major producer boards are the Meat 
Board, Wool Board and Dairy Board. Marketing or producer boards also 
exist for apples and pears, pork, milk (from supply), tobacco, poultry, 
potatoes, wheat, eggs and citrus fruit, honey and kiwifruit. 
3. Glossary, 
in S. Hoos, (ed), Agricultural Marketing Boards - An International 
Perspective, Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing Co, 1979, p.351. 
2. 
Webb, for example, classified producer boards as public corporations, 'not 
as a means of introducing administrative autonomy into state marketing 
enterprise, but as a means of enabling producers to share the responsibility 
for the centralised economic management of their industries'. 1 Cleveland 
and Robinson also see producer/marketing boards as part of the government 
administration system, but semi-independent. 2 However there is also a 
substantial body of international/national literature which suggests the 
dominant responsibility of producer boards is to producers, therefore 
they can more accurately be classified as private interest groups. 
Giddings defines producer boards as 'statutory cooperatives in which 
the two elements of the statutory framework ·are the dominant one of 
producer control self government, and the background one of a publicly-
controlled environment' . 3 Similarly Metcalf emphasises that the place of 
the government in the boards is one of sanctioning the cooperative by its 
authority. He defines a marketing board as a 1 prod~cer controlled, 
compulsory, horizontal organisation, sanctioned by government authority 
to perform specific marketing operations in the interest of the producer 
of the commodity concerned' .4 Morley agrees that most marketing boards 
are cooperatives (albeit compulsory rather than voluntary) in two main 
respects. Firstly ~he cost of administering them and the advantages of 
working through them are related to the use made of them by the farmer; 
in other words the bigger the production, the more, indirectly, he 
contributes to the costs. Secondly producers themselves have a direct 
1. M.Webb, The Economics of Nationalised Industries, Nelson, 1973, 
pp.144-145, quoted in Mascarenhas, (1982), op. cit. p.104. 
2. Leslie Cleveland and A.D.Robinson, (ed), Readings in New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, Reed Education, 1972, pp.16-17. 
3. Dr Phillip Giddings, Marketing Boards and Ministers, Farnborough, 
Saxon House, 1974, p.18. 
4. Metcalf, The Economics of Agriculture, Middlesex, Penguin, 
1969, quoted in J. W. Barker, Agricultural Marketing, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1981, p.118. 
voice in the control of the boards. 1 Campbell also notes that in 
Australia, producer boards were formed after farmers asked government 
for 'compulsory cooperatives' . 2 
3. 
Referring specifically to producer boards in New Zealand, Westrate 
argues corporate bodies developed in New Zealand as a result of a national 
desire of producers to manage their own affairs and government sympathy 
with this desire. 3 More recently Mascarenhas has argued that producer 
boards are private monopolies, however 'they are distinguished from other 
enterprises in the private sector which are subject to greater price and 
market competition' .4 Mascarenhas backs this up with evidence from the 
New Zealand Standard Institutional Sector Classification Manual, based on 
the United Nations system of national accounts. He claims this classifica-
tion indicates the unique position of producer boards which: 
(1) are constituted by statute and serve private enterprise; 
(2) finance their operations from fees and levies in the industry, 
and from trading surpluses; 
(3) have the majority of members on the controlling body represent-
ing producers; 
(4) are given power to carry on their function but the government 
may interfere on policy matters; 
(5) possess monopoly power granted by government. This distinguishes 
them from private enterprises subject to greater competition in pricing 
and marketing. 5 
1. J.Morley, "Marketing Boards", in T. Warley (ed), Agricultural 
Producers and Their Markets, New York, Augustus Kelley, 1967, pp.344-345. 
2. Keith Campbell, Agricultural Marketing and Prices, Cheshire, 
Cheshir.ePublishingltd, 1973, p.97. 
3. G.Westrate, Portrait of a Mixed Economy, New Zealand, University 
Press, 1959, p.57. 
4. R.Mascarenhas, Public Enterprise in New Zealand, Wellington, New 
Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1982, p.22. 
5. Department Statistics, New Zealand Standard Institutional Sector 
Cl~f~ification Manual, September 1975, quoted in Mascarenhas (1982), op.cit. 
p .... Ob. 
Mascarenhas also points out that the producer boards in their sub-
mission to the select committee on the Official Information Bill claimed 
4. 
the Bill did not apply to them as they did not come into the category for 
inclusion on the criteria adopted by the Danks Committee, they were not 
government departments or bodies, and the Bill was concerned with official 
information, and their role was to regulate and assist the industry, a 
fact which entitles them to exclusion. 
The criteria for inclusion adopted by the Danks Committee involved 
organisations where the government appointed members, controlled staffing, 
provided funds and controlled finance, had statutory powers of direction, 
received assistance or advice, and had powers to take over functions. The 
producer boards felt they did not come within these criteria because a 
majority of their members were appointed by the industries concerned, the 
government had no control over staffing, they were funded from trading and 
levies, and the government could not take over their functions. 1 
These arguments reinforce the distinction between public corporations 
as government agencies and producer organisations as non government 
agencies. It is interesting (though not necessarily detracting from 
Mascarenhas 1 argument), that the Danks Committee chose to include the 
producer boards under the Official Information Act. Nevertheless, they 
were given wide powers to withhold information from the public on certain 
commercial grounds. A closer examination of the formation of the Meat 
Board, however, reinforces the view that the Board was intended to be 
primarily responsible to producers, rather than the public interest. 
2. Formation of the Meat Board 
While there has been some debate among historians as to whether the 
proposal for a Meat Board came from government or farmers, it seems 
1. Evening Post 2S February 1982, quoted in Mascarenhas (1982), 
op.cit. p.104. 
5. 
apparent that the New Zealand Farmers Union had for a number of years 
pressed for market reforms; aware of producer dependence on the British 
market, and their vulnerability to price movements. As far back as 1909, 
a fall in London meat market prices first led to suggestions for some 
form of producer or government control over, or participation in, certain 
export marketing activities. 
A conference of producer organisations and other concerned parties 
was held; including agricultural and pastoral committees, farmer unions, 
1 
meat export slaughterhouses, Chambers of Commerce, stock agents. One of 
the proposals was that frozen meat should be sold through a producer 
organisation or farmers cooperative tG be formed for that purpose. This 
proposal was defeated by the conference however, along with all other 
proposals for reform. 
With the beginning of World War 1, the Imperial Commandeer, where 
all export meat and other commodities were sold to the UK government at 
governmentally negotiated and fixed prices, offered farmers some security 
and they no longer pressed for reforms. 2 The real crisis for farmers came 
after the war, with the subsequent depression and slump in prices. This 
led them to turn to the government for assistance. A major factor 
contributing to the- slump in prices was the large quantity of meat still 
in store in New Zealand at the time of the expiration of the contract; 
equivalent to (then) one season's current production. Shipment of meat 
owned by the UK government from store, as well as the shipment of the 
increased meat production from New Zealand and other sources led to a 
considerable fall in market prices for meat, particularly mutton, late in 
1921. 3 
1. Michelle Veeman, Marketing Boards in New Zealand, Berkely, 
University of California, 1972 PhD Thesis, p.258. 
2. Ibid, p.259. 
3. Ibid, p.260. 
6. 
Farmers however, believed their difficulties were caused not only 
by unfavourable market conditions, but also the activities of the middle-
men, which prevented them receiving a fair share of the price which the 
meat realised in London and other populated centres in ti~e UK. Farmers were 
concerned at the rising costs involved in the production and export of 
meat, particularly refrigeration and shipping freight rates. One 
historian concluded: 
Post war depression coincided with the return to free marketing 
of primary produce. Many farmers, interpreting these phenomena 
as effect and cause, began to revive the demand originally 
voiced before the war for controlled marketing, such as they 
had experienced under the wartime 1 comandeer 1 • There was a 
general feeling they were not getting a reasonable share of the 
price on the London market, and that 'some unfair power must be 
operating' against their interests. Guided by American anti-
trust literature and laws, they looked for the source of their 
trouble, not in their own land speculations, or in the fall of 
world prices, but in the machination of 'meat trusts', in 
manipulating the London market. There was also a good deal of 
animosity toward shipping 'rings' or 'combines' and some talk 
of founding a state shipping line.1 
At the 8th Annual Conference of the New Zealand Council of 
Agriculture, a motion was carried proposing 'that an effort should be 
made to organise the frozen meat industry of New Zealand in cooperative 
lines with a uniform system of grading, and one cooperative selling 
agency for the meat' . 2 A deputation of farmers went to the government 
in October 1921. Prime Minister, Mr William Ferguson Massey of the 
Reform party sympathised with farmers' requests, and proposed a meat 
combine or board with compulsory powers. A number of discussions then 
took place between a parliamentary committee of six, and a producer 
committee of 14. When these committees agreed on a proposal, producer 
meetings were held all over the country to assess the level of support 
for such a proposal. This culminated in a major gathering of producers 
1. Keith Sinclair, History of New Zealand, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1961, pp.228-229. 
2. Editorial, The New Zealand Farmer, 1 August 1921. 
in Wellington January 1922, with representatives from agricultural and 
pastoral associations, farmers unions, and other farmer organisations. 
The preamble of the Meat Export Control Act, which enabled the 
formation of the Meat Board, sets out the government's justification 
for the legislation to assist the interests of one sector of producers: 
The economic welfare of New Zealand has lately been adversely 
affected by reason of a reduction in the business of the 
production of meat for export, such reductions being in part 
due to the falling prices, and in part to the charges payable 
in respect of freight and other services. It has been 
resolved that the public economic welfare will be promoted by 
the establishment of a Board of Control with the power to act 
as the agent of producers in respect of preparation, storage, 
and shipment in meat in respect of the disposal of such meat 
beyond New Zealand.I 
7. 
It is clear that the government held the view that whatever was best for 
producers was also best for the nation. When introducing the third 
reading of the Meat Export Control Bill in Parliament, Prime Minister 
Massey said: 'The whole prosperity of the country depends on the 
prosperi,ty of our producers, on the market that happens to be available, 
and the price they receive' . 2 
David Jones, chairman of the parliamentary committee on the issue, 
and also a farmer, said: 
The government is practically a partner with every farmer in 
New Zealand, 'and with the high rate of taxation they have to 
put up with, they should have whatever assistance is 
required from government, for they cannot afford to sit idly 
by and let the producer be ruined.3 
The Meat Board was quite clearly intended to be for producers, and 
run by producers. As Massey said, 'our object is to make a producers 
pool, or organisation or combination, or whatever you choose to call it, 
managed, and run by producers themselves' . 4 
1. Preamble to New Zealand Meat Export Control Act, 1922. 
2. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, (NZPD),'.VoL19J;-1921, p.126. 
3. NZPD, \101..193, 1921, p.182. 
4. NZPD, Vol.194, 1922, r.318. 
8. 
The extent of the Meat Soard 1 s powers was the subject of consider-
able debate, both within Parliament, and the farming districts. Massey 
insisted that the Board should possess compulsory powers of acquisition 
of all meat for export, which would go into a common pool and be sold 
through the Meat Board alone. A number of prominent farming men however 
disagreed with the need for such widespread powers for the Board. 
At the major meeting of producers in Wellington 1922, one prominent 
farmer, Walter (later Sir) Mulholland, moved a resolution that the 
proposed BQard should have the power to decide whether it would trade in 
meat. Massey took Mulholland aside at a break and assured him that his 
worry would be taken care of in the final scheme. He asked Mulholland 
to withdraw his resolution, which he did. 1 
The revised Meat Export Control Bill, clearly took account of 
farmers• concerns, proposing to endow the Board with powers to assume 
control of all or any part of meat for export, yet not necessarily 
requiring the Board to exercise these powers. Nevertheless, the 
provision for the Board to have wide control over the whole meat industry 
was emphasised by Massey: 
While it is not intended to interfere more than can be avoided 
with the people already engaged in the meat trade, nevertheless, 
the Board wilJ have the power to take action if there is move-
ment on the part of any sector antagonistic to the interests of 
producers.2 
The passing of the Meat Export Control Act 1922, led to the 
formation of the Meat Producers Board. The Board was permitted a 
dominant membership of five representatives elected by producers, two 
government nominees appointed at the recommendation of the Minister of 
Agriculture as representatives of the New Zealand government, and a 
1. Dai Hayward, Golden Jubilee, New Zealand Producers Board, 
Wellington, Universal Printers Ltd, 1977, p.15. 
2 . NZ PD , Vo 1. 19 4·, 19 2 2 , p . 110 . 
9. 
representative from stock and station agents. 1 Under the Act, the Board 
could assume control over all export meat, prohibit or limit exports, 
impose a levy, negotiate all shipping contracts, lay down conditions on 
grading, handlinQ;sStorage and -insurance, arrange promotion or make any 
arrangements it considered necessary for the sale and disposal of New 
Zealand meat. 2 
The editor of one of the farming journals of the day, acknowledged 
the Meat Board was a private corporation with exceptionally wide 
statutory powers, which he felt was cause for concern: 
There is no doubt that the controlling power of the Board has 
been made not only comprehensive, but absolute with regard to 
the export of mgat. Section 10 (of the Act) expressly makes 
the Board the sole judge of the limits to which it may 
exercise control over the industry. This appears to the 
writer to be going a little too far, in conferring upon, what 
is after all, a private corporation, unchecked power over 
public interests.3 · 
It appears then that the Bo_ard was set up with primary responsibility 
to producers and therefore resembles more closely a private interest 
group, than .. a public corporatfon, .However ·~while. thjs,: formal 
structure has continued, reinforced by public perception, informally the 
Board's structure of responsibility and accountability has changed. 
Corporatism theory, which describes a particular relationship 
between private in~erest groups and the government (as distinct from 
public corporations) is useful to explain this development. 
3. The Corporate Interest Group 
Despite the Meat Board's dominant status as a private, rather than 
public organisation, it is clear that it has had an evolving close 
1. The stock and station agent representative was the result of an 
amendment to the Act designed to compromise w:ith thec'.Stock and-station agents 
who were strongly opposed to the Act. 
2. Hayward, (1977) op.cit. p.28. 
3, Editorial, 11 A Few Comments on Meat Export Control Act", The New 
Zea 1 and Farmer, f'·Ap ri1 , 192Z, P:- 437·.-: 
relationship with government. The nature of this relationship has 
implications for the Board's accountability to producers. 
10. 
There are two major theories which attempt to explain the develop-
ment of interest groups in the governmental policy process. These are 
theories of pluralism and corporatism. Pluralism theory originated in 
America, and was adapted by European social scientists to analyse 
interest group development in Western Europe. A useful definition of 
pluralism is offered by Schmitter: 
... a system of interest representation in which constituent 
units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, 
voluntary, competitive, non-hierachically ordered and self-
determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories 
which are not specifically licensed, recognised, subsidised, 
created, or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or 
interest articulation by the state, and which do not exer-
cise a monopoly of representational activities within their 
respective categories.l · 
This indicates three distinct but interrelated components of the 
relationship of an interest group with the state: firstly the network 
of interest association; secondly their internal organisation; and 
finally, their structural relationship. 2 Wilson expands this definition 
1. P. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" The Review of 
Politics, Vol 36, No.l, January 1974, p.91. 
Schmitter later preferred to use the term 'intermediation' to replace 
'representation' as 'representation' conveyed a distortive impression 
that formal interest associations accurately and faithfully transmit the 
demands and preferences of their members, or worse, are 'representative' 
in some statistical sense. It also implies representation is the 
exclusive or even predominant task of such specialised organisations. 
'Intermediation' emphasises that associations not only may express 
interests of their own, fail to articulate or even know the preferences 
of their members, or play an important role in telling members what their 
interests should be, but also assume, or are forced to acquire private 
governmental functions of resource allocation and social control. 
Representation (or misrepresentation) may only be one of the activities 
of these associations and not even the most important. "Modes of Interest 
Intermediation and Modes of Societal Change in West Europe", in~ Schmitter 
and G.Lehmbruch (ed~:. Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, London, 
Sage Publications, 1979. 
2. It is not clear here what is meant by the 'state'; whether it 
refers to Parliament, government or administration, or all three. 
However from later writings, it appears. that Schmitter intends 'state' to 
include any or all of these components according to which is most 
applicable for a particular regime. 
11. 
to explain that between the interest group and the state, there is a 
well defined boundary. Interest groups are seen as working from outside 
the institution of government to influence the formal actors involved 
in government policy-making. There are no institutional or organic links 
involving interest groups in government 1s formal policy-making process. 
Points of contact between interest groups and government are multiple 
but informal, and voluntary rather than constitutionally mandated. 
The relationships between groups, both across and within sectors, 
are competitive. They will form or mobilise in order to oppose 
politically dominant forces in each sector. No group, or combination 
of groups alone provides input into the policy-making process for 
various issue areas. The government moderates among conflicting demands 
presented by individual interest groups as it determines official policy. 1 
Increasingly however, pluralist theorists have acknowledged that the 
traditional pluralist theory does not adequately explain some interest 
group behaviour, and internal organisation in Western democracies. 
Interest groups have increasingly become involved in institutionalised 
consultation with government. To help explain these developments, 
pluralist theorists have preferred to adapt the traditional pluralist 
model, rather than,look for solutions in an alternative theory. 
One pluralist theorist, Almond, claims that pluralism theory can 
include a disaggregated competitive variety at one extreme, and a state 
controlled variety at the other extreme. 2 Other writers, however, 
including Schmitter, explain the relationship between interest groups 
and the government in Western industrial democracies as an adaptation 
of corporatism theory, traditionally associated with both fascist and 
socialist regimes. 
1. Frank Wilson, 11Alternative Models of Interest Intermediation -
the Case of France 11 , British Journal of Political Science, April 1984, 
pp.176-177. 
2. Gabriel Almond, 11 Corporatism, Pluralism, and Professional Memory 11 , 
World Politics, Vol 35, January 1983, p.251. 
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Schmitter defines corporatism as a system of interest representation 
which is the polar opposite of pluralism: 
... a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number 
of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierachically 
ordered, and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state 
and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of 1 leaders, and articulation of demands and supports. 
In contrast with pluralism, the boundary between the interest group 
and government is unclear, or even non-existent. Interest groups are 
involved directly and formally in the policy-making process through 
government institutions designed to provide direct representation of 
interest groups. In this way there are more formal institutional links. 
Within a sector, the number of interest groups is limited to 
usually a single group representing each category of interests. Compe-
titian of groups within a sector is minimal because of the representa-
tional monopoly created by government or by arrangement among interest 
groups themselves. Although Schmitter does not extend his theory to 
include the relationship between sectors, a number of writers argue that 
competition between sectors is also discouraged in favour of elite 
negotiation and accommodation. Elites recognise their dependence and 
work together to accommodate each other's needs. Grassroots membership 
of groups is compulsory because of either social pressure or the need 
to belong in order to obtain social security, unemployment, and insurance 
benefits. 2 
While Schmitter defines the theories of pluralism and corporatism as 
concrete ideals and polar opposites, in reality there may be tendencies 
1. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" op.cit. p.93. 
2. F. Wilson (1984), op.cit. p.178. 
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of either pluralism or corporatism evident in any democracy. Secondly, 
most Western industrial democracies have co-existing elements of both 
pluralism and corporatism. Thirdly, there may be different degrees of 
corporatism, both between nations, and between different sectors within 
a nation. 
4. The Development of Corporatism 
Schmitter confines his definition of corporatism to a political 
subsystem which is not necessarily influenced by the wider development 
of economic and social structure. Although other writers make the 
association between the development of corporatism and historical 
materialism (Lehmbructi},political economy (Winkler), structural differ-
entiation (Almond), Schmitter criticises this as political reductionism. 
He claims the assumption that changes in the mode of interest representa-
tion are primarily the product or reflection of prior and independent 
changes in economic and social structure - 'ignores the importance of 
emergent organisational and political processes'. 1 It follows that 
elements of corporatism may be found in several different regimes. 
Along with most other corporatism theorists, Schmitter does draw 
a distinction between the nature of corporatism found in Western 
industrial democracies, and the state imposed corporatism found in 
fascist and socialist regimes. Schmitter distinguishes between 
'societal corporatism' which emerged 'from below' in more or less 
spontaneous response to prior changes within civil society and the 
associational sphere itself, and 'state corporatism' which is imposed 
'from above' as a matter of deliberate public policy contrived and 
controlled by pre-existing authority groups. 2 Comparable terms for 
1. Schrnitter, 11 Modes of Interest Intermediation 11 , op.cit. p.91.. 
2. Ibid, p.66. 
'societal corporatism' used by other theorists include liberal 
corporatism, quasi-corporatism, and neo-corporatism. 
Despite Schmitter1s reluctance to make an association between the 
development of corporatism and the theories of the development of 
society, he does associate societal corporatism with post liberal 
advanced capitalistic welfare state: 
... the more the modern state comes to serve as 
the indispensable and authoritative guarantor 
of capitalism by expanding its regulative and 
integrative tasks, the more it finds that it 
needs the professional expertise, specialised 
information, prior aggregation of opinion, 
contractual capability, deferred participatory 
legitimacy which only singular, hierachically 
ordered, consensus led monopoly can provide. 
To obtain these the state will agree to devolve 
upon, or share with those associations much of 
its newly acquired decisional authority, subject 
as Keynes noted 'in the last resort to the 
sovreignty of democracy expressed through 
Parliament' .1 
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Panitch also argues that tendencies towards corporatist activities in 
liberal democratic societies, accelerated in the late 1930s during World 
War II, and particularly post war period: 
... associated with increased state involvement in 
managing the advanced capitalist economy, and have 
centred on the integration of central trade union 
and business organisations in national economic 2 planning and incomes policy programmes and bodies. 
Corporatist theorist Lehmbruch claims that the corporatist element in 
'liberal societie~ develops as a result of: 
... the replacement of classical liberal capitalism 
with 'organised capitalism' and a growing 1 politici-
zation1 of the market by the transformation of 
competitive economies through the social power of 
oligopolistic forms and orga_nised interest representa-
tives; the traumatic experience of the economic crisis 
in 1929, with its subsequent disastrous consequences 
for political stability in the liberal democracy. 
Due to this experience, economic policy was subject 
1. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism? 11 , op.cit. p.111. 
2. Leo Panitch, 11 The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies 11 , in P. Schmitter and G, Lehmbruch (ed), Trends Toward Corporatist 
Intermediation, London, Sage Publications, 1979, p.121. 
to the political imperative that full employment, 
monetary stabilisation and balance of payments 
and increasingly economic growth ... should be 1 guaranteed and maintained in a balanced condition ... 
Beer specifically identifies the origins of 'quasi-corporatism' 
in Britain with the development of producer/marketing boards in the 
early 20th century: 
The establishment of producer/marketing boards post 
WWII, which brought government and producer groups 
into intimate and continuous relationship in 
farming, applying and legitimising state2policies 
could be defined as 'quasi corporatist'. 
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In the relationship between the producer groups and government, neither 
the business pressure groups dictated to government, nor government 
agencies planned the activities of business, but rather decisions were 
made in the process of bargaining and negotiation. After World War II, 
Beer observed the increasing 'syndicalist' power of groups in relation 
to government, as the government became more involved in the management 
of the economy and therefore needed the cooperation of these groups: 
As modern society became more interdependent,government 
was confronted with a new kind of power. Within this 
interdependent network, a group controlling a sp~ci~lised 
function could paralyze the whole of society by a with-
drawal of its activities.3 
Beer noted that the formation of the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC) in ,1962 was potentially a big step forward for the 
corporatist trend as it was organised on a collectivist tripartite 
basis with representatives from government, trade unions and both 
public and private industry. 4 
1. G.Lehmbruch, 11 Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and 
the New Corpora ti sm 11 in Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, 
op.cit. p.54. 
2. L. Panitch, 11 The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies 11 , op.cit. p.121. 
3. Samuel Beer, Britain Against Itself, London, Faber and Faber, 
1982, p.64. 
4. Ibid, p.64. 
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5. The Future of Societal Corporatism 
Referring specifically to Britain, Beer claims that despite his 
prediction of the 'coming of the corporate state' with the formation of 
the NEDC, the prevalence of pluralism has prevented any effective 
'collective' policy system to develop. Beer now predicts that in the 
future, 'syndicalism will be dominated by pluralism. The producers 
which exerci.sed syndicalist power are a vast array of farmers united 
only in weak formal groupings' . 1 
Schmitter also acknowledges that neo-corporatist arrangements or 
societal cornoratism, face potential contraditions which menace their 
persistence. Nevertheless he adds, this is common to all systems which 
represent and accommodate interests, and does not necessarily signal an 
end to societal corporatism in the future. Schmitter emphasises that 
societal or liberal corporatism is very weakly legitimated by the 
political cultures in which it is embedded in Western Europe and 
especially North America: 
Its restrictions on entry of newcomers into the 
political process and on choice between alter-
native, competing forms of expression, violate 
some deeply held traditional norms of democratic 
conduct. Its elements of hierachy and compulsion 
are patently illiberal. Its emphasis on collective 
solidarity, professionalized representation, passive 
membership, vicarious satisfaction and proportional 
inequality, hardly coincides with the civic ideal of 
an active, individualistic citizenry, and publicly 
accountable institutions and practices lack the 
socialized normative support and explicit ideoldgical 
justification that can be crucial to the persistence 
1. Samuel Beer, Britain Against Itself, London, Faber and Faber, 
1982, p.75. 
It must be added that Beer's discussion incorporates the future develop~ 
ment of corporatism generally across a number of sectors in Britain. 
While this will obviously affect corporatist development within specific 
sectors, there may still be elements of corporatism present, independent 
of the overall corporatist trend. While reference will be made to the 
general development of corporatism in New Zealand, the focus will be on 
the corporatist elements within the meat industry. 
of political arrangements when performance declines, 
indirect consequences emerge or anticipated rewards 
fail to materialize.I 
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Schmitter anticipates that as well as the impetus for possible 
change coming from resistances .and defections from within civil society, 
they may also come from within the 'political realm': 
Might the civil servants not find that devolution of 
authority to nee-corporatist intermediaries and their 
institutionalized presence in state agencies could 
deprive them of their historical status of authorita-
tive decision makers and caretakers of the general 
public interest .... ·Likewise ~ight not they 
(professional politicians) resist the progressive 
short-circuiting and by-passing of party channels, 
territorial constituencies, and legislative 
processes, 2that, after all, constitute their reason for being. 
Schmitter's definition of corporatism will provide the framework 
to examine the development of the Meat Board as a corporate interest 
group and the implications of this relationship for the Board's 
accountability to producers. Schmitter provides a useful distinction 
between the relationship of the corporate interest group and government, 
and the resulting implications for both the corporate interest group's 
relationship with other interest groups and its own members. 
Following this framework, chapter two will examine the evolving 
structural relationship of government and the Meat Board as a corporate 
interest group. Chapter three will ~xamine the network of interest 
associations within the meat industry sector, between the Meat Board as 
the corporate interest group and another major interes.t group: meat 
processors and exporters. Chapter four will examine the relationship 
of the Meat B~ard as a corporate interest group and its constituents, 
meat producers, through the formal means of accountability, the Electoral 
1. P, Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Nee-Corporatism 
Has Gone, and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May be Going", in 
P. Schmitter and G.Lehmbruch Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, London, 
Sage Publications, 1982, p.266. 
2. Ibid, p.274. 
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College. Chapter five will provide a conclusion, suggesting the imminent 
breakdown of the corporatist trend within the meat industry and 
agriculture generally worldwide. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEAT BOARD 
AS A CORPORATE INTEREST GROUP AND GOVERNMENT 
19. 
In the previous chapter it was established that the Meat Board was 
intended to have primary responsibility to farmers therefore it bears 
greater resemblance to an interest group than a public corporation or 
government agency. Nevertheless, the Meat Board is a 'special' interest 
group with corporate tendencies of a close and continuing relationship 
with government. This chapter will examine more closely the evolving 
structural relationship between the government and the Meat Board as a 
corporate interest group. 
1. Theory: Societal Corporatism and the Relationship Between 
Government and Interest Groups 
Most corporatist theorists agree that there is a distinction between 
elements of corporatism found in Western democracies and those found in 
fascist or socialist states, based on the relative dominance of either 
government or groups. It is clear that societal corporatism found in 
Western democracies is a group dominated relationship as opposed to a 
government-controlled relationship in fascist and socialist states. 
However, although societal corporatism implies a less dominant role for 
the state than state corporatism, there is a variety of views on exactly 
what this is. These views range from a passive role, implementing group 
demands (Mulgan), to actively placing demands on the corporate group's 
leadership selection and articulation of demands and supports in return 
for the granting of a monopoly representational status for the group 
(Schmitter). 
Mulgan sees yorporatism as 1 a form of government in which power 
lies with organised interest groups rather than elected political 
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leaders or public servant~. 1 According to Mulgan's definition, corporate 
interest groups not only have greater representational monopoly powers, 
but they are also endowed with governmental policy-making powers: 
Public policy is decided by officially recognised groups or 
public 'corporations', each of which is allowed a monopoly 
of authority within its own sector. Discussions on matters 
which concern more than one interest are made by negotiations 
between the groups concerned ... The state, that is the 
central political organ of government, confers authority on 
sectoral organisations by recognising them as the sole 
legitimate representatives of their respective interests. It 
provides a focus for their negotiations and enforces the 
decisions which they reach.2 
Mulgan argues that the government is largely passive, as it 'does not 
otherwise attempt to interfere in the internal decision-making of interest 
3 groups, nor impose its own views on agreements made between groups'. 
Lehmbruch also argues that 'liberal corporatism' implies that groups 
have sufficient power to form public policy. He claims that while early 
corporatist tendencies may have been designed to protect interests, recent 
liberal corporatism signified an extension of these powers to include 
policy-making between sectors. Corporatism is: 
.... more than peculiar pattern of articulation of interests. 
Rather it is an institutionalised pattern of policy-
formation in which large interest organisations cooperate 
with each other and with public authorities not only in 
the articulation (or even intermediation) of interests 
but - in its developed forms - in the 'authoritative 
allocation of 'values' and in the implementation of such 
policies.4 
He adds that liberal corporatism should not be confounded with simply 
more consultation and cooperation of government with organised interest 
groups which is, of course, common in all constitutional democracies 
with a highly developed capitalist economy. 'The distinguishing trait of 
1. Richard Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, Auckland, 
Oxford University Press, 1984, p.91. 
2. Ibid, p.92. 
3. Ibid, p.92. 
4. G,Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", in 
P. Schmitter and G.Lehmbruch (ed) Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, 
London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1979, p.150. 
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liberal corporatism is a high degree of collaboration among these groups 
themselves in the shaping of economic policy'. 1 
By contrast, Cawson and Schmitter emphasise that·even within liberal 
or societal corporatism, the state is not a passive recipient of groups' 
demands, rather it places demands on those groups which are granted 
favoured representational monopoly status within their particular sector. 
Cawson sees the relationship between government and interest groups in 
industrial democracies as 'power dependent': 
Both interest groups and the state enjoy some measure of 
autonomy, although within a set of constraints. The 
relationship between corporatist associations and the 
state within liberal or 'societal corporatism' comprises 
a process of political exchange whereby bargains are 
struck, in which favourable state policies are traded 
for compliance and enforcement of those policies by the 
association. It is not a relationship in which the 
state directs the interest organisations (state 
corporatism), or one in which the state agencies are 
captured by private interests. It implies the state is 
sufficiently powerful to be able to bargain in a 
situation where its parties know the alternative to 
reaching agreement may be coercive compliance or legal-
bureaucratic direction. But the state is not powerful 
enough, or has sufficient specialised knowledge to 
formulate and implement policy without the agreement of 
the parties.2 
Schmitter (whose theoretical framework is used in this thesis) 
also suggests there is a greater balance in power between the interest 
group and state: 
.. ;interest groups are recognised· or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate mono-
poly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their selection ~f 
a leader and articulation of demands and supports. 
1. G,Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", in 
~ Schmitter and GPLehmbruch (ed) Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, 
London, Sage Publications, 1979, p.150. 
2. A. Cawson "Introduction" in A. Cawson (ed), Organised Interests 
& the State - Studies in Meso Corporatism, London, Sage Publications Ltd, 
19 85, p. 7. 
3. P. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", The Review of 
Politics, Vol.36, January 1974, No.1, p.91. 
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Schmitter limits the degree to which the state recognises interest groups 
in corporatism to a representational monopoly within a particular sector, 
rather than public policy-making and implementation which takes place 
between various sectors, and which he defines as 'concertation'. He 
does acknowledge however that 'one obvious hypothesis is that a structur-
al compatibility or elective affinity exists between corporatism and 
concertation .. •1 Schmitter's definition is useful for this thesis as it 
specifically provides an analysis of the relationship of a privileged 
interest group with monopoly representational powers within a particular 
sector, and government, rather than examining the wider public policy-
making powers of a number of corporate interest groups across different 
sectors. 
To analyse the way in which the Meat Board has evolved over time 
as a corporate interest group, a distinction will be made between the 
period from the Board's formation in 1922, through to the end of World 
War II, and the period post WWII until 1985. The Board's powers will 
be examined as well as the formal and informal provisions for government 
to check the Board; both in its controls on the selection of the group 
leaders, and articulation of demands and supports. Finally, a tomparison 
of various government attitudes toward the Meat Board as a corporate 
interest group will be made. 
2. 1922 - 1945 
(i) Board Powers 
As shown in the last chapter, the Meat Board was set up in 1922 
by the Reform government at farmers' request. Although the government 
was clearly involved, it had a 'background' role typical of societal 
1. P. Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism 
Has Gone, and Where the Praxis of Corporatism may be Going" in G.Lehmbruch 
and P.Schmitter (ed), Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making, London, Sage 
Publications, 1982, p.264. 
corporatist development, providing statutory backing to farmers' 
initiative. 
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The Board was endowed with wide powers of control over the whole 
meat industry. As Chapman said: 'The Meat Producers Board was legally 
equipped with semi-governmental powers within its own sector of the 
economy'. 1 However despite considerable powers to engage in such 
marketing activities as the sale of export meat or to direct the sale 
of export meat, the Board chose not to become involved in marketing. 
This was despite the fact that the first chairman of the Meat Board, 
Mr David Jones, was a strong advocate of Prime Minister Massey's proposed 
compulsory pool idea and the general policy approved at one of the first 
meetings of the Board in April 1922 was 'to control the whole of the 
export meat of the Dominion so that it may yield the highest net return 
to the producer'. However the policy went on to state: 
t:xperience··maymodify our plans. If prices are maintained 
at such a high level, that, in the opinion of the Board 
such action would not be warranted, we may, and probably 
would be able to give sound reasons why we should not 
interfere, but we, as a Board, do keep steadfastly before 
us, the fact that control of the meat of the Dominion is 
our job.2 
Experience did modify the Board's plans and was likely to have been 
influenced by the ~trong opposition to the Board's compulsory marketing 
powers from some. prominent farming men (as mentioned in chapter 1), and 
meat processor/exporters. The sale of meat was initially left in the 
hands of the meat companies and the Board concerned itself with the 
establishment and supervision of grading standards for export meat, 
negotiation of freight rates and terms of contract for the carriage of 
export meat - performing that activity termed 'regulation of shipments', 
1. R.Chapman, The Political Scene 1919-1931, Auckland, Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1969, p.13. 
2. Dai Hayward, Golden Jubilee, New Zealand Meat Producers Board, 
Wellington, Universal Printers Ltd, 1977, p.39. 
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maintaining a watchdog attitude towards costs entering into the slaughter 
and export of meat, and conducting advertising and similar promotional 
activities in the UK. 1 
The Meat Act 1939, further extended the Board's powers giving it 
considerable influence over the granting of licences for new meat works, 
or permission to extend or alter existing works. Although the Act allowed 
the Minister of Agriculture to make the final decisions, this was 'on the 
recommendation of the Meat Producers Board'. In practice, it appears the 
minister was powerless to take any action contrary to the Meat Board's 
recommendations. The extent of the Meat Board's power in this area of 
meat works licensing independent of government was clearly illustrated 
in the Board's refusal to grant a licence for a new export meat slaughter-
house in Southland from 1938 to 1951. The Board's decision was shown to 
be final, despite the obvious disapproval of Labour and National govern-
ment· ministers, and various reports, eg Scott Matheson report in 1938, 
and Royal Commission of Inquiry into the needs of meat producers in 
Southland in 1951, which supported a new works. 
The issue arose as a majority of Southland farmers were dissatisfied 
with the prices they were receiving from the existing freezing works in 
Southland. They bJamed the lack of competition and therefore applied to 
establish their own freezing company and works. The farmers were willing 
either to form a works esta~lished by a farmer cooperative company or by 
a proprietary company with capital provided by farmers on a 50:50 basis. 2 
In 1946, the Meat Board was emphatic that a farmer owned works with 
limited 1 financial resources would find it difficult to compete with 
existing companies, so the Board suggested they should take on a strong 
partner, someone established in the industry with practical know-how of 
1. M.Veeman, Marketing Boards in New Zealand, Berkely, University 
of California, 1972 (Thesis PhD), p.265. 
2. Clive Lind, A Cut Above, Southland, Alliance Freezing Company 
(Southland Ltd) 1985, p.34. 
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both the operations of the works and disposal, and selling outlets for 
meat and important by-products of sheep and cattle. 1 On 28 August, the 
Board passed a resolution: 
1his Board is prepared to support an application for a 
new licence by applicants approved by the Board when 
materials are available for building, and if, at that 
time, pro2ucers are still of the opinion it is 
required. 
As a result, the 2,200 Southland farmers formed the Southland 
Sheepfarmers Company Ltd, in 1947, and agreed to legal partnership with 
the British owned W&R Fletchers (NZ) Ltd in erecting and operating a new 
meat works near Invercargill. The Southland Sheepfarmers Company Ltd 
and Fletchers formed the Alliance Company, each partner holding one share, 
the farmers and Fletchers having equal shareholding and a farmer chairman 
without a casting vote. The Meat Board refused to grant a licence in 
1947 for reasons which were only disclosed through a parliamentary 
inquiry; it was against overseas ownership or control of freezing works 
in New Zealand. 
Despite his obvious dissatisfaction with the Board's decision, the 
then Minister of Agriculture, Hon Edward Cullen, was not prepared to 
confront the Meat Board. Without a favourable recommendation he could 
not act, nor was h,e prepared to change the legislation to take more 
power upon himself. 3 However it was quite clear the minister was unhappy 
with the Board's handling of the affair: 
It took a hearing of a Parliamentary Committee to ascertain 
the reasons why the Board did not recommend the granting of 
a licence. The Board should have taken me into its confi-
dence. The Minister should not be subservient to the 
Board and I make this point in fairness to the Board. In 
all my dealings with the Board I have always been 
courteously treated but I feel in this respect, the words 
1. Clive Lind, A Cut Above, Southland, Alliance Freezing Company 
(Southland Ltd) 1985, p.35. 
2. "The Meat Board and the Southland Farmers: A Demand for 
Elementary Justice", New Zealand Economist and Taxpayer, Nov 26 1953, p.172. 
3. Lind, 1985, 6~.cit, p.44. 
in the Act 'may on the recommendation of the Meat Producers 
Board' were n~t meant to be applied in the manner adopted 
by the Board. 
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Cullen did however talk to the Meat Board after visiting Southland him-
self and receiving favourable reports on the potential ther~ but to no 
avail. 
At that time the National opposition leader, Sidney Holland, gave 
Southland farmers his word that if he became prime minister, he would 
set up a commission of inquiry into the establishment of an additional 
freezing works in Southland, the finding of which would be final. 
This inquiry which was duly carried out when National came to power 
in 1949, determined that an additional slaughterhouse in Southland was 
'not only justified, but a necessity' .2 However the law still required 
a licence for a new export slaughterhouse to be approved by the Minister 
of Agriculture on the recommendation of the Board. Far from issuing its 
approval, the Board attempted to establish a competing Southland Farmers 
Company which it subsidised. The government 'weakly' agreed on the 
condition that a broad cross section of farmers in Southland subscribed 
$2,000 within four months, later extended to eight months when it was 
3 
apparent the Board was finding it difficult to secure support. 
When it failed to meet even this extended deadline, the Board pro-
posed to hold a meeting for all interested Southland companies and 
organisations to reach a compromise suitable for all parties. Southland 
Federated Farmers refused to agree to this proposal, and at this stage. 
Holyoake told the Meat Board to reconsider the Alliance claim as it was 
now a matter of urgency. The Board however did not even consider the 
proposal in a full Board meeting. 4 Although Cabinet was dissatisfied 
1. "The Meat Board and the Southland Farmers ... 11 op.cit. 1953, 
p.174. 
2. lb.lil, p.175. 
3. Ibid, p.177. 
4. Lind, op.cit. p.68. 
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with the attitude and decision of the Board it seemed powerless to take 
action. As one commentator said: •once more the tail wagged its 
master•. 1 
Cabinet suggested Holyoake call a caucus meeting to measure support 
for a revision of the Act to allow the Minister of Agriculture to make 
the decision of approval for a meat export slaughterhouse licence, after 
consultation with the Meat Board. However at a full caucus meeting a 
majority decided not to oppose the Board 1 s recommendation. 2 
Finally a year later, while the Board would not agree to the 
Alliance/Fletcher partnership, it offered to form a cooperative partner-
ship with the Southland farmers, still to be called the Alliance Company, 
and farmers agreed. However while farmers eventually received a new 
works, the Meat Board still came out on top in bringing Southland farmers 
around to its thinking, rather than giving in to a combination of farmer 
and government pressure. 
(ii) Government Controls: Formal and Informal 
While the provision for formal government control over producer 
boards\lar.ies,,the Meat Board has been subject to very few formal controls. 
One of the main provisions has been government representation on the 
Board which is intended to enable the minister to keep an eye on the 
Board 1 s activities. In practice however, government appointees have been 
ineffective in this role; 
Generally the selected representatives are men with similar 
background to those representatives chosen from the industry 
i.tseJf:_ Governments did not put experts on the Board, 3 therefore did not take advantage of the formal measures. 
1. 11 The Meat Board and the Southland Farmers ... 11 , op.cit. p.179. 
2. Lind, op.cit. p.68. 
3. J. Biggs, Corporatised Pressure Groups in the Welfare State, 
Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington, 1966, p.71 (Thesis: MA, 
Political Science). 
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The first government nominee to the Meat Board in 1922, and chair-
man, David Jones, was a farmer, as were many government appointees to 
follow. This provoked considerable public criticism at the time. The 
editorial in "The New Zealand Farmeru; in ·1922 stated: 
I thought government would have added expert business 
talent and expertise to the constitution of the Board, 
and at the same1 time a111member who could represent the general public. 
A number of government representatives, after completing their 
governmentally appointed membership, were subsequently re-elected by 
producers as their elected representatives, which suggests one of the 
main criteria for their initial selection as government representatives 
was their acceptance to producers. 
Government representatives have also had little influence on the 
marketing boards in Australia and th~ UK. Campbell observ~~ tbAt in 
Australia: 
Despite the presence of government representatives on the 
Board, there is a marked reluctance on the part of the 
responsible Minister to interfere in their operations. 
At times, far from intervening, the Commonwealth govern-
ments virtually passed on to the Boards their licensing 
powers, and on occasions have given them authority t~ 
negotiate commodity agreements with other countries. 
Similarly in the UK, government appointees stress they are not there 
to threaten the Board's independence, and Giddings confirms this is the 
. t. 3 case 1n prac ice. 
1. Edi tori a 1, 11 A Few Comments on the Meat Export Contra 1 Act 11 , The 
New Zealand Farmer, April 1922, p.437. 
2. Keith Campbell, Agricultural Marketing and Prices, Cheshire, 
Cheshire Publishing Pty Ltd, 1973, pp.98-99. 
3. Dr Phillip Giddings, Marketing Boards and Ministers, Farnborough, 
Saxon House, 1974, p.56. 
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Formally there was very little provision for government to influence 
the Board's policy decisions. 1 There has always been an inherent pressure 
regarding Parliament's position to change legislation vis a vis the boards 
if it deemed necessary. However despite the fact that governments have 
argued that they may suspend legislation or completely write boards off 
the books, from an historical context, the boards quickly became so 
firmly entrenched in the economy, this was not an effective means of 
control. 2 
The Board was also required to submit an annual report, subject to 
questioning and debate in Parliament, however Parliament has exhibited 
a distinct lack of deep inquiry into the functions of the boards; it 
is not prepared to exercise more than a watchful eye over their 
t . 3 opera 1 ons. 
In the area of financial control, the Board was required to have 
an annual audit conducted by the controller and auditor general to 
ensure that activities were conducted in the proper manner accorded by 
the Act or regulations. The controller and auditor general reports to 
Parliament, however there was no specific provis)on giving Parliament 
power to censure the boards. Formally and in practice then, it is 
clear the Board was intended to have a minimum of interference from 
government. 
(iii) A Comparison of Reform/Liberal Government Attitudes 
Towards the Meat Board 
While the establishment of the Meat Board as a corporate 
interest group is associated with the 1922 Reform government, it is 
1. The Primary Products Marketing Act (1953) allowed the Minister 
of Agriculture the power to issue explicit policy directives to Honey, 
Eggs, Citrus and Dairy Boards. 
2. Biggs, op.cit. p.72. 
3. Ibid, p.72. 
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generally agreed that the decision to set up the Board was more influenced 
by economic circumstances than party philosophy. 1 Farmers were 
experiencing economic hardship through a combination of falling world 
prices and increasing service costs, and called on the government for 
help. 
Producers' political influence at that time was substantial, and as 
Helen Clark noted, no government could afford to ignore producers' 
Politically it would have been foolhardy, if not suicidal 
for any of the political parties to ignore farmers' needs 
(at that time). The farmer was a demanding customer, not 
given to supporting parties with a broader concept of 
national views or those who failed to go along with his 
ever increasing claims on government.2 
A majority of parliamentarians at the time were leading farmers, and 
the electorates were structured in such a way that farmers had greater 
weighting over the urban electorate. 
The Reform government was particularly quick to support producer 
demands, as it was predominantly an agrarian party, and was obli~ed to 
a considerable extent to adopt whatever measures the farmers, and 
especially the North Island small farmers who provided its main backing, 
wanted. Although it has been termed 'conservative', Sinclair argued 
it was not reactionary or conservative, as Europeans understood the 
term. 3 The formation of the producer boards was a compromise form of 
government involvement which required very little financial commitment, 
and gained producer acceptance allowing major decisions in the industry 
to be made by producers. 
1. R.Mascarenhas, Public Enterprise in New Zealand, Wellington, New 
Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1982, p.39. 
2. Helen Clark, The Political Attitudes of the New Zealand 
Countryside·, Auckland, University of Auckland, 1974, p.2. (Thesis, MA, 
Political Studies.) 
3. Keith Sinclair, History of New Zealand, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1961, p.228. 
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The Opposition Liberal Party, while in favour of government assist-
ance for farmers, criticised the Reform government's choice of assistance 
in the form of producer boards. It claimed the boards did not allow 
adequate government control. As one opposition member of the Liberal 
Party said during the Meat Export Control Bill debate in 1922: 
We had been led to believe the proposed plan was a matter 
of state marketing which Labour would have agreed to. But 
it is not that at all ... it is certainly not state 
marketing of meat, neither is it state control. It reads 
something like a species of high brow s~ndicalism - it 
certainly does amount to a private profiteering department 
of industry havin~ the whole of the credit of the state 
placed behind it. 
Subsequent political support for producers and their boards was 
offered by Liberal and Coalition governments as there was little doubt 
that producers and the public generally in New Zealand strongly approved 
of the Board and its activities. 2 
Although the initial lack of both Liberal and Reform government 
interference in the running of the Board up until World War II_ may have 
been the result of political expediency, it may also have been because 
the Board chose not to fully exercise its direct marketing powers and 
therefore did not come into conflict with other interests in the industry. 
It may also have been the result of improved prices for meat overseas 
from the time the Board was set up through until 1945, including the 
World War II Bulk Purchase agreement. 3 The Wool Board was said to be 
considerably weaker at that time than the Dairy or Meat Boards and 
subject to considerable government intervention. This was largely due 
to the fact that there were problems with prices in the wool industry. 
1. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), Vo.1.,1~4, 1922, p.332. 
2. Economic Record, Supplement, February 1928, p.155. 
3. Mary Ensor notes the relationship between the degree of freedom 
offered to the boards by government, and the extent to which the board 
exercised control over the ~gricultural industry concerned, as well as 
its degree of competence. Mary Ensor, Wool Marketing Reform, 1967-1972, 
A Cautionary Tale, Christchurch, University of Canterbury, 1975, p.139, 
(Thesis, MA, Political Science). 
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(iv) World War II and the Labour Party 
World War II signalled a deviation from this trend of govern-
ment non-interference in the Meat Board's activities. The New Zealand 
Marketing Department which had been established by the Labour government 
in 1936, and had been the exporting agency for New Zealand dairy produce 
since then, also took over a number of the Meat Board activities at the 
beginning of the war: 
Virtually the only major pre-war activity which the Board 
was able to continue was that of the supervision of 
grading standards at export slaughterhouses. The Board 
did serve as a cons.tllti"flg and advisory body to government 
over the period of continuation of bulk contracts and 1 continued its watch dog function on behalf of producers. 
At the same time the Labour government introduced temporary price 
stabilisation measures with Board support, so that any increases in the 
contract prices paid for meat by UK Ministry of Food, went into an 
emergency reserve account to maintain ewe mutton prices above canning 
prices. A provision was made for the Meat Board and government to 
consult on the use of any surplus in the account at the end of the 
emergency period and the government agreed to assume responsibility for 
any debt. 
In addition the government introduced a rigorous scheme of national 
economic stabilisa~ion in 1942, which hindered the Board's financial 
independence. This scheme involved controls on the meat industry 
intended to hold prices, wages and costs at a constant level. Under this 
scheme, dairy product and meat prices paid to producers were to be main-
tained at the level prevailing at 15 December 1942, and increases in 
producer prices over these levels were only to be allowed on the basis of 
increased production costs. A Meat Stabilisation Account was established 
in addition to the existing Meat Pool Account and any increases in 
contract prices for meat and its by-product following 15 December 1942, 
were paid into this account. 
1. M. Veeman, op.cit. p.269. 
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Under the stabilisation arrangements, many of the major costs of 
production including fertiliser and other farm supplies were held down 
by subsidies charged to the Meat Stabilisation Account, and the Dairy 
Stabilisation Account. There were certain increases in schedule prices 
for heavier grades of certain classes of livestock approved by the 
Economic Stabilisation Committee in the seasons 1943-48. 1 
Although the Board's powers were significantly curtailed by the 
Labour Party policy of state marketing, it was able to retain a greater 
measure of independence than the other boards. The State Marketing 
department had marketed all dairy produce for three years before it also 
took control of meat export marketing. Immediately after the war in 
1947, the Labour government relaxed some of its controls over the Meat 
Board, agreeing that the Board should take over administration and pay-
ments from UK contract sales to the slaughtering and freezing industries, 
and also agreed to the Board acting as adviser to government in periodic 
negotiation of prices and terms of a long term bulk UK contract. 2 
In the initial period then from 1922-1945, the Board's corporatist 
relationship with government was characterised by strong Board representa-
tional monopoly over the industry with considerable independence from 
formal and informaJ government influence. According to Schmitter 1 s 
definition, the Meat Board was recognised or licensed (if not created), 
by the state, and granted a deliberate monopoly within the meat industry, 
but without the need to observe many controls on the selection of leaders 
and articulation of demands and supports. The exception was the period 
during World .War II, when the Labour government's policies CL1rtailed _the 
Board 1 s powers. 
1. M.Veeman, op.cit. pp.274-275. 
2. _Ibid, p.271. 
3. Post World War II (1949-1985) - The National Government and the 
Meat Board Since 1949 
(i) Board Powers 
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The election of a National government in 1949 was the turning 
point for the strengthening of the Meat Board as a corporate ·interest 
group. Whilst the Board's powers over producers and meat companies 
increased,at the same time government increased its informal controls on 
the Board. It must be added that successive National governments have 
had more opportunity to influence the development of the Meat Board as a 
corporate interest group because they dominated this period (with the 
exception of Labour governments in 1957-60, 1972-75, 1984-). 
Officially National governments have supported 'producer control' 
of agricultural sectors through the producer boards. As Mary Ensor said 
in 1975: 
The emergence of producer boards over the past 25 years as 
prominent decision makers may be attributed to National 
government's policy of producer control .1 
National MP since 1982,Ruth Richardson, confirmed this National government 
policy. As a new National caucus member she was told by Muldoon that the 
National government was 'for producer control'. This was to be accepted 
as 'an article of faith' .2 
After World War II, the new National government was quick to return 
to the Meat Board and other producer boards those powers which were taken 
over by the New Zealand Marketing Department during the war. This was 
despite the continuation of the wartime bulk purchase arrangement with 
Britain until 1955. For the last two years of this scheme, the Board was 
authorised to conduct the annual bulk purchase contract price negotiations 
with the UK Ministry of Food. 
1. Ensor, op.cit. p.94. 
2. Interview,National MP Ruth Richardson, 16 August 1986. 
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In regard to the Board's meat export control powers under the 1922 
Meat Export Control Act, although the Board was given powers to control 
exports it was never clear whether this could be int~rpreted as power 
to take ownership. Two amendments were made in 1959 and 1962 which 
specified the Board's powers, allowing it to sell meat only for the 
purpose of 'establishment of markets where no substantial market for 
New Zealand meat existed, and for expanding and maintaining markets in 
such countries'. 1 Then in 1971/72, the Board intervened directly into 
the market, buying and selling lamb itself as the sched~le was so low. 
The 1959/62 amendments to the 1922 Act were overridden by the 1971 
amendment allowing the Board to 'sell meat on any market' . 2 Finally in 
1982 the Meat Board assumed monopoly marketing powers. 
The Board's powers over the processing and exporting sector under 
the Meat Act (1939), were also increased through amendments in 1964. The 
Board was given the power to control the capacity of that industry, 
building new plants, and the entry of firms. As clause 58 stated: 'the 
Minister of Agriculture may not grant permission for an exporter to have 
stock killed or handled in an export slaughterhouse without the consent 
of the Board', and clause 28 stated that 'the Minister has to obtain 
Board approval bef~re licensing a new export meatworks' . 3 A further 
amendment in 1975 gave the Board additional powers to impose various 
conditions on meat export control licences to assist orderly marketing. 
These included limitations on the type of meat and permissable 
destinations. 
The Board's powers over the processing sector however were signifi-
cantly reduced in 1976 when a .rreat industry .authority was established to 
1. L.Woods, "Historical Notes on New Zealand Meat Industry", Lincoln 
College Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, September 1981, 
p.2 (Paper). 
2. Ibid, p.4. 
3. Hayward, op.cit. p.20. 
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take over the minister's function of controlling licences for new and 
expanded slaughtering facilities. 1 This Authority was not required to 
act only on the recommendations of the Meat Board, but was required only 
to seek advice from the Director General of Agriculture. In 1981, the 
meat processing sector was delicensed removing all controls on the 
establishmentof slaughtering facilities. The only criteria now to be 
taken into account by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries when 
issuing licences are whether the applications comply.with the hygiene 
requirements and local authority by-laws. 
(ii) Formal Government Controls 
Until 1983, the formal framework for government control of 
the boards remained limited and mostly ineffective. With one exception, 
the continued appointment of government representatives cl.osely associated 
with the agricultural industry, and favoured by farmers, reinforced the 
earlier analysis that government appointees were not intended to provide 
an effective check on Board. activities. 2 The current Board chairman, 
Adam Begg, and deputy chairman, Norman McRae, were elected as producer 
representatives after an initial period as government appointees, thus 
reinforcing earlier trends. 
As the Board became more involved in marketing, the staff acquired 
increasingly specialised expertise, which made it even more difficult 
for the government appointees to monitor the Board if they themselves 
had no specialised expertise. This was recognised by the Meat Industry 
Task Force in 1983, which recommended that: 
1. Membership included three members to be recommended by the 
minister after consultation with the Meat Board, Freezing Companies 
Association and employees of the meat industry. 
2. The exception was the appointment of Dobbs in 1977, who was 
the chief executive of a well-known advertising and marketing consultancy 
firm. However, the other government representative at the time was a 
farmer, as were subsequent representatives appointed by National 
governments. 
the two government nominees on the Board should be 
selected for their commercial expertise in marketing 
or financial management and be appointed by the 
Miniyter of Agriculture after consultation with the 
MIC. 
Within the timeframe of this thesis, it is not possible to determine 
whether this recommendation will be adopted in practice. 
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In regard to the wider membership of the Board, the National govern-
ment in 1956, increased the producer representatives from five to six, 
and replaced the stock and station agent by a representative of dairy 
producers on the recommendation of the Dairy Board. One instance where 
Parliament exercised formal policy controls was in 1953 when it refused 
to pass legislation introduced by the Meat Board. The Meat Export Control 
Bill was an attempt by the Board to retain the wartime powers conferred 
on it for emergency purposes only, as well as to take control of all or 
any meat for export. 2 Generally however, the National government adopted 
a policy of non-interference in the Board's affairs. As Mascarenhas 
said: 
As quasi non-governmental bodies, they seem to enjoy 
the statutory backing of governmen~ without at the 
same time having to account to it. 
As the past Minister of Agriculture, Duncan Macintyre,said: 
For many years it has been the government's view that 
the primary responsibility for the industry and working 
out strategies rests with the producers engaged in it. 
This after all is one of the main functions uf the Meat 
Producers Board - the government has an obvious role to 
play, but4farmers and their representatives will take the lead. 
1. Report of the Meat Industry Task Force, September 1983. 
2. New Zealand Economist and Taxpayer, Vol .24, No.9, 20 Dec. 1962, 
p.238. 
3. R.Mascarenhas, "Quasi-governmental Bodies in New Zealand 11 , 
1982 (Paper). 
4. Letter from Minister of Agriculture 1983- Duncan Macintyre to 
Southland Federated Farmers, 28 April 1983. 
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(iii) Informal Government Controls 
While formal government controls have in practice had little 
impact on the Board's activities, there have been a number of informal 
government controls on the Board, particularly since the late 1960s. In 
the area of financial control, although the Meat Board is funded primarily 
by a levy on all export meat: and is therefore formally independent of 
government influence, the Board has become informally more financially 
Jependent on government. This change is the result of both government 
and Board initiative through a combination of low market prices and the 
Board's increasing commercial activities. This financial dependence has 
affected Board policy. 
Giddings, referring spetifically to British marketing boards, presents 
some possible implications for any marketing boards which lose their 
financial independence: 
Marketing boards have seen their financial independence 
disappear under the combined pressure of the state of 
the market and the guarantee system. It depends on the 
general market situation combined with the importance 
of the subsidy to the Board and its ability in practice 
to have recourse to other sources of income, like a 
levy. If these factors combine together unfavourably, 
the Board's freedom will be very limited indeed, even 
in a formal framework in which it has financial 
independence.I 
In 1952/53, the National Party removed the financial directives 
imposed on the Board by the previous Labour government's economic 
stabilisation scheme. The government agreed to pay out to producers 
the full UK contract price for each grade and class of meat exported. 
At this time the Meat Pool Account and Meat Industry Stabilisation 
Account were consolidated to form the Meat Indust~ Reserve Account, 
which at that time had approximately $70 million. The government and 
Board decided that the money would be used to: 
1. Giddings, ~p.cit. p.78. 
. . . cushion_ any lgng t~rn'l downward trend:in \vQrld prices 
in the future, and hence support farmers' incomes at 
a higher level than would be the case while correspon~­
ing adjustment takes place in other prices and costs. 
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The Meat Board claimed as early as 1953, towards the end of the 
bulk purchase scheme that the Meat Industry Reserve funds should be used 
to provide minimum prices for export meat. This was agreed to by govern-
ment and led to the Meat Export Prices Act 1955, and the formation of the 
Meat Export Prices Committee to set minimum prices pre-seasonally. 2 This 
deficiency payment scheme administered by the Board continued unchanged 
until 1976, when the National government introduced an Act which required 
a stabilisation scheme to be introduced alongside the deficiency payment 
scheme. Such a scheme had been first mooted by the Labour government in 
1972-75, but that introduced by the Nati0nal government,contai~ned more 
flexible criteria under which the minimum prices were to be set. A 
trigger price was set, above which levies were imposed, which were then 
used to offset supplements payable when the market price was below the 
minimum price. The reserves were no longer available for supplementation. 3 
In practice the market prices dropped to the extent there was no chance of 
creaming off good prices and instead deficits built up in the reserve 
account. 
The National goverment in 1977 further complicated the Board's 
financial position vis a vis government when it required the Board to 
administer the government's supplementary minimum prices scheme giving 
farmers direct handouts. According to Giddings this can complicate the 
matter in two ways: firstly the returns to the producer from the market, 
which is usually the crucial factor in registered producers' views of the 
Board and the scheme, are as dependent upon government as the Board, even 
1. New Zealand Marketing Department, 29 Annual Report, 1950/51, in 
Veeman, op.cit. p.277. 
2. This committee had equal representation of government/Meat Board 
members. 
3. Woods, op.cit. p.5. 
though the Board is the marketing authority; secondly, although the 
boards are to administer the distribution of government funds to 
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producers, they can, in some cases, use that money for their own purposes 
in the process of the transfer, thereby receiving a form of government 
subsidy themselves. 1 
The Meat Board was careful to separate itself from the government's 
policy of supplementation. Nevertheless there were suggestions that the 
Board was able to take advantage of this subsidy to improve its own 
financial position at times, particularly as it became more directly 
involved in marketing. As the Board became more involved in trading it 
required government backup financial support. In 1972 when the Board 
first intervened in the market, the government offered to pay two thirds 
of any loss incurred. Later the Board was offered overdraft facilities 
with the Reserve Bank with only 1 percent interest payments, to fund 
price supplementation or finance trading deficits. According to Wilson, 
forms of governmental financial subsidies are an indicator of a group's 
2 
corporate status. From this evidence the National government went out 
of its way to offer financial assistance to the Board and indirectly 
producers, which reinforced the corporatist strength of the Board at that 
time. However as the Board built up increasing debt, the government also 
imposed greater informal pressures on the Board. While National govern-
ments have continued to recognise the Board as the central institution 
in the meat industry, reinforcing its representational monopoly, they have 
also requested the Board ~ot to formulate policy which will aggravate 
either a majority of producer or other major groups in the industry. 
As a result the Board has become, as a past chairman of the Board 
noted, 'in a sense a government of the industry, whose policy debates 
1. Giddings, op.cit. p.62. 
2. F, Wilson, "Alternative Models of Interest Intermediation - the 
Case of France", British Journal of Political Science, April 1984, p.17~. 
have paralleled parliamentary decisions'.~ 
Since World War II, the Board has had a much greater 
number of functions and responsibilities. One of the 
more important of the additional functions was the 
additional work devolved upon the Board in maintain-
; ng c-rose:r 1 i a i son than before with other producer 
organisations, eg Federated Farmers, shipping 
companies, 2freezing companies and the Electoral Committee. 
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Board policy as it is presented to government, is often a compromise 
between the interests of producers and other major interests in the 
meat industry, eg meat companies. (This will be examined in more detail 
in chapter three.) 
This informal control was heightened during the 1970s for a number 
of reasons. Commentators claim that the National government became 
increasingly reluctant to support only producer interests in the various 
agricultural sectors. It acknowledged the important function of the 
numerous industries serving the farming industry such as meat companies, 
manufacturers, and social services. This attitude was also becoming 
evident worldwide. In USA it was noted that the power base of farmers 
was being eroded by the large agricultural input producing and marketing 
industries; the non farm producers of chemicals, fertilisers, and owners 
of storage and shipping facilities. 3 
Helen Clark notes that in New Zealand: 
The feeling among farmers all over the country 
was that gov~rnment had ceased to listen to 
their voice. 
1. Sir John Ormond, 11 Self Help in an Export Industry; the Case 
of the New Zealand Meat Board', Columbia Journal of World Business, 
Vol .4, October 1969, p.81. 
2. New Zealand Meat Producers Board (NZMPB), Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, 1957, p.48. 
3. D, Hathaway, 11 The Implications of Changing Political Power on 
Agriculture", in V Rulton et al, Agricultural Policy in an Affluent 
Society, New York, W W Norton and Company Inc, 1969, pp.63-68. 
4. Clark, op.cit. p.6. 
Yere~ claims that the producer boards came to the end of an era with 
the retirement of the three knights: Sir Andrew Linton, Chairman of 
the Dairy Board; Sir John Acland, Chairman of the Wool Board; and 
Sir John Ormond, chairman of the Meat Board~ 
This was the completion of a noticeable lessening of 
political influence of the producer boards which had 
begun at the time of the EEC negotiations when 
government gained the upper hand.1 
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While the National government appeared to be questioning their long-
held belief in 'producer control', this originated primarily in caucus, 
and met with strong opposition from a majority of National cabinet 
ministers, including Prime Minister Muldoon and Minister of Agriculture, 
Duncan Macintyre. 
The question of whether to delicense the processing industry in 
1980/81, showed the National government divided in opinion between the 
cabinet ministers who were mostly 'opposed to any form of delicensing' 
and supported the Meat Board's powers to license the processing industry, 
and a number of caucus members who questioned the philosophy of the 
Board's centralised control powers over the industry. These caucus 
members argued that while the National government supported producer 
control, producers would only benefit if there was an efficient and 
effective processing sector. They argued this could best be achieved 
through competition rather than licensing. 2 
Eventually the caucus was successful in achieving cabinet support 
for delicensing. This support was given on the condition that the 'open 
door' arrangements were retained; This ensured that government would 
still be seen as working in the farmers' interests. This arrangement 
gives farmers the choice of exporting their meat directly after payment 
of slaughtering and freezing charges, rather than selling their animals 
1. Clark, op.cit. p.5. 
2. Intervie~ Ruth Richardson, op.cit. 
to meat exporters on a schedule price basis. 1 Thus in return for 
removing all restrictions on companies setting up freezing works, 
farmers were guaranteed a bargaining position to prevent company 
monopoly. 
The second example of tension within the National government was 
illustrated in 1983, when the Board declared that it wished to assume 
monopoly marketing powers over the industry. While the cabinet was 
ambivalent to this proposal, there was some concern as this implied 
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the Board could cause potential conflict with other major interests in 
the industry. As a compromise, the government maintained the Board 
should secure support for its proposals from a majority of producers, 
meat processors and exporting companies. While not wishing to become 
directly involved, the government provided the framework for this 
compromise agreement to take place through the establishment of a Meat 
Industry Task Force in 1983, with representatives from the conflicting 
sectors in the industry. 
Predictably, the Task Force reinforced the Board 1s recommendations 
to remain as the central element in the meat industry, with the right 
2 to assume monopoly control of meat for export. There were also com-
promises for the meat companies, including the establishment of an industry 
organisation to formulate plans for the industry and advise the Meat Board 
(Meat Industry Council). This outcome however was criticised by some meat 
companies; caucus members, including former cabinet minister and farmer, 
Derek Quigley. 
Quigley questioned the principle of the Board 1 s monopoly powers. He 
criticised the government for failing to provide sufficient long term 
goals through government economic policies: 
1. Veeman, op.cit. p.253. 
2. This was the majority view known as the Task Force Report, 
however there was also a minority report from one member of the Task 
Force, Mr Ian Jenkinson, who disagreed with the recommendation to allow 
the Board to take over monopoly marketing powers. 
Successive governments have delegated politically 
sensitive areas of decision making to organisations 
which have functioned on a reactive basis to a 
series of crises rather than providing innovative 
leadership. As a1result most of the outcomes have been compromises. 
In regard to producer control, Quigley claimed New Zealand was 
unique in the dominant attitude of both farmers and politicians: 
In communist countries, agriculture is largely, if 
not entirely, controlled by the state, and there is 
little, if any, private enterprise. However in 
most of the free world, and especially in USA there 
are few, if any marketing controls other than those 
to do with qualityA grading standards and quaran-
tine arrangements.' 
Quigley questioned how farmers had allowed their leaders to convince 
them that they · have the right to control their f~rm prcid~tt from 
the farm gate to the consumer's table and that intermediaries are 
parasites: 
It could well be argued that this is a day for 
specialisation and that the farmer should be 
encouraged to concentrate on his farm and that 
specialist traders and exporters do have an 3 important role to play in our overall economy. 
He recommended to the Meat Industry Task Force that if the Meat 
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Board was to be involved in marketing, it should have a commercially 
independent meat marketing company formed to operate in competition with 
the existing trade: He also suggested that if however, the Board remained 
as the central marketing authority, then the dominant producer representa-
tion on the Board was not necessarily a recipe for good administration or 
good marketing of a product. He felt Board membership needed to consist 
of a more representative group to take account of the various interests in 
1. 11 The Quigley Marketplace Formula; Government Sets Guidelines 
and Steps Back 11 , National Business Review, 22 August 1983, p.30. 
2. The Press, 11 August 1983, p.12. 
3. Ibid, p.12. 
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the industry ranging from producers to processors, those employed in the 
industry, transport requirements, and as a first priority the needs of 
the market. He claimed serious consideration should be given to the 
formation of a meat industry board. 1 
Doubts regarding the Task Force proposals were also voiced by 
Treasury and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) officials. 
Treasury officials claimed that the Task Force had identified the wrong 
set of problems in the industry. The Task Force claimed a solution had 
to be found to counter market instability, peculiarities in the structure 
of buying markets, the undersupply of market services, weak selling, and 
pool selling. Their answer was centralised control through the Meat 
Board. By contrast Treasury officials claimed many of the problems in 
the meat industry were related to government's support of the Meat 
Board's authority to intervene in price setting and product acquisition, 
as well as wider industry assistance through SMPs and government meat 
inspection service. They claimed that the Board's setting of schedule 
prices, alleged limitation of access to supply, and licensing of exporters 
may have reduced the competition and performance of those already 
established in the market. 
The Treasury report claimed that the market's most important 
feature for ensuring efficient outcomes was the. ability of new firms to 
enter into the industry and outcompete established firms; 
The ability and inclination of the Meat Producers 
Board to license exporters will have reduced the 
threat of competition from new efficient export-
ers, better able2to transfe~ a product to a 
client's tastes. 
The overall effects have been to reduce innovation, market development, 
efficiency and as a consequence, returns to producers. In effect, private 
1. "Meat Industry-Outside View", Food Industry, June 1983, p.16. 
2. Treasury, "Meat Industry Task Force Report: Analysis of Problems 
Facing the Industry", paper. 
initiatives have been 'crowded out' by Meat Board preferences. 
In addition they claimed that forms of price setting which have 
operated in the industry through the former schedule price·, Meat Board 
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acquisition prices and SMP scheme, have almost certainly served to 
adversely affect product decisions and weaken incentives to accentuate 
or supply the 'right' products. In particular consumer preferences have 
been obscured, and signals to farmers distorted by clumsy interests. 
Therefore they questioned the contribution of both Board and government 
intervention in the industry: 
There is good reason to believe that current and past 
interventions have adversely affected the performance 
of the meat industry. We are concerned that the Task 
Force ignored completely these aspects of 'the current 
environment whith seem: to us to have been major con-
tributing1factors to the difficulties in the meat 
industry. 
Much of this Treasury paper was based on the research of both MAF 
officials and Dr Tony Zwart of Lincoln Co'llege• Aarict1ltural 
Economics Research Institute. MAF in its submission to the Task Force 
compared two alternative industry structures: a market with selective 
interventions and a centralised marketing system. It did not promote 
either one of the two proposals, however it warned that while in 
principal a central marketing authority (eg Meat· Board) could operate as 
efficiently as a decentralised market with selective intervention, it is 
difficult to ensure a statutory authority remains efficient and maximises 
't kt t 't' 2 i s mare oppor uni ies. Dr Zwart advised the retention wherever 
possible of competitive elements within the processing and marketing 
sectors of the industry, the establishment of a base price for carcaser·· 
meat, to be set by the Meat Board, and relatively free access by all 
exporters to that meat. Meat processors would then be in an environment 
1. Treasury "Meat Industry Task Force Report: Analysis of Problems 
Facing the Industry", paper 
2. The New Zealand Meat Producer, Vol 11, No.8, Sept. 1983, p.4 
conducive to maximum use of further processing and sophisticated 
marketing techniques. 1 
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As a result of this pressure, the government, while not significantly 
altering the Task Force proposals did indirectly reduce some of the Board's 
monopoly powers in the industry, by giving greater powers of decision-
making to the proposed MIC. As Ruth Richardson commented: 
ln essence the government has opted for a' ha 1f back 
role - we have extracted ~he ball from the scrum 
and passed it to the MIC. 
It was clear then that the government found it difficult to maintain the 
Board's corporate status in the meat industry, as a result of the pressures 
both within and outside of government. Nevertheless it attempted as much 
as possible to allow the meat industry to reach compromise solutions 
without directly intervening itself. 
(iv) The Wider Development of Corporatism in the Agricultural Sector 
While the Meat Board exhibited strong corporatist tendencies of 
a favoured relationship with National governments, this trend was not 
evident to the same degree for other producer boards, nor was there a 
successful industry wide corporatist trend. As Mulgan observed: 'interest 
group activity in New Zealand is not wholly corporatist in nature', 
claiming there is also both private and something inbetween private/ 
corporatist tendencies. 3 The other two major agricultural producer 
boards, the Dairy and Wool boards have both had a history of greater 
intervention in their activities than the Meat Board. 
Societal corporatism on a wider scale was attempted in 1963 when 
the government organised an Agricultural Development Conference, from 
1. A.C.Zwart, 11 Marketing Institutions for New Zealand Sheepmeats 11 , 
Lincoln College Agricultural Economics Research Unit, Sept. 1983, p.iii. 
(Discussion Paper No.71) 
2. Letter from National MP Ruth Richardson to A.C.Zwart, 16 November 
1983. 
3. Mulgan, op.cit. p.92. 
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which developed the Agricultural Production Council in 1964. This council 
included representatives from a full range of farmer groups, producer 
boards, service sectors and government departments. In 1969 however, the 
council became a sector committee of the National Development Conference. 
That council disbanded in 1974 and although the Agricultural Sector 
Council still formally exists, it has never met since 1974, although 
provincial branches still meet. 1 It would seem then that the corporatist 
trend within the agricultural industry has generally been fragmented and 
tenuous, with government adopting widely varying relationships with 
individual producer boards and major farmers' organisations, eg Federated 
Farmers. 
4. The Labour Government and the Threat to the Meat Board 1s Corporate 
Status 
While National governments (formally at least) upheld the Meat 
Board 1 s dominant position in the meat industry, Labour governments have 
more openly questioned the structure and function of the Board. How-
ever despite this questioning, only the most recent 1984 Labour government 
has been willing to take action which may seriously threaten the future of 
the Meat Board as a corporate interest group. 
(i) Formal and Informal Government Controls 
In the area of leadership selection, successive Labour govern-
ments have opposed producer domination of the boards. They have 
differed however in their proposals for board membership. The 1972-75 
Labour government appeared to want to: 
1. J,J, Sheerin, The Role of the Producer Boards in New Zealand - EC 
Negotiations from 1970-1982, Christchurch, University of Canterbury, 1985, 
pp.55-56, (Thesis, MA, Political Science~. 
... . turn farming organisedinta a series of corporations 
(or boards) wherein producers and governments will 
have equal representation ... one thing is for certain 
- farmers will no longer have the final say, for ill 
or good as to the marketing of their product. They 
must share in those powers with government.I 
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In regard to the meat industry, the Labour government in its 1975 mani-
festo pledged to investigate the establishment of a meat marketing 
corporation. However it was not included in the 1981 manifesto. 2 In 
1974, the Labour government took the unprecedented step of appointing a 
government representative to the Meat Board with considerable commercial 
expertise, rather than a farmer politician. Dryden, had considerable 
practical and marketing experience in the meat industry. His marketing 
experience included consultancy work specialising in the Japanese meat 
market. He was also General Manager Marketing of UEB Textiles, and helped 
promote the export of processed farm products for Watties Ltd, and Wright 
Stephens and Co. 
Opposition spokesman for Agriculture in 1983, at the time of the 
Meat Industry Task Force, Colin Moyle, emphasised the need for greater 
industry as well as government input into the meat industry decision-
making. However rather than suggest the Meat Producers Board be trans-
formed into an industry representative board, they proposed a separate 
'modern commercial operation' to assist the Board. This separate 
organisation was to have producer, government and processor 
representatives. 3 
Once in power, the Labour government modified the representational 
nature of the Board by adding a meat workers union representative. 4 
1. David Yerex, 11 Primary Industry in a Labour Mould 11 , New Zealand 
Economist, Vol.134, No.10, Feb. 1973, p.13. 
2: NZPD, Vol.450, 1983, p.455 
3. NZPD, Vol . .450, 1983, p.456". 
4. At the same time two union representatives were added to the MIC. 
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This appointment fully compensated for the previous lack of union 
representation compared with the meat exporters/processors which are 
represented on the MIC, and producers which are represented on both the 
MIC and the Board. It was interesting that the union representative was 
added to both the MIC and the Board, when processors/exporters are 
represented only on the MIC, and it had appeared from earlier comments 
that the government preferred to have a producer dominated board and a 
separate industry organisation. The less controversial appointment of a 
.uofon \representative may have been intended to test producer response and 
to pave the way for further restructuring at a later time. 1 
It was notable that there was very little farmer reaction to this 
appointment. One electoral committee member, Owen Buckingham,observed 
the conflict of interest between the Board's aim to 'obtain the highest 
possible return to the farmer for all meat exported', and the appointment 
of a union representative. 'We did not ask to have a union member here; 
the conflict of interests is too great and we feel we should take the 
2 issue to government'. Nevertheless the majority of electoral committee 
members felt there was benefit to be gained from this appointment in 
improving communication between meat workers and farmers, and did not 
perceive any longer term implications for the erosion of producer control 
of the Board. 
With regard to policy controls, the wide control powers of the Board 
and indeed all prdducer dominated boards have always been openly 
questioned by Labour governments. National M~ Allan Dic~summarised the 
different attitudes of the two parties in 1970: 
The Labour Party believes that the producer boards today 
have too1.much power, and the basis of Labour Party 
policy is for government to decide in matters of market-
ing. Rather National is concerned with cooperation 
between producer boards and farmers - the concept of 
1. Possible restructuring options will be discussed in chapter five. 
2. Sarah Morton, 11 Kennedy 1 s Seat Challenged 11 , Straight Furrow, 
9 April 1986, p.12. 
farmers having the right to market their own product 
with government assistance coming in only by way of 
negotiation with other countries in the matter of 
international trade agreement.1 
One example of the Labour government reducing producer influence 
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over marketing decisions occurred in the wool industry between 19?.2-75. 
The National government in 1970-72 set up a wool corporation with greater 
government/commercial expertise than the producer dominated Wool Board to 
be responsible for marketing. This corporation was to have compulsory 
marketing powers which met with considerable producer resistance. To make 
this proposal more acceptable to producers, it provided that the compulsory 
marketing powers be subject to a producer referendum. By contrast the 
Labour government in 1973, immediately carried an amendment to remove the 
provision for a producer referendum. 
Prime Minister Norman Kirk,argued that the corporation should be able 
to make a decision to assume monopoly control of marketing independent of 
producers, as it was not just the responsibility of woolgrowers, but also 
taxpayers, whose money was used to subsidise the wool industry in bad 
times: 
We accept the importance of the wool industry, but I do 
not believe that having accepte·d the principle of tax-
payer support, or the responsibility of a meat banker 
in a bad season, the taxpayers interests should then be 
completely ignored. It should be a partnership between 
producer and taxpaye2, and not ... a matter simply for 
the owners of sheep. 
This amendment was carried in 1974. 
The advent of the 1984 Labour government quickly established it was 
going to 'give a lead' in the future evolution of the industry's policy. 
The government wanted to 'make things happen to suit them'. The Minister 
of Agriculture,Colin Moyle> said: 
You (as government) can follow one of two policies -
you can let things happen and then react, or you can 
1. NZPD, Vol.365, 1970, p.200 .. 
2 . NZ PD , Vo 1 . 3 9 1 , 19 7 4 , p . 2 G 0 9 . . 
make things happen to suit you. That's the difference 
between the last two ministers of agriculture. We 
have Duncan Maclntyre's well-known statement that it 
seems that meat marketing has changed in recent years 
but he hasn't noticed. But we in the Labour Party 
know what the situation is and we want to act.l 
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This government's policy direction has been to adopt a policy of completely 
neutral assistance within and across all sectors, whether agricultural, 
manufacturing, export or import sectors. As MAF spokesman, Peter Bushnell 
said: 'This means no product is favoured or advantaged. All stand 6r fall 
by their value to the nation or what someone overseas is willing to pay 
for them' .2 This policy is obviously at odds with the corporate theory 
of government favouring a particular group and therefore suggests the 
future decline of the Meat Board as a corporate interest group. This 
development corresponds to Schmitter's prediction that the conditions of 
corporatism may not always be accepted by society, nor indeed by 
politicians who have some of their decision-making powers taken away by 
such bodies. 
Financially, the Labour government removed a number of financial 
supports which had previously reinforced the Board's corporate status. 
Firstly the Supplementary Minimum Prices Scheme was abolished. The 
government also announced in June 1985 that it would remove the Board's 
open-ended overdraft facility with the Reserve Bank at 1 percent interest. 
The Board was required to finance its debts henceforth on fully 
commercial terms with the government acting as 'guarantor of the last 
resort in periods of difficulty with terms and conditions to be determined 
at the time•. 3 As a result, the Meat Export Prices Committee was required 
to set the minimum price so low in relation to the expected market returns 
1. Glenys Christian, "Advice From the Ex-Minister 11 , Straight 
Furrow, 7 September 1983, p.3. 
2. Sarah Morton, 11 Who is Getting the Handouts?" Straight Furrow, 
7 August 1985, p.3. 
3. Sarah Morton, 11 Moves Could Be Risky", Straight Furrow, 10 July 
1985, p.3. 
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that they were virtually inoperable. 1 The overdraft in the Meat Income 
Stabilisation Account was frozen at $495 million, and it is still unknown 
whether the government will write off this debt or future producers will 
carry the responsibility. At the same time, the new MISA No 2 Account 
was set up, and the government clearly stated any further debts from the 
Meat Board trading deficits would be the sole responsibility of producers. 
This obviously made it more difficult for the Board to maintain its 
monopoly marketing powers with the commercial risks involved. Later in 
the year, the government put further nails in the Meat Board's c·offin by 
virtually demanding that the Board withdraw its monopoly marketing powers, 
in practice if not legally. The government announced it wanted to remove 
restrictions on exporter access to overseas markets and to product within 
New Zealand. It also decided to separate the Board's marketing and 
administrative functions as soon as possible. Although this was to take 
place over a three year period, the government placed pressure on the 
Board, both directly with financial and legal threats as well as 
indirectly through the MIC, to remove its monopoly controls immediately. 
(This will be examined in more detail in chapter three.) 
Consequently the Board withdrew from all meat marketing in November 
1985. As the Board chairman, Adam Beg~ told a Meat and Wool Section of 
Federated Farmers just before the Board pulled out of marketing: 
Government interference in the Board's affairs has 
reached such an intolerable level, ~t could not do 
the job legislation demanded of it. 
The seriousness of this action for the future of the Meat Board's powers 
was expressed openly by Begg at a special electoral committee meeting 
to explain the Board's decision: 
1. NZMPB, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1985, p.4. 
2. Sarah Morton, "Meat Board May Pull Out of Pool", Straight 
Furrow, 6 November 1985, p.6. 
The Board is constantly under the threat of losing 
its control powers ... Farmers 1 political influence 
is at an all time low.I 
It seems clear that the future of the Board's powers will be reviewed 
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but in practice the Board has already lost those powers informally under 
this government. 
5. Summary 
Formally, the Meat Board as a corporate interest group has, until 
the advent of the recent Labour government, been given a representational 
monopoly over the meat industry, with little formal interference from 
governments whether National or Labour. Until the Second World War there 
had been little informal interference either, and the Board's power 
resembled Beer's definition of syndicalist group dominated corporatism. 
Since World War II however, National governments have placed increasing 
informal demands on the Board's articulation of support and demands; 
requiring it to negotiate with conflicting interests in the industry in 
the formation of its policy. This was the result of the decline of 
producers' political influence (therefore less need for the government 
to secure producer cooperation), the Board's desire to exercise greater 
monopoly marketing powers over producers and the industry, and the 
increasing political importance of service industries, including certain 
vertically integrated meat companies (which will be examined in more 
detail in chapter three). 
While early Labour governments openly opposed the 'producer control' 
of the meat industry through the Meat Board, it is only the most recent 
Labour government which has been willing to take formal action and seems 
likely to seek legislative reform to remove the Board's present monopoly 
1. C.Bartley, 11 Farmer Political Influence at All Time Low 11 , Straight 
Furrow, 20 November 1985, p.6. 
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powers. It is possible that the National government may have eventually 
made some formal changes to the Board's structure to allow it to be more 
representative of the industry as this attitude was reflected informally 
in their increasing pressure on the Board to compromise with the industry 
in its policy formation. As past chairman of the Meat Board, Sir Charles 
Hilgendor~ questioned in 1984: 
Will any government today for long, leave complete control 
of the acquisition and sale of all lamb in the hands of a 
body not dominated by government - much less 1in the hands of a farmer controlled Meat Producers Board. 
Nevertheless these changes would have been unlikely to be as far reaching 
as this Labour government's impending reforms. As National MP, Howard 
Austin, said: 
... the results may mean changes and reorganisation of 
the various producer boards, but the boards will be 
and must always be under the National government -
farmer oriented. They must also have business 2 
expertise, and perhaps a little more than at present. 
The implications of the corporate interest group's relationship 
with government also affects the Board's relationship to other groups 
within the same sector. The following chapter will examine the Board's 
evolving relationship to another major group within the meat industry: 
meat companies. 
1. 11 Hilgendorf 1 s Views on the Meat Debate 11 , Straight Furrow, 
20 January 1984, p.8. 
2. NZPD, Vol.450, 1983, p.457. 
CHAPTER I I I 
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEAT BOARD 
AS A CORPORATE INTEREST GROUP 
AND ANOTHER MAJOR INTEREST GROUP 
IN THE MEAT INDUSTRY: MEAT COMPANIES 
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In the previous chapter the government's favoured treatment of the 
Meat Board as a corporate interest group was discussed in detail. This 
chapter examines the implications of this for the Board's relationship 
with the other major interest group in the industry; namely meat 
companies. 
1. Theory: Societal Corporatism and the Relationship Between Corporate 
Interest Groups and Other Interest Groups 
Most definitions of corporatism stipulate that the number of interest 
groups in society is limited with a single group representing each cate-
gory of interests. Competition within a sector is unusual because a 
particular group is given representational monopoly by the state or by 
arrangement among interest groups themselves. This contrasts with 
pluralist theory which states that groups are competitive both across and 
within the various sectors of society. 1 
Schmitter defines the relationship between corporate interest groups 
and other interest groups as: 
... a system of interest representation :in which the 
constituent units are; limited, singular ... non 
competitive ... and granted a deliberate representa2 tion monopoly within their respective categories. 
1. Frank Wilson, 11 Alternative Models of Interest Intermediation -
the Case of France", British Journal of Political Science, April 1984, 
pp.176-177. 
2. Phillipe Schmitter, 11 Still the Century of Corporatism?" The 
Review of Politics, Vol.36, No.I, Jan.1974, p.93. 
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Corporatism implies the replacement of competition with cooperation. As 
Pahl and Winkler say: 'This desire for collaborative effort arises from 
a revolution against the perceived wastefulness of competitive structures 
on a~l fronts•. 1 Schmitter makes it clear however, that although there 
is demand. moderation and negotiation, this takes place within a central-
ised hierachy within the sector. 2 The corporate interest group seeks to 
aggregate opinion before formulating policy on behalf of the industry. 
Cawson summarises the relationship as: 'The competitive role of interest 
. 
groups (presumably both within and between sectors) will be replaced by 
an orderly cooperative and stable relationship' . 3 Reginald Harrison goes 
further to suggest that corporate interest groups are: 'consensus-
formation mechanisms - those institutions which bring together differing 
conflicting interests and produce the compromises which define a group's 
interest' . 4 
One aspect of this analysis, however, requires further clarifica-
tion. Corporatist writers refer to the influence of corporate interest 
groups within or between 'sectors' or 'categories', but the precise 
definition of these terms is unclear. In the relationship between the 
Meat Board and meat companies it is uncertain whether or not these 
parties constitute parts of the same sector, namely the meat industry, 
or whether they represent the two narrower sectors of producers and 
processor/exporters. Salisbury explains this problem: 
1. R. E. Pahl and J. T. Winkler, "The Cami ng Corpora ti sm 11 , New 
Society, 10 October 1974, p.72. -
2. P. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Modes of 
Societal Change in Western Europe", in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (ed), 
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, London, Sage Publ.ications, 
1979, p.64. 
3. A~Cawson, "Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Role of the State", 
Government and Opposition, Vol .13, No.2, Spring 1978, p.184. 
4. R.Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism, London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1980, p.13. 
the term sector is most commonly employed to refer to 
major sections of economic self-interest in modern 
industrial society; labor, business and agriculture. 
What is unclear is how many such sectoral or producer 
groups should be designated as sect~rs without 
distorting the meaning of the term. 
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He concludes that the term usually means larger rather than smaller 
sectors of society. From this explanation it seems reasonable to assume 
that the Meat Board and meat companies are part of the broader sector of 
the meat industry. 
2. Structural Relationship ofrthe Meat·Board:,a:nd":Meat Companies 
Before attempting to determine the evolving network of influence 
within the meat industry, it is necessary to understand how the under-
lying structure of the industry influences the relationship between 
producers and meat companies, and between companies themselves. The 
structure of the meat industry has always created a potential conflict 
of interests between the producers and the companies which process and 
export the meat. The meat producing farmer is naturally anxious to get 
the highest possible price from the meat processing and exporting 
companies for this meat, while at the same time hoping that the charges 
for killing and processing can be held down. Freezing companies on the 
other hand must run their organisation at a profit and as the returns 
to the farmer are a cost to the freezing industry, it is obvious that the 
two interdependent halves of the New Zealand meat producing industry look 
at the industry from different viewpoints. 2 
By contrast the dairy industry has a predominantly cooperative 
structure which allows greater coordination and integration between 
1. Robert Salisbury, 11 Why No Corporatism in America 11 , in Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch (ed), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, op.cit. 
p.215. 
2. Dai Ha.vward Golden Jubilee, New Zealand Meat Producers ~roducers ~oard, Weliington, Universal Printers· Ltd, 1977, p.161. 
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producers, their dairy manufacturing coop.era ti ves and Dairy Board 
members. The processing of dairy products is organised in smaller units 
than the meat industry and runs on a cooperative basis with companies 
managed by boards of directors elected from milk suppliers. 1 The 
directors of the dairy companies in turn elect 11 members to the Dairy 
Board on a ward or regional basis. 
Along with the fundamental conflict of interest between meat 
producers and companies, the meat companies are divided in their interests 
between those which process, and those which export meat. The processor 
is the company which owns the meat processing plant (more commonly known 
as the freezing works), and employs the processing staff. This company 
charges the exporter a fee, commonly referred to as killing and processing 
charges. The exporter either buys livestock direct from the producer, or 
from uncommitted stock held in processor's stores. He arranges for the 
processor to process, cut or pack according to the specifications required 
for the customer, and ensures that the product is transported to the 
marketplace. Licensed meat exporters vary in the size of their operations 
from those which sell just a few tonnes each year, to those selling 
50,000 tonnes and more. Some exporters also own processing plants and 
are thus both processors and exporters. 2 
In the meat export trade, there is considerable conflict between 
those exporting companies which own processing p~ants and those which 
do not. This conflict arises from the different economies of seal~. 
Extensive capital investment is required to set up and run a processing 
plant and a buyer must be found for all meat cuts, regardless of whether 
or not they are in demand or profitable. By contrast, exporters are 
able to buy from the processors those cuts for which they know there is 
1. D. Campbell, "Control of Agricultural Marketing in New Zealand", in 
C Moriarty (ed), New Zealand Farm Production and Marketing, Wellington, 
New Zealand Institute of Public Administrati:on, 1963, p.82. 
2. New Zealand Meat Exporters Council (Inc) and New Zealand 
Freezing Companies Association, The New Zealand Meat Export Industry -
A Background, 1982, p.9. 
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a specific market requirement. Processing companies claim exporting 
companies can often afford to sell at a lower price than the processing 
companies because they do not have such high overheads. 1 As a result, 
the large processing companies such as Waitaki New Zealand Refrigerating 
Ltd, have sought for some time to rationalise the industry and 
dramatically reduce the number of licensed exporters, which in 1982 was 
as many as 120. 
The conflict of interests between companies is not only apparent 
between processing and exporting companies, but also between the large 
1 overseas 1 companies operating in New Zealand, and the New Zealand 
owned companies. Finally, conflicts exist between the New Zealand 
owned private, public, and farmer cooperatives. 2 
As there is a wide range of interests between companies, the Board has 
potentially di ffetent rel C:itions.bi pS:-vd th each company, :dependtng:Qn wbether they 
are processorss. exporters·; New..:Zealand:owne.d.or_ove.ts.e_o~s; public, private or 
cooperative. These different relationshirs will be examined in an attempt 
to identify a hierachy of influence in the industry. 
3. 1922 - 1970 
(i) The Meat Board's Relationship with Meat Companies Generally 
As we have seen, the formation of the Meat Board resulted from 
the conflict between the producers and meat companies. The Board, as a 
statutory body with wide legal powers to control the whole of the meat 
export industry, created a hierachy of influence in the industry in 
favour of producers. As an ex Board chairman) Sir John Ormontj,said: 
1. Interview with Waitaki NZR Public Relations Consultant, Glyn 
Clayton, 24 July 1986. 
2. Although referred to as 1 overseas 1 companies, these specifically 
refer to UK owned companies. 
In 1922, a system was created in which the processing 
and exporting companies - public, private and 
cooperative - worked under the overall direction of 
the Meat Board. 1 
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This suggests that the Board was involved in coordinating the industry, 
although it is clear that it was also under pressure to retain some 
competition within the industry. The Board did not exercise its market-
ing powers, thereby avoiding confrontation with the meat companies which 
had earlier opposed the legislation allowing the Board compulsory powers 
over the industry. The first Board chairman, David Jones, emphasised 
the importance of cooperating with the mercantile community, thus 
justifying the inclusion of the stock and station representative on the 
Board. 2 
(ii) A Comparison of the Meat Board's Relationship with 
Individual Meat Companies 
The greatest producer suspicion regarding meat companies was 
initially directed at 'overseas' companies. While it was considered that 
these companies were necessary to provide some competition: 
... an early fear seems to have been that this industry 
might exert monopsonistic pressure on farmers and also 
that if overseas interests were to greatly increase, 
or if any one firm were to greatly enlargen, this 
might not only preclude competition with respect to 
purchases from farmers, but also with respe§t to the 
sale in the UK of New Zealand meat exports. 
The Board was expected to restrict :the level of influence of the over-
seas companies in the industry. 
1. New Zealand Meat Producers Board (NZMPB), Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, 1971, p.6. 
2. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), \lol.I:94, 1922~. 
p.326. This only lasted until 1957 when legislation was changed allowing 
an extra producer representative on the Board and a Dairy Board repre-
sentative to replace the Stock and Station representative. 
3. Michelle Veeman, Marketing Boards in New Zealand: An Economic 
Analysis and Appraisal, Berkely, University of California, 1972, p.286. 
(Thesis, PhD) 
The original Board policy in regard to overseas interests in the 
meat industry was: 
That in the event of any purchase or erection of 
freezing works by overseas interests without the 
approval of the Board, it would take such action 
as would prevent such interests controlling the 
meat going through such freezing works.1 
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In practice however, the Board did not take a hard line against overseas 
interests. This brought considerable criticism from some farmers, 
politicians, and industry commentators. In 1924, the Board was criticised 
for allowing the sale of a farmers' owned meat company in Gisborne to the 
UK company Vesteys which already owned a works in the area. 
One Opposition MP at the time, Mr William Lynsar, went so far as to 
suggest that 'the Meat Board is not being run for the benefits of 
producers, but for the benefits of trusts and combines' .2 He unsuccess-
fully attempted to introduce legislation to keep the overseas companies 
out of New Zealand altogether. While these extreme views were not given 
widespread support, a Commission of Inquiry was set up in 1926 to 
investigate the claims and charges made by Lynsar regarding the conduct 
of the Board. On this occasion the Board's actions were upheld. 3 
It was clear from the outset that the Board had to find a balance 
between being seen to secure producer control of the industry in the 
face of opposing company and mercantile interests, whilst at the same 
time considering the wellbeing of the overseas companies which was· 
important to the national economy. These vertically integrated companies 
had expertise; were powerful, owning freezing works, ships and shops; 
and provided investment in New Zealand. Prime Minister Massey, assessed 
the importance of the big UK company Vesteys in 1924: 
1. NZMPB, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1923, p.9. 
2. NZPD, Vol.205, 1924-, p.512. 
3. NZMPB, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1926, p.3. 
They are a very big firm doing a tremendous business. 
I have heard it repeatedly said in England that they 
have 2,500 shops. There are 4,000 shops, including 
those 2,500 owned by Vesteys and some of the other 
big concerns and we cannot play with those things ... 
There are plenty of consumers in England, but the 
people who 1can reach the consumers are those with the shops. 
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The Board did take some action to prevent the dominance of overseas 
companies. Thus in 1928 it imposed restrictions on the throughput of 
overseas works; firstly in the North Island. Whenever any freezing works 
proposed to make additions or alterations to its works, the Board 
considered whether the increase in potential throughput was acceptable 
before giving its consent. While the output could initially be restricted 
in this way, the introduction of the 1 chain 1 killing system meant there 
was no limit on the number of stock a works could kill; so legislative 
provision was made accordingly in the Slaughtering and Inspection 
Amendment Act 1934. 2 
The British company, Thos Borthwicks and Sons Ltd, had restrictions 
placed on the number of lambs it could kill through its Canterbury works. 
As the Meat Board said: 
It was of the opinion that the number of killings which 
Borthwicks were putting through their Canterbury works 
was becoming a menace to other works in the district, 
and it therefore acted under the provisions of the 
Slaughtering and Inspection Act ... and made a recom-
mendation to the Minister of Agriculture that the 
maximum number of sheep and lambs which may be killed 
at Borthwicks 1 Belfast works should be fixed at what 
was considered to be a fair share of the output of the 
district - namely 620,000 ... This left approximately 3 1,700,000 for the remaining 6 works in the district. 
It was'suggested that this action was taken against Borthwicks on the 
basis of their 1 overseas 1 status: 
1. NZPD, Vol.205, 1924, p.789. 
2. NZMPB, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1935. 
3. Ibid. 
Someone (gifted with a strong imagination) actually 
raised the bogey that Borthwicks might squeeze out 
the New Zealand owned companies and so get complete 
control of the South Island business.! 
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It was pointed out that a ceiling quota was put on B~rthwicks' Belfast 
works only, and not on any of the other works in the Canterbury district: 
It is significant that Borthwicks were the only 
British company operating in the South Island; 
had the row been between different New Zealand 
companies, the government might not have inter-
vened. At any rate there is no record to show 2 they ever put a quota on any New Zealand company. 
This implied prejudice was backed up by the Board's willingness to 
facilitate the development of farmer cooperatives through the provision 
of loans and bank guarantees. 3 With government approval the Board 
extended bank guarantees and loans to two producer cooperative meat 
exporting companies - Producer Meats Ltd (PML), and Primary Producers 
Cooperative Society (PPCS) - as well as to two cooperative meat export 
slaughterhouses - Alliance Freezing Company, and Auckland Farmers 
Freezing Cooperative (AFFCO). 
In practice however, many works were sold to overseas interests. 
Some of these eventually received Board approval after earlier refusal 
4 
and others occurred because the Board did not have the power to refuse. 
It is estimated that up until 1973, a total of 12 works had passed to 
overseas ownership, and at one stage more than 60 percent of the export 
trade was controlled by overseas interests. 5 It appeared that there was 
considerable discrepancy between the Board's policy regarding overseas 
1. Godfrey Harrison, Borthwicks - A Century in the Meat Trade -
1863-1963, London, Hazell Watson and Viney Ltd, 1963, p.130. 
2. Ibid, p.130. 
3. Amendment (1950) to Meat Export Control Act 1922 enabled the 
Board subject to the approval of the Minister of Agriculture to advance 
money or give guarantees to certain societies carrying on any business 
in New Zealand connected with export meat. (See M Veeman, op.cit. 
p.286.) 
4. Dai Hayward, op.cit. p.163. 
5. Ibid. 
companies, and its treatment of them in practice. The 1951 Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into the establishment of an additional freezing 
works in Southland clearly pointed out the extent of this discrepancy: 
The Board's policy of prejudice against any further 
expansion of the enterprise of British owned meat 
export companies in New Zealand by the establish-
ment of new freezing works, seems hard to reconcile 
with the Board's proposal to sponsor the formation 
of a company for the purpose of establishing retail 
meat shops in England for the sale of New Zealand 
meat.I 
The Commission also claimed it was difficult to reconcile the Board's 
policy with its approval of a reconstruction of the Ocean Beach works: 
These works are owned by a New Zealand company, but 
half the sales are owned by an overseas company. 
According to the evidence, this overseas company 
has either bought, or is nego~iating to buy the 
remaining half of the shares. 
Thus in the period from the Board's formation in 1922 through to 
1970, while the Board clearly had powers to control the industry, it 
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encouraged a considerable degree of competition. There was some 
expectation that the Board would take a strong stance against the over-
seas companies in particular, to prevent their monopoly influence in 
New Zealand while favouring the development of cooperatives. While 
there was some evidence of this attitude, it was apparent more through 
rhetoric than action. The importance of the large scale, highly inte-
grated overseas freezing companies to the economy, could not be ignored 
by either government or the Board. 
1. Clive Lind, A Cut Above, Southland, Alliance Freezing Company 
(Southland Ltd) 1985, p.60. 
2. Ibid, p.60. 
4. 1970 - 1985 
(i) The Meat Board's Relationship With Meat Companies Generally 
After 1970, the Meat Board placed greater emphasis on 
coordination in the industry to modify the private enterprise system 
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of competition between companies. The Board began to take greater control 
over export marketing in response to low world prices, and a cor~ 
respondingly unpromising exporter schedule. Although this created 
potential conflict with companies, their cooperation was maintained 
through a series of compromises. 
As the level of consultation between the Board and companies 
increased, the companies formed national representative organisations 
to negotiate with the Board. In 1974, the New Zealand Freezing Companies 
Association (NZFCA) was formed by the amalgamation of the two existing 
North and South Island Associations. This represented the interests of 
the larger companies with processing facilities. In addition the Meat 
Exporters Council (MEC) was formed in 1971 to represent the views of all 
exporters, including the freezing companies, independent exporters and 
marketing cooperatives. Finally, an Independent Exporters Association 
was formed to represent the interests of independent exporters which did 
not always coincide with the majority views on the freezing company 
dominated MEC executive. 1 
By 1980 both the Board and MEC acknowledged that they had achieved 
a much closer union of interest. As chairman of the Meat Board, Adam 
Begg,said: 'It is fair to say, this union has been an effective and 
amicable one' . 2 Similarly the chairman of the MEC in 1979/80, Mr Ron 
Cushen, said: 
1. The MEC executive comprises six freezing company representatives, 
two independent exporter representatives and two marketing cooperative 
representatives. 
2. NZMPB, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980, p.1. 
Nothing gives me more satisfaction than to be able 
to report that relationships between the Council 
and Board have never been better.l 
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While he acknowledged the two groups were not always in total agreement: 
.... the point is thati.therregula-ritywith which 
dialogue between the two organisations occurs 
and the atmosphere of those tasks is such 
that there is always a willingness to resolve 
differences in the best interests of the 
producer and the meat export industry.2 
As an indication of this increasing coordination,.anumber of joint 
councils were formed with representatives from both the Board and MEC. 
These councils covered areas of promotion, grading, shipping and market-
ing. One of the most notable was the Joint Meat Council (JMC) formed 
in 1981 with five members each from the Board and MEC, with an aim of 
providing close coordination in marketing and maximising the returns to 
New Zealand for all meat exports. 3 
The Board and exporters working through the JMC in 1982, tried 
several control measures to stabilise prices in overseas markets, 
particularly in the UK, but the uncertainties in the marketplace intensi-
fied to the extent that both the Board and MEC agreed more decisive action 
was necessary. The Board proposed to take temporary control of all 
export lamb and mutton from October 1982, through to the end of the 1903/84 
season, and this was accepted by the MEC. It seemed ironical that the 
MEC should accept this proposal which, although temporary, could be 
envisaged as an ongoing arrangement which would virtually remove their 
competitive rights to market. It appeared however, that the exporters 
were relieved that the risks in the marketplace were transferred to the 
Board. As MEC chairman, Eric Gammell, commented: 
1. New Zealand Meat Exporters Council (NZMEC), Annual Report, 
1979/80, p.9. 
2. Ibid, p.9. 
3. The New Zealand Meat Export Industry - A Background, op.cit. p.9. 
The decision to hand over ownership was made jointly, 
and while some of the members disagreed, the MEC 
directors on JMC saw no other desirable alternative 
under the circumstanles - then or in the foreseeable 
future at that time. 
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(ii) The Meat Board's Relationship· with Meat:CompanieS InaiVidurilly 
One_of the most striking features of the period from 1970-1985 
was the willingness of both government and the Board to acknowledge 
publicly the importance of vertically integrated companies to the 
economy, and therefore the need to encourage their interest in the meat 
industry. Initially, all vertically integrated companies were overseas-
owned, however by 1985, a majority were New Zealand owned enterprises. 
This admission was likely to have been influenced by the 1974 Commission 
of Inquiry into the meat industry which dispelled many of the myths 
regarding the threat of overseas ownership and control of the slaughtering 
and processing works in New Zealand. The Commission noted that: 
... as was to be expected many submissions favoured 
New Zealand ownership of the existing freezing works, 
but only a small minority advocated overseas 
companies being forced to sell their works to New 
Zealand controlle_d companies.2 
The point was made that at that time, overseas companies controlled or 
had a part in only 29 percent of works; more than two thirds of the 
works were New Zealand owned and controlled. It was recommended that 
overseas-owned companies should not be allowed to expand their operations; 
but no other restrictions on their processing or marketing operations 
were suggested. 3 
Prime Minister Muldoon, on more than one occasion emphasised the 
importance of the giant UK meat companies to the New Zealand meat industry 
1. NZMEC Annual Report, 1982/83, p.2. 
2. Borthwicks Bulletin, July 1974, p.2. 
3. Ibid, p.2. 
and economy generally. Their vertically integrated market system from 
farmer to consumer could 'not be overlooked in terms of its importance 
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to the growth of our trade'. 1 The fact that these companies owned 
hundreds of retail outlets, and were able to influence the British govern-
ment signified their value. 2 Meat Board chairman in 1974, Sir Charles 
Hilgendorf, reiterated these views saying: 
Some of us waste far too much time and thought plotting 
the downfall of the big owerseas-owned companies; 
well they're likely to be very much part of our export 
meat industry for a 1 ong time yet and generally they 
deserve to be _.3 
By comparison the Board appeared·to find it increasingly difficult 
to favour producer cooperatives, despite farmers' acknowledgement of 
their high performance. Thus in 1983 when the Board chose to restrict 
the number of licensees for a particular market, the marketing cooperative 
PPCS was refused a licence. Board chairman,Adam Begg,acknowledged the 
important contribution of PPCS in improving returns to the farmer, but 
justified the Board's decision as having to take account not only of 
producers' interests but also the national interest. 4 In this light, 
clearly the vertically integrated companies were given preference. 
On one occasion however, the smaller independent exporting companies 
successfully pressured the National government in 1981 to delicense 
the meat processing sector, despite considerable opposition from· 
the Meat Board, processing companies and cabinet ministers. The lobbying 
campaign was initiated by Dawn Meats Company, which had tried unsuccess-
fully for many years to secure a licence to build a works at Oringi. 
When they were refused a licence they pursued the possibility of 
persuading government to deli cense the industry. They .approached the 
1. Allan Parkes, 11 New Deal for Borthwicks 11 , in Agribusiness Executive 
Nov. 1981, p.25. 
2. Borthwicks Bulletin, February 1978, p.10. 
3. Allan Parkes, op.cit. p.25. 
4. Minutes of Electoral Committee Meeting, 18 August 1983. 
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Board for support, but while the Board agreed that licensing did restrict 
competition within the industry, it argued that some licensing was 
necessary to retain the 'open door' provisions. As a compromise, the 
Board recommended that modifications be made to the licensing criteria 
to enable new licences to be granted more readily. After this unsatis-
factory response to their proposal Dawn Meats approached Federated Farmers 
which eventually supported their attempts to 1 obby government. They were 
successful in gaining support from John Falloon and the agricultural 
1 
caucus committee who in turn persuaded Cabinet to support the proposal. 
The way in which this issue became an indication of the changing attitude 
among National caucus members to the 'producer control' philosophy was 
examined in chapter two. 
The larger companies such as Waitaki and AFFCO were clearly opposed 
to delicensing. As one industry commentator noted: 
Almost any established industry is in favour of 
licensing which limits competition from other 
companies.2 
The New Zealand Freezing Companies Association claimed: 
I.he overall economic stability of existing licensees 
could be seriously threatened by the changes in the 
legislation at this time.3 
This pressure for greater competition in the meat processing 
industry suggested government's tra-dUionatsupport for 1 producer control' 
through Meat Board control of the industry was under threat. 
1. Phone Interview General Manager Dawn Meats Ltd, John Foster, 
11 February 1986. 
2. A.C,Zwart, An Analysis and Suggested Modifications to the Meat 
Industry Task Force Report, Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics 
Department, 1983, p.4. (Paper) 
3. New Zealand Freezing Companies Association (Inc), (NZFCA), 
~nnual Report (6), p.4. 
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(ii) The Meat Industry Task Force, 1983 
In 1983, the Board claimed that previous attempts at coordina-
tion between the Board and companies had on the whole been unsuccessful. 
As Board chairma~Adam Begg,told the ~lectoral tommittee in July 1983: 
The Board has made every effort to bring the more 
than somewhat disparate elements and factions of 
the industry together to act as a coordinated 
cohesive team. A good many company people have 
assisted us, but the efforts have failed. The 
industry has proved to be as incapable as 
standing together on the marketing front as it 
has on the industrial front.I 
The Board proposed to use its compulsory powers to operate a national 
pool for sheepmeat marketing and thus gain even greater control over 
the meat export industry. However the sequence of events arising from 
this proposal suggested that the Board would eventually be required to 
face greater competition with the companies, thus placing a further 
strain on the Board's corporate status. 
While the National Cabinet was in favour of the Board's proposals, 
there was pressure from some companies, members of caucus, and industry 
advisers, for greater competition in the slaughtering industry. The 
Minister of Agriculture at the time, Duncan Macintyre, therefore set up 
a Meat Industry Task Force to: 
: .. define tne requi rernents for the meat industry to deve 1 op 
and run a global meat marketing strategy to maximise 
returns to the nation and to make recommendations on 
the appropriate industry organisation to achieve 
these requirements, including any legislative changes 
to be made.2 
This Task Force was made up of representatives from a wide range of 
interests in the industry including independent exporters, cooperatives, 
public companies, Federated Farmers, Ministry of Agriculture and 
1. 1Tloa rd Proposes Logi ca 1:-Stra tegy"; -in 1he NZ-Meat Producer, 
Vol.11, No.8, Septemb~r 1983, p.2. 
2. The,_Press, 27 Mav 1983, ~:3. 
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Fisheries, Meat Board and government. Jt appeared that the government 
wanted the Task Force to support the Board's proposals, but also include 
incentives for companies. The decision to appoint the Meat Board chair-
man, Adam Begg, as chairman of the Task Force brought claims that the 
Task Force was merely an 'in house job for the Minister' with the Task 
Force recommendations mirroring Board proposals. 1 
There were two components to the Task Force recommendations. 
Firstly it reinforced the Board's position as the central statutory 
organisation for the meat industry, thus upholding its corporate status. 
It supported the Board's proposals to assume control of all export lamb 
and mutton carcases (ex 'scales') and handle them as a national pool. 
It proposed that existing exporter licences be restricted, and the Board 
act as a primary exporter of carcases and primal cuts, particularly to 
single buyer markets. However, the Task Force also provided a compromise 
for the companies, recommending that licences be available for New 
Zealand exporters wishing to acquire carcases or primal cuts for expo~t 
and product for further processing, where there was special expertise in 
relation to individual markets and their activities were consistent with 
overall marketing plans. This was commonly known as the 'buyback scheme'. 
In addition if there was a dispute between the Board and exporter over 
the issue of licences, the exporter was to have the right to appeal through 
legislatory provision. Failure to agree on a price for licensed exporters 
to purchase the product was to be settled through an agreed arbitrator. 
The Task Force also recommended the number of organisations permitted into 
the UK be reduced to one, namely the Meat Board. 
The second component of the recommendations was the need for a more 
broadly based industry organisation with commercial and marketing 
expertise to be responsible for industry planning and strategy. Thus 
1. Richard Fletcher, 11 Meat Task Force Line-Up: In House Naval 
Gazing? 11 in National Business Review, 13 June 1983, p.30. 
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they proposed the formation of the Meat Industry Council (MIC). As the 
MIC was to exist alongside the Meat Board as the second major industry 
organisation there were speculations as to whether the MIC would 
eventually supercede the Meat Board as the formal corporate interest group 
in the industry. The Task Force however, clearly did not intend the MIC 
to have statutory authority over the Board. Instead it was to perform 
its functions in 'cooperation with the Board'. The Task Force recommended 
that the Board provide the secretariat for the Council, and that a member 
of the Meat Board be the chairman. The proposed membership of the Task 
Force was a chairman (from the Board), two Board members, one meat 
processing representative, one exporter representative, the Director 
General of Agriculture (or nominee), and two members selected for their 
. 1 t. 1 commerc1a exper ise. 
The Board's reaction to the Task Force proposals was predictably 
supportive, with the exception of the recommendation that the Board be 
the sole importer in the UK. It preferred to appoint a small number of 
importer agencies. 2 Reaction to the report varied among companies 
according to the extent they would benefit from being able to have access 
to product from the national pool through buy-back arrangements.,,o.r on a 
contractual basis for the Board, or as approved importing agents in the 
various markets. 
The Freezing Companies Association supported the general content 
and theme of the Task Force report, including the meat pool proposals, 
but with one 'fundamental exception': 
While the Task Force recommended an MIC, we proposed 
the establishment of a Meat Industry Board with 
farmer, exporter and government involvement. The 
Board in our concept would not have 3directly pro-cured, processed or market product. 
1. Report of the Meat Industry Task Force, August 1983, pp.3-4. 
2. The Press, Editorial, 5 August 1983, p.20. 
3. NZFCA, 10th Annual Report, p.4. 
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The larger vertically integrated multinational processing companies were 
in a position to benefit most from the changes. The Board openly 
acknowledged: 
There will be a major role for private enterprise in 
exporting, particularly those companies that have 
marketing operations based overseas. Some exporters 
will be adversely affected and may well decide to 
redeploy their resources ... New Zealand investors 
will still be able to invest in companies with 
active and I hope profitable marketing as well as 
processing operations. 
As a Christchurch Press Editorial noted: 
(While) in public they (the processing companies), 
expressed views of varying intensity from vague 
disquiet to open hostility, in private some are 
relieved they will be spared the risks and costs 
of selling a product that is difficult to market 
in the world's depres.sed economy .2 
This observation was based on the fact that a year earlier, the MEC had 
supported temporary Board control because the risks and uncertainties in 
the marketplace were so great and the situation had not improved since 
then. 3 
Waitaki NZR, was singled out by the Board as a company likely to 
succeed under the scheme. Waitaki chairman of directors at the time, 
John Neilson, supported many of the Task Force proposals. He was firmly 
in favour of greater licensing controls for exports: 
... the proliferation of meat operators is not in 
the best interests of an efficient and effective 
marketing system. 4 
1. Letter from Chairman Meat Board to all sheepfarmers, September 
1983. 
2. The Press, EditoriaJ,8 August 1983, p.20. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Press, 5 March 1983, p.19. 
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Neilson claimed it was difficult to see how the company could return to 
buying all farmers' production, as a result of the significant increase 
in the New Zealand lamb and mutton products, the variations in returns 
for these products and the distortions created by the supplementary 
minimum prices scheme. 1 
Not all freezing companies were supportive of the proposals however. 
While Waitaki as a public company supported the proposals for restructur-
ing,the cooperative processing company Alliance (Southland Ltd), was less 
supported. Alliance chairman, John Falcone~ said: 
We are concerned that the system will favour multi-
nationals simply bec~use of their vertically 
integrated networks. 
One group of companies which openly voiced their opposition to the 
Task Force recommendations were the independent exporters. They 
potentially stood to lose most from the buyback operation because they 
lacked processing facilities. They opposed the restriction of licences 
in the UK market, anticipating they would effectively be denied the 
chance to trade carcase sheepmeats in Britain. The Independent Exporters 
Association supported the minority recommendations of the Task Force 
member, Ian Jenkinson, Managing Director of the Marketing Cooperative 
Primary Producers Cooperative Society (PPCS). 
Jenkinson was cynical of his inclusion in the Task Force as he 
believed all marketing policy had already been determined and the main 
thrust would be an attack on the companies and unions to reduce costs. 3 
As a result he refused to give his consent to the majority view of the 
Task Force and instead produced his own minority report. He recommended 
that the proposed MIC be the central statutory authority in the industry 
1. The Press, 5 March 1983, p.19. 
2. Harry Broad, 11 Meat Exporters Fail to Unite 11 , Straight Furrow, 
29 July 1983, p.10. 
3. Lind, op. cit. p. 308. 
76. 
with powers to perform major statutory functions leaving the Meat Board 
with less important areas. He suggested the Meat Board's function to 
oversee the industry be retained, but that marketing and trading should 
be the responsibility of a separate organisation, to be owned jointly 
by the MEC and MIC. He disagreed with the majority report which 
recommended the appointment of the Meat Board chairman as the chairman 
of the MIC. Instead he suggested that the chairman be selected through 
a joint session of the MIC and the Board. 1 PPCS also opposed the Task 
Force proposals because they gave the big English meat importers a 
privileged position yet they could withdraw their support from the 
industry at any time. 2 
The Meat Exporters Council publicly opposed the Task Force report, 
although there was a range of conflicting views among its members. It 
lobbied farmers to oppose the proposals through placing a full page 
advertisement in a number of newspapers. The advertisement focussed on 
the negative aspects of total acquisition, loss of free enterprise, 
bureaucratic control, lower returns, loss of choice and control by 
farmers. It also advocated the formation of an independent autonomous 
MIC with statutory authority. A 1 ong with the Independent Exporters 
Association and the Freezing Companies Association, it recommended an 
independent chairman with commercial expertise. 3 
There was common agreement among exporting companies that the MIC 
should have greater legislative authority in relation to the Meat Board. 
This view was also supported by a number of industry advisers, and 
caucus members. Na ti ona l MPs, Ruth Richardson and Derek Quigley, spent 
1. Ian Jenkinson, Addendum to the Report of the Meat Industry Task 
Force, 5 September 1983. 
2. Harry Broad, op.cit. p.10. 
3. The Press, 24 April 1983, p.25. 
considerable time talking to campanies, particularly Dawn Meats and 
Alliance which were 'regular ports of call'. 1 
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As a result, while government largely accepted the Task Force 
recommendations, it made a number of changes which appeared to take into 
account some exporter criticism. Firstly, where the Task Force 
recommended one organisation to import lamb carcases and primal cuts 
into the UK, namely the Meat Board, the government decided the Board 
should instead appoint a limited number of agents as primary importers 
to that market. It also suggested there should be a contractual arrange-
ment between farmers, processors, and exporters for specialist markets. 
More significantly for the future of the Board's corporate status, the 
government decided the MIC should not be merely an advisory body as the 
Task Force suggested. Instead it proposed to give the MIC statutory 
powers independent of the Board. The functions of the MIC would include 
examining, commenting and approving industry strategies and plans 
developed jointly by the industry and Meat Board, and to monitor the 
performance of the industry and Board in executing these strategies and 
plans (see appendix 2). The government proposed the MIC should have a 
chairman appointed by the Board after consultation with the MEC and 
FCA, and with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture, and not a 
member of the Board as the Task Force had suggested. The MIC was also 
to have an independent administrative secretariat. 2 
These changes while not legally removing the Board's corporate 
status in the industry, did signify a threat. The MIC was given a semi-
governmental role to oversee and arbitrate between the interests of the 
Board and companies, thus treating them more as equals competing against 
each other. The MIC however, did not receive its statutory powers before 
the National government was replaced by a Labour government and so 
1. Interview, Ruth Richardson, 16 August 1986. 
2. The Press, 11 November 1983, p.3. 
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remained an advisory body. There were some suggestions that the National 
government was reluctant to introduce the changes because of the effects 
on the Board's powers. As will be shown later in more detail, the Labour 
government was more committed to increasing the powers of the MIC over 
the Board in practice, even before draft legislation was introduced. 
The Board's meat pool and buyback scheme once in operation, heightened 
the hierachy of company influence in the industry according to the degree 
to which they could operate in the marketplace. The larger vertically 
integrated coll)pan.ies such as Waitaki NZR were able to profit significantly 
from the scheme due to their vertically integrated market structure and 
marketing expertise which the Board required. Waitaki 1 s past chairman 
of directors, John Neilson, and general manager, Athol Hutton, agreed 
that they benefi tted greatly from the buyback scheme. Hutton admitted 
there was considerable lobbying on their behalf: 
We scratched the Board's back and they scratched ours. 
We played politics to get the best deal for the 
company, particularl{ as we had the resources and 
markets for buyback. 
In that first year of operation, Waitaki claims they were the only 
company which made use of the buyback provisions. Hutton acknowledges 
that many of the advances made in further processing resulted from the 
Board's buyback scheme: 
We could put product into a number of markets 
while the Board put an umbrella over us and the 
rest of the industry and helped identify what 
the markets required.2 
Waitaki was also in a position to be able to negotiate good terms and 
conditions for selling meat on behalf of the Board on a commission 
basis, and acting as an importing agent. Waitaki 1 s only criticism of 
the outcome was that the Board did not restrict sufficiently the number 
1. Interview> Managing Director Waitaki NZR, Athol Hutton, 29 July 
1986. 
2. Ibid. 
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of importing licences in the UK. Neilson argues the number of licences 
should have been reduced to one or two. Instead the Board reduced the 
number from 21 to eight and later nine. 1 
Those companies able to participate in buyback also pressured the 
Board to improve the operating conditions. Companies claimed the price 
which they were required to pay for the product was too high and would 
not permit them to process and sell meat at a profit. The Board 
eventually agreed to reduce the price by 15 percent but to phase out 
this discount over the following years. The Board justified this action 
arguing: 
We believe the future of lamb will largely be determined 
by the ability to market the product as a premium food 
item and that further processing2by meat companies should be encouraged where appropriate. 
However a number of industry commentators argued that the Board gave in 
to company pressure at the producer's expense. Many companies made 
profits and as Adam Begg admitted at an electoral Committee meeting with 
producers, there had been claims that the Board had 'allowed the companies 
to make profits in good times and when the going got tough, they earnt 
fat commission by selling for the Board'. 3 
. 1. Interview, ex Chairman Directors, Waitaki NZR, John Neilson, 
30 July 1980. The eight companies which became agent importers in UK 
for lamb carcases and primal cuts were: Associated New Zealand Farmers 
(ANZF), Thos Borthwick and Sons Ltd, Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd, 
Defiance Meats Ltd, Swift and Co Ltd, Dalgety Lonsdale Ltd, Towers and 
Co Ltd, Weddel and Co Ltd. 
2. "Exporting Under Buyback'.', in The NZ Meat Producer, Vol.12, 
No.2, April May 1 84, p.6. 
3. Electoral Committee of the Meat and Wool Boards, Annual meeting 
March 1983. The number of compromises made by the Board to take account 
of certain company interests must have reduced the Board's effectiveness 
as a marketing operator. One commentator noted it would be difficult 
for the Board to be successful at marketing as it had to "worry about 
such things as the need to be elected next time, and the need to keep 
various factions happy by compromises which will always tend to dilute 
an all out marketing effort" (NZ Farmer, Editorial, 10 November 1983). 
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For many of the smaller independent exporters, it was difficult to 
progress under this arrangement. Some of those companies which had been 
outspoken in their opposition to the Board's proposals appeared to be 
penalised. In particular, the marketing cooperative, Producer Meats Ltd, 
was refused an importing licence for its UK subsidiary. Unlike the other 
processing and exporting cooperatives, PML did not become involved in 
'bricks and mortar' when it became clear that the Meat Board would 
ultimately control marketing. This may have counted against them. 1 
In a newsletter to their shareholders, PML said they were: 
... angered by the Board in tlreir capacity as current trustee 
of the sheepmeat industry - not appointing Producer Meats 
(London) Ltd; a UK selling agent. Despite correspondence 
and meetings with the Board, the reasons gi~en us for our 
omission as an agent are totally illogical. 
They claimed they were justified in expecting a licence as their UK 
subsidiary had been operating for 18 years as a New Zealand owned company, 
totally committed to the promotion and selling of New Zealand lamb. In 
more recent years, they developed a high quality processing and packaging 
operation at considerable cost. This was aimed at improving the market-
ing of the product so that supermarket chains could have access to New 
Zealand lamb in a form which would compete with the improved presentation 
of alternative meats. 
Many independent exporters were critical of the Board's performance 
as a commercial operator. Independent's secretary at the time, John 
Foster, maintains there was no orchestrated or concerted campaign to 
undermine the Board. 3 However the Board claims there was at least one 
occasion when the i~dependents gave farmers information which criticised 
1. Marianne Kelly, "Rebuilt Industry in Better Shape Than Most 
Realise", · The-·New _Zealand Farmer·, 22· ~~ardi 1984, p.24. 
2. Letter from Producer Meats Ltd Managing Director, W F Leonard, 
to all clients, 12 March 1984. 
3. Interview, John Foster, op.cit. 
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the Board's meat company in Japan, ANZCO before allowing the MEC to raise 
the matter with the Board. 1 The information leaked to farmers was a 
letter from the independents to the MEC, expressing concern that at a 
time when mutton was extremely short in Australia and they were importing 
various New Zealand mutton and lamb products at a premi1um, the New Zealand 
company was selling in Japan below the Australian price. The letter 
stated: 
It is ridiculous this situation has arisen and we can 
only put this down to inexperience of ANZCO staff in 
Japan .... As many exporters have stated over the past 
year, if we have a single seller there is no yard-
stick against which you can measure their performance. 
Unfortunately this is now happening.2 
Other independent exporters however 'played the game' and gained the 
Board's approval. Research Fellow in Agricultural Policy of the 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit at Lincoln College and past general 
secretary of Federated Farmers, John Pryde, said: 
If you are a little meat company in Timaru, then you 
have to be careful as Big Brother Meat Board holds 
the reins and you have to keep in the good books.3 
One independent exporting company which flourished under the new scheme 
was Fort Exports Ltd (now Fortex Ltd). This company was willing to work 
within the system and gain Board recognition. As general manage~ Graeme 
Thompson) said in 1984: 
There were certainly many times when I wondered if 
trying to make headway in the system was worth it. 
Last year we were just a post box rerferring 
inquiries from overseas to the Board and if the 
price was not right on the Board's minimum, no 
sale was possible. But now the lines of communi-
cation have developed.4 
1. Interview, Barrie Saunders, PR Officer for Meat Board, 23 May 
1984. 
2, Letter from John Foster, Secretary of Independent Exporters to 
Bob Diprose, New Zealand Freezing Companies Association, 28 March 1984. 
3. Interview, Research Fellow with Agricultural Economics Research 
Unit Lincoln College John Pryde, February 1985. 
4. The Press, 24 February 1984, p.21. 
Fort was able to participate successfully in further processing using 
buyback products purchased from the Board. 
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The conflicting intere~tsof those exporting companies coming under 
the umbrella of the MEC was heightened when the Board took control of 
all export meat. It became increasingly difficult for the Council to 
speak with a united voice. As past chairman of the MEC, Mr Eric Cammell, 
said in the speech to the Council: 
We ha~e been unable to operate cohesively and individual 
interests have always been paramount which is not1 necessarily oest for the industry or the country. 
The policies of the MEC often conflicted with the policies of the 
Freezing Companies Association even though the freezing companies were 
also members of the MEC. As the general manager of one of the smaller 
independent exporting companies observed: 
There was a lack of communication between the two 
organisations. This was despite the fact that at 
one stage the Marketing Manager of AFFCO, Eric 
Cammell was on the MEC executive, and the General 
Manager of AFFCO, Trevor Gibson was on the 
Freezing Companies Association Executive.2 
As a result, the Freezing Companies Association decided to dissolve the 
Council in September 1985. It believed a more unified approach could 
be obtained through one representative organisation for the whole 
industry. It renamed the Freezing Companies Association as the Meat 
Industry Association (MIA), and set up a special marketing committee to 
incorporate the views of independent exporters and producer cooperatives. 
5. 1985 - Changes Under Labour 
In 1985 under the Labour government, companies began to lobby more 
actively to regain control of sheepmeat exports. Why the larger companies 
1. NZMEC, Annual Report, 1984/85, p.10. 
2. Interview,John Foster, op.cit. 
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such as Waitaki wanted to regain control when they were making signifi-
cant profits under the buyback arrangements is not entirely clear. It 
appears that all companies feared that under the Board control of all 
meat exscales, the Board could be tempted to move a step further and 
take over the running of the whole industry, leaving no room for company 
initiative. Hutton specifically claims there was a limit to their growth 
under Meat Board control. The Board was still able to impose numerous 
specifications for export to certain markets which Hutton claims 'cramped 
their style'. 1 
In 1985, the Meat Industry Association produced a discussion paper 
for the MIC and government which suggested the Board should lose its 
wide sweeping powers and concentrate on looking after farmers. Meat 
companies said the uncertainties created by the Board's outdated powers 
were the biggest obstacle to their industry's progress. They suggested 
that control over sheepmeat marketing should be returned to the private 
sector in the following season with a transition period managed by 
industry (not government). The Association also reinforced the increasing 
importance of the vertical integrated system: 
Companies should either be integrated food processors 
or simply slaughter stock for a third party. Most 
meat marketing should be done by companies that 2 
market, manufacture, and process sheep and lamb. 
This Association's view coi~cided with government's desire to move 
toward more competition rather than coordination in a number of areas, 
including the meat industry. In 1985 the Minister of Agriculture, 
Colin Moyle, announced that the government would introduce legislation 
which would make the MIC the central organisation to develop policies 
for the industry. The government also gave the MIC broad guidelines on 
the direction it sought for the industry, but left the details of how to 
1. Interview) Hutton, op.cit. 
2. Ibid. 
84. 
achieve these aims to the discretion of the MIC. Moyle said there was 
general agreement among all parties in the meat industry that marketing 
should be returned 1 progressively 1 to the private sector. This 
included: 
a) progressively removing restrictions on exporter access to 
overseas markets and to product within New Zealand; 
b) developing an effective market for sheepmeats within 
New Zealand; 
c) separating Board indebtedness from future trading operations 
in which the Board would be involved. 
It was agreed that the Board should have to compete with other 
companies in marketing, thus removing the favoured corporatist status 
of the Board. 1 It appears there was some discussion as to whether 
legislation would be introduced to remove the Board 1 s monopoly powers, 
however it was decided these should remain provided they were not used 
to frustrate the overall plan to return to private enterprise within a 
three year period. 
The Board however would not give up any of its powers without a 
fight, and by this stage it was clear the Board and companies were in 
more open competition with each other with the MIC as arbitrator .. This 
was particularly evident when the government left the Board and exporters 
to come to some agreement over who should be responsible for marketing 
carcases and primals to the Mediterranean Gulf, with the MIC to intervene 
as a last resort. The Meat Board had proposed the setting up of a 
consortium of three to four major companies in association with the Board, 
which was clearly using the Board's control powers. The MIA however would 
not agree and submitted an alternative marketing strategy to the MIC. The 
MIC supported the Board's proposals and the meat companies then asked the 
government to intervene. 
1. The Press, 27 September 1985, p.1. 
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Accordingly the government asked the MIC to reassess its decision. 
It advised them that the Meat Board plan it had approved was not 
sufficiently in line with government thinking of freeing up those markets 
in the longer term. It put up a proposal of two consortia operating in 
competition over these markets with the Board acting as a trade partici-
pant in one of the consortia~·, The government also conveyed these views 
to the Board. 
The Board however decided to continue with its earlier proposals 
creating greater conflict with the companies. The climax came when the 
Minister of Overseas Trade, Mike Moore, asked leaders of the five major 
marketing groups organised by the companies themselves as a means of 
coordination, to accompany him to the Arab States. During this time 
Hutton admits the company representatives put considerable pressure on 
Moore; 
We travelled with the Minister and put a lot of 
·pressure on him. He saw the frustration we were 
experiencing.I 
As a result the minister took action to change the situation, contacting 
both Colin Moyle and Adam Begg. The government threatened the Board 
financially offering to lend a further $200 million to the Board to fund 
its Meat Income Stabilisation Account deficit only if it agree~ to 
government demands. 2 
As a result the Board, in what has been described as a 'fit of pique' 
handed over all ownership to companies immediately rather than gradually 
over a three year period. 3 The Board in practice lost its corporate 
status at this point. Although it is still formally the central statutory 
authority in the industry, it no longer has a favoured relationship with 
1. Interview Hutton, op.cit. 
2. Sarah Morton, "Meat Board May Pull Out of Pool", Straight 
Furrow, 6 November 1985, p.6. 
3. Warren Berryman, "Moyle and Exporters Block Meat Board", 
National Business Review, 26 August 1985, p.3. 
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government. It is on a more equal footing with the meat companies, thus 
corresponding more to the pluralist theory of interest group behaviour. 
The Board no longer formulates policy on behalf of the industry; the 
companies now negotiate directly with government. Government has 
reinforced this trend by offering the meat companies the same financial 
protection that the Board had received as a marketer'of meat. 
6. Summary 
Until 1970, the Board's relationship with companies was only 
partially corporatist in nature. While the corporate framework was 
set in place by the establishment of the Board, the importance of 
vertically integrated UK companies to the economy, limited the Board's 
ability to control the industry. As Biggs said in 1966: 
There was an inherent d~gree of competition within the 
meat industry, as the Meat Board had to compete with 
large scale highly influential meat freezing works and 
proprietors·important in government circl~~; which 
substantially reduced its scope of action.I 
Publicly the Board indicated it favoured the development of the 
New Zealand farmer owned cooperatives, and this was backed up to some 
extent by financial assistance. Nevertheless, the Board also considered 
the wellbeing of the overseas companies whose importance to the economy 
could not be denied. In this way the relationship was 'quasi 
corporatist' with a combination of both competition and coordination. 
As one writer commented: there was evidence of both 'socialism and a 
sturdy independence 1 ! 2 
After 1970 however, the Board exhibited greater corporatist 
tendencies in its relationship with companies. It sought greater 
1. Jeffrey Biggs, Corooratised Pressure Groups in the Welfare 
State , Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington, 1965, (Thesis, 
MA, Political Science), p.69. 
2. Godfrey Harrison, Borthwicks ... op.cit. p.127. 
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coordination of the industry by intervening in the marketplace and 
therefore limiting the role of the meat companies. This coordination 
inevitably included some cooperation and compromise with companies. 
Under the National government, the 'Board publicly emphasised the 
importance of vertically integrated overseas companies to the national 
economy, although by this stage they no longer dominated ownership of 
the meat processing works. The Labour government (1972-75) however did 
not support this attitude. They encouraged the growth of New Zealand 
owned vertically integrated companies such as Waitaki NZR. 
In 1981, the smaller independent companies pressured the National 
government to delicense the processing industry, thus reducing the 
Board's powers and the privileged position of the larger processing 
companies in the industry. This suggested that the Board's traditionally 
favoured relationship with the National government was under threat. 
Nevertheless the Board still retained its powers over marketing, 
and in 1983, sought to use its monopoly powers to control export meat 
ex scale, reducing competition in the industry. Predictably, the Task 
Force set up to investigate these proposals, provided some compromise 
for the companies through the buyback for further processing, and a 
limited number of licences for export. This compromise heightened the 
hierachy of influence within the meat industry favouring such companies 
as Waitaki with further processing facilities and an international 
distribution network. By contrast, the Board's pool superceded the 
functions of the marketing cooperatives, and only a small number of 
independent exporter companies profited. 
This move by the Board, signalled the peak. of the Board's 
corporatist status, however this was to be shortlived. The same 
pressures for greater competition which led t'o the delicensing of the 
freezing industry, also led the National government to establish an 
industry organisation - the MIC - to oversee the industry, including 
the Meat Board. The MIC was to have statutory powers independent of 
the Meat Board which formally threatened the Board's favoured status. 
In practice however, the MIC remained an advisory body and never 
received these statutory powers before the National government was 
replaced by the Labour government in 1984. The Labour government how-
ever gave the MIC greater powers to arbitrate over the industry, even 
though the statutory powers were not yet in place. In response to the 
change of government, the meat companies joined together to remove the 
Board's monopoly powers. This coincided with the government's plans 
for greater competition within the meat industry. As a result of 
company and government pressure, the Board relinquished its monopoly 
powers in practice (though not legally), placing the Board on a more 
equal footing with the companies. 
88. 
Chapter four will examine the implications of the Board's corporatist 
relationship with government and other interests in the meat industry, 
namely meat companies, on its relationship with the farmers as 
primary constituents. 
CHAPTER. IV 
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEAT BOARD 
AS A CORPORATE INTEREST GROUP 
AND ITS PRIMARY CONSTITUENTS, THE FARMERS 
The internal accountability of Board members to their primary 
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constituents, the farmers, is to a large extent affected by the Board's 
status as a corporate interest group having a close relationship with 
government. Before discussing the corporate theory of a group's internal 
accountability to members it is necessary to define 1 accountability 1 • 
Groups are generally accepted as being 1 representative 1 if group 
goals reflect member preferences. In pluralist theory, representativeness 
is taken for granted as 'regardless of how group goals may change over 
time, member turnover ... will guarantee the group's representativeness in 
1 the long run 1 • 
Representativeness however does not necessarily imply member partici-
pation. Theorists Arthur Bentley, David Truman, Robert Dahl adopt an 
elitist view of group behaviu~r ~laiming th~t minimum member 
participation is an advantage. On the other hand, British liberal 
democratic theorists such as John Stuart Mill, Carole Pateman, consider· 
citizen participation as important and desirable. 2 Wilson clarifies this 
difference of opinion by identifying a group as: 
... representative ,-but undemocratic if member influences 
are congruent with leadership policies, but (member-
ship participation is limited, ie) members do not as 
a practical matter choose these leaders in meaningful 
elections or participate in the formulation of leader-
ship policies ... To the degree that a group permits 
members to freely choose officials or policies, it is 
democratic. 3 
1. Terry Moe, The Organisation of Interests, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1980, p.73. 
2. Reginald Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism, London, George 
Allen and Unwin, 1980, p.65. 
3. James Q. Wilson, Political Organisations, New York, Basic Books, 
1973, pp.237-238. 
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Where a group membership is permitted to participate, this is most 
commpnly through the election of group representatives. This may or may 
not allow members to indirectly influence group policy decisions. 
Alternatively there may also be more direct provision for group members 
to affect policy. 
It must be pointed out that the mere existence of statutory pro-
vision for member participation in elections or policy-making, may not 
necessarily mean the group is democratic in practice. As an example, 
organisational theorist.Moe, claims that: 
If leaders are shielded from the vicissitudes of 
competitive, closely fought elections, in effect 
guaranteed official positions, then they will be 
free of electoral restraints in shaping group 
policies.l 
In most cases he would argue, they have no influence over policy at all, 
and in some cases can be used to mobilise support. For this study, it 
will be assumed accountability covers both representative and democratic 
elements as outlined by Wilson. 
1. Theory: The Corporate Interest Group and Internal Accountability 
Corporatist theorists argue that the corporate interest group will 
exhibit greater tendencies towards oligarchical internal organisation 
than interest groups or organisations generally. 2 While this implies 
that a group will be less democratic and representative, not all theorists 
see this as an inevitable outcome. It is widely accepted however that 
corporatism implies less group membership participation. As Lehmbruch 
states: 'A large autonomy of the lower echelon is difficult to 
1. Moe, op.cit. p.249. 
2. See Michel's 'Iron Law of Oligarchy' which states the natural 
tendency of organisations fs to retain power with little or no intention 
of competition and without necessarily being representative or accountable 
to membership and interests. (Roberto Michels, Political Parties, New 
York, Free Press, 1962, quoted in Harrison, op.cit. p.69.) 
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reconcile with corporatism'. 1 
Moreover, a number of theorists go further and claim that corporatism 
implies group policies will be less representative of group interests. 
Schmitter argues the internal organisation of a corporate interest group 
will be compulsory and hierachically ordered: ' ... the osmodic process 
whereby the modern state and modern interest associations seek each other 
out leads on the one hand to even further concentration and hierachic 
control within these private governments. 2 
Expounding this further, Schmitter states that contrary to pluralist 
thought, membership in associations is not always voluntary and a wide 
range of de facto, as well as de jure arrangements exist both to bind 
members to 'their' association, and to prevent the emergence of competing 
ones. Secondly, interest associations are not just the passive recipients 
of already formed members' interests, but may play an active role in 
identifying and forming those interests. Finally, interest associations 
do not merely transmit member preferences to authorities, but may 
actively and coercively govern the behaviour of their members, especially 
through devolved responsibility for the implementing of public policy. 3 
Harrison reinforces these views claiming not only do group preferences 
become compromised in negotiation with other groups, but group representa-
tives may suffer an attitudinal compromise through their close links with 
government and so even less faithfully represent their sectors. He claims 
the group may lose some of its autonomous and representative nature: 
1. G. Lehmbruch, "Neo-Corporati sm in Comparative Perspective", in 
G.Lehmbruch and~ Schmitter (ed), Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making, 
London, Sage Publications, 1982, p.24. 
2. P. Schmitter, · 11stil 1 the Century of Corporatism?" The 
Review of Politics, Vol.36, No.1, Jan. 1974, p.91. 
3. P, Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporati sm 
Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Nee-Corporatism. may be Going", in 
Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making,~ Schmitter and G.Lehmbruch (ed), 
London, Sage Publications, 1982, p.260. 
To the extent that leaders are perceived as more remote, 
detached from members' views and aspirations and 
association with government, membership involvement 
declines and becomes apathetic, or because of a reduced 
commitment to the procedures hitherto recognised for 
defying the group's position, it becomes anarchically 
militant.1 
Harri son notes a second outcome of a group being recognised by 
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government above other groups is that 'taken far enough it can virtually 
shut off the main challenge to established elites - a freely formed new 
association, denying the representativeness of old' . 2 'To the degree 
that institutionalisation confers a sectoral monopoly, it thwarts the 
expression of individual or minority group dissent within the sector. 13 
Mulgan however does not believe that corporatism automatically 
implies less group representativeness. He believes group leaders are 
conscious of the need to pursue the interests of those whom he or she 
represents, however at the same time, each will be aware of the need 
to remain on good terms with representatives of other groups and interests; 
The process of continually shifting disputes requires an elaborate degree 
of give and take among the participants, a willingness to concede here and 
to gain there. 
Mulgan acknowledges that the power given to corporatist interest 
groups is only indirectly passed to the rank and file: 
Most rank and file members of particular groups will do 
little more than pay an annual subscription, perhaps 
attend an occasional meeting at a time of crisis or ~ote 
to elect representatives if elections are contested. 
Nevertheless he claims that if the members are: 
... aware of their own interests as members orthe groups 
and are prepared to become more active if their 
representatives are unsuccessful in securing what 
they want, this will often be sufficient to guarantee 
1. Harrison, op.cit. p. 72. 
2. Ibid, p.72. 
3. Ibid, p. 74. 
4. R,Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, Auckland, Oxford 
University Press, 1984, p.105. 
responsiveness, not only from their representatives, 
but also from various branches of government which 
deal with their group.1 
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The extent to which the Meat Board is both representative and 
democratic will be examined in this chapter. This analysis will be 
restricted to assessing the effectiveness of the Electoral 6ommittee, 
as the main statutory provision (albeit indirect) for producers to hold 
the Board accountable. 
The electoral committee of initially the Meat Board and later also 
the Wool Board was set up by regulations for the Meat Export Control 
Act 1922. This provided for 25 delegates to be elected by sheep farmers 
on a district basis, the number of districts to be decided by the Board. 
These delegates were given the task of electing producer representatives, 
and considering the annual report and balance sheet of the Board. 
As the electoral Committee is an intermediary body providing the 
main formal link between the producer and the Board, to be effective it 
must be able to hold Board members accountable and influence policy, as 
well as being held accountable to producers itself. Each of these 
processes will be examined separately, distinguishing between the 
periods 1922 - 1970 and 1970 - 1985,_ to illustrate significant changes 
which have taken place since 1970. 
2. The Electoral Committee and the Producer 
(i) 1922 - 1970 
The Meat Board initially divided the country into six electoral 
districts from which 25 committee delegates were elected by sheep farmers. 
A sheep farmer was defined as: 'a person, company or corporation owning 
not less than 100 sheep'. Membership of the committee was for a period 
1. R.Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, Auckland, Oxford 
University Press, 1984, p.93. 
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of one year but delegates could offer themselves for re-election and if 
unopposed in their respective district, they were returned as of right. 
No person was eligible for candidacy as a delegate unless nominated by 
a sheep farmer and seconded by another sheep farmer. 1 
The concept of an electoral committee was modelled on the American 
~lectoral dollege system for electing the president, an understanding of 
which provides some insight into the degree to which the committee was 
intended to provide an affective means for holding the Board accountable. 
The American Electoral College was intended to be: 
... an independent body of men chosen by the peop 1 e from 
among themselves on account of their superior. discern-
ment, virtue and information ... left to make the 
election according to their own will, with~ut the 
slightest control from the body of people. 
The college was to elect the president in a 'calm judicious atmosphere, 
remote from popular passions' . 3 The Meat Board and government clearly 
had similar objectives in mind in the formation of the electoral committee 
system of election for the Meat Board. According to the first Board 
chairman, Mr David Jones, it allowed the Board to adopt a national approach 
to decision-making, free from the pressures of local issues which would 
arise if Board members were elected directly by producers on a regional 
basis. 4 Even the committee elections, which were organised on a regional 
basis were unlikely to be contested on the basis of regional issues of 
contention as the number of districts was limited to six, and therefore 
each district covered a large area. 
This electoral committee system was clearly intended to prevent 
producers from significantly influencing the Board through competitive 
1. 1970 Meat Board Regulations. 
2. Report of Select Committee of USA Senate, 19 January 1826, 
quoted in L Wilmerding, The Electoral College, New Brunswick, Rutgers 
University Press, 1958, p.170. 
3. Alan L.Clem, American Electoral Politics, New York, D Van Nostrand 
Company, 1981, pp.200-201. 
4. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), (1930), Vol.225, p.848. 
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elections. As Moe claims, elections will only be an effective means of 
accountability if leadership depends on member votes for their position 
and therefore they are led to appeal to the membership on an issue 
b . 1 as1s. It appears then that the Meat Board as a corporate interest 
group backed by government intended the electoral committee to be 
removed from producer influence and in turn to prevent too much scrutiny 
of the Board. This was necessary if the Board was to make decisions at 
times which compromised producer interests with other interests in the 
industry. 
As could be expected, farmers initially rarely participated in the 
committee elections. Voter turnout for contested elections was as low 
as 23.5 percent in 1923 and 24.5 percent in 1924. More often, elections 
were unnecessa.l"'Y a.s incumbent delegates were rarely challenged, and 
where vacancies occurred, there was often only one nomination. This 
gave rise to a situation where delegates were appointed rather than 
elected. The first committee was appointed by Parliament and the 
Sheepowners Federation, and later in 1929 one MP noted: 
It is the most abominable system of appointment in which 
three organisations - the Agriculture and Pastoral 
Association, Sheepowners Federation and Farmers Union, 
nominate representatives to the committee. This is 
often without a vote and goes down2loaded with the idea of leaving things as they are ... 
This emphasis on appointment rather than meaningful elections, 
ensured that vacancies were filled by persons regarded as 'suitable' 
by the Board and other major agricultural organisations. This resulted 
in a network of men on the committee many of whom later became members 
of the Meat Board, other producer· boards, Federated Farmers and govern-
ment. In addition, many of these well known family names have appeared 
1. Moe, op.cit. p.249. 
2. NZPD, Vol.225, 1930, pp.942-943 .. 
on later committees. 1 This formation of a complex network led to the 
often heard claim that the committee is part of an 'old boys' network' 
or a self-perpetuating oligarchy. As a result, delegates were not 
considered to fully represent producers. 
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An attempt was made to improve the effectiveness of the electoral 
system in 1928 when regulations were amended to prohibit any member of, 
or candidate for, the Meat Board from standing for election to the 
electoral committee. As Herman notes: 'this provided for a separation 
of the committee and Board allowing for no duplication of interests' . 2 
The Board also acknowledged it would have to make some changes to 
the system to encourage greater producer participation, and identified 
the small number of electoral districts as a major problem. In the 
Board's Third Annual Report, it was noted: 
The Board last year had under consideration the practica-
bility of reducing the size of the various electoral 
districts and a recommendation was also received from the 
annual meeting of delegates to this effect. It is hoped 
this will reflect in the candidates being known 3to a greater proportion of electors in the district. 
However the increase in electoral districts from six to 10, seemed only 
a token gesture and had very little effect on voter turnout. Thus in 
the first year after this change, only three elections were necessary 
out of a possible 10, with 26 percent voter turnout, and in the second 
year, only one election was.necessary with 31 percent voter turnout. 
In the early 1940s, voting turnout increased slightly ranging from 
37.84 percent to 46.33 percent. This increase was likely to have been 
1. Sir Charles Hilgendorf, "Comments on 1st Annual Meeting of 
Electoral Committee, August 1923 11 , 3 May 1979, pp.1-5 (paper). 
2. P. Herman, "The Electoral Committee of the New Zealand Meat and 
Wool Boards", Political Science, Vol.26, July 1974, No.1, p.58. 
3. New Zealand Meat Producers Board (NZMPB), Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, 1925, p.3. 
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caused by farmers' concern at the continuation of the government purchase 
of meat toward the end of World War II in 1944. This concern was 
reflected in greater farmer interest and three incumbent members on the 
Meat Board were replaced. In 1947 the Board made a more significant 
attempt to increase farmer interest in elections by increasing the 
number of electoral districts to 21, thus creating more single delegate 
districts. A further district was added in 1957 and again in 1964, 
bringing the total number to 23, and leaving only the Southland and 
Gisborne districts with two delegates each. This situation still exists 
today. Following this change, the voting percentage was initially 
higher, reaching 56 percent, but then fluctuated between 1948 and 1970, 
from 33.86 percent to 56.92 percent, averaging 48 percent. 
While there were some increases in farmer interest in the electoral 
. 
committee during this period, the predominant impression is that farmer 
interest was generally low. As Herman noted, since elections were the 
exception rather than the rule, it was generally not necessary for 
1 aspiring or incumbent delegates to campaign. 
Equally significant is the suggestion that prior to 1970, the 
contact between delegates and producers was limited: 
GA Shanks, delegate for Gisborne since 1960 stated 
that many farmers in his district were actually 
unaware of the committee's existence, and that on 
occasions he was introduced at local me2tings as a 
Board member, not a committee delegate. 
Herman however argues that although the committee demanded no'. ,substanti a 1 
interest among the rural community, this cannot be taken as a condemna-
tion of the committee, rather the reverse; 
Prior to 1973 it has to be admitted that the system 
has, from its inception worked quite smoothly and 
adequately; and coupled with the fact that the 
Boards have embarked': on few actions that have 
1. Herman (1974), op.cit. p.61. 
2. Ibid, p.61. 
proved divisive, the unruffled history of the 1 committee has largely dulled farmer awareness. 
Herman argues that while the noticeable lack of elections giving rise 
to situations where delegates were simple re-endorsed year after year 
without having to expound their policies would normally be anathema to 
most electoral systems, in this particular electoral committee process 
a non vote by a farmer, must, in a majority of cases be interpreted as 
a vote of confidence in the status quo. Herman argued that the sharp 
increase in farmer interest in the committee elections during the 
controversial 1973 wool acquisition debate was evidence of its 
effectiveness. 2 This was a case where the committee and Federated 
Farmers supported the government's proposed moves, however the average 
wool grower objected, and as a result there was the highest ever voter 
turnout and the largest number of incumbent delegates replaced. In 
1972, the number of elections was an all time high of 11, and this was 
exceeded in 1973 when 24 out of 25 seats were contested and 15 new 
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delegates were elected. The voting turnout for those years was 57 per-
cent and 67.4 percent respectively. Herman argued that this indicated 
the electoral committee was used by farmers to express their opinion, 
also emphasising that farmers' dissatisfaction was not aimed at the 
committee but the Wool Board. 
While this argument may be feasible in part, some points may be 
contested. While it seems that prior to 1973, the Meat and Wool Boards 
did not engage in many controversial activities which demanded farmer 
attention, it is not satisfactory to assume that a farmer's non-vote in 
a majority of cases was a vote of confidence in the status quo. The 
electoral committee system in fact encouraged very little producer 
awareness of Board activities. There was scant communication between 
1. He rma n ( 19 7 4 ) , op . cit . p . 61. 
2. For more detail on the wool acquisition debate see chapter two, 
p. 51. 
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farmers and the committee and this was heightened by the lack of any 
formal communication structure outside Federated Farmers. As a result, 
farmers had a limited.basis on which to gauge the performance of both 
Board and committee delegates. There can be no effective accountability 
unless there is adequate information available. In addition any informa-
tion which was passed on to farmers by the committee was likely to have 
been limited to that supplied by the Board. 
The interest taken in the elections during the time of the 1973 
wool acquisition debate has in fact been described as a farmers' 'revolt' 
indicating it was more than simply an example of the committee's effective-
ness as a vehicle for a farmer opinion. 1 Although it provided a means 
for wool growers strongly opposed to Wool Board policy to gather a 
majority on the committee and then proceed to elect members to the Board 
who reflected grower opinion more accurately, there was also some 
implicit disapproval of the electoral committee system. The committee 
had earlier failed to transmit accurately the views of the majority of 
farmers clearly opposed to the proposals, thus indicating a general lack 
of representativeness. 
Secondly farmers were made more aware of the whole issue through 
wide media coverage, giving farmers a wider range of information than 
they would normally receive through the committee. In addition, an 
active farmer minority group opposing the proposals, the Wool Action 
Committee, also launched a widespread campaign to provide farmers with 
more information, and to transmit grassroots farmer opinion back to the 
Board through a referendum of all wool producers. 
1. Brian Peacocke, 11 A Review of the History of the Producer Boards 
and the El ectora 1 Process From the Producer to the Statutory Boards 11 , 
June 1981, p.23. (Paper to complete the Kellog New Zealand Rural 
Leadership Course, Lincoln College.) 
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(ii) The Turning Point, 1969 - 1973 
Although the 1972/73 upheaval of the electoral committee 
raised questions as to its effectiveness, some of the details of the 
formal committee process had already been questioned in 1969 by an 
electoral committee subcommittee, set up by the electoral committee and 
the Meat and Wool Section of Federated Farmers. A second subcommittee 
was set up by the committee in 1973, consisting of representatives of 
the committee and secretaries of the Meat and Wool Boards. These sub-
committees examined the electoral procedures, meetings and functions of 
the committee, and made recommendations on the basis of submissions from 
cither major farming organisations and individuals. One major issue 
addressed by both subcommittees was voter qualification. The 1969 sub-
committee suggested that the statutory requirement for a farmer to have 
100 sheep to be eligible to vote should be extended to include farmers 
with 100 cattle for the purposes of beef production. 1 This was subse-
quently included in the regulations. It was also suggested by both 
subcommittees that the sheep stock requirement should be increased from 
100 sheep to 300 (1969 subcommittee recommendation) or 250 (1973 sub-
committee recommendation). It was argued that if the stock requirement 
is too low, it opens the way for the influence of part-time farmers who 
2 
operate only a small flock and have no real stake in the system. 
However there have been no formal changes to the regulations. 
One major change to the regulations has been the removal of the 
original statutory provision for a committee delegate to be appointed 
by the Board as a result of an extraordinary vacancy, such as an early 
retirement. The regulations now read: 
1. 1970 Report of the Subcommittee appointed by the Electoral 
Committee of the New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards and Dominion Meat and 
Wool Council of Federated Farmers to examine electoral machinery of the 
two boards. 
2. 1970 Subcommittee Report op.cit. and 1974 Report of Subcommittee 
appointed by the Electoral Committee to examine electoral procedures, 
meetings and functions of the committee. 
If a vacancy occurs not less than 70 days before 
the next day fixed for a meeting of the Electoral 
Committee, the vacancy is to be filled by a 
postal ballot conducted by the Board in the 
electoral district where the vacancy occurred. 
Alternatively, if the vacancy occurs less than 70 
days before the next day fixed for a meeting of 
the Electoral Committee, the Meat Board after 
consultation with the Wool Board and members of 
the Meat and Wool Section provinces within the 1 
region may appoint a farmer to fill the vacancy. 
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This recognises the need for the electoral committee to have greater 
independence from the Board. Furthermore, the two subcommittees also 
agreed that the electoral ballot should be conducted by a returning 
officer, and not the Board, and any decision to hold another election 
should also be conducted by the returning officer. 2 However no formal 
changes have been made to the regulations as a result of this second 
recommendation. 
Again regarding the voting procedure~ the 1973 subcommittee was 
strongly in favour of a one man one vote system. They felt that in a 
legally constituted partnership where the stock is owned jointly by all 
parties, the present provision for each partner to be allowed a vote is 
wrong and the partnership should be allowed only one vote. 3 Similarly 
one person owning a number of different properties, either in the same 
or different electoral districts should not be entitled to more than one 
vote. Although these concerns have not been given further consideration, 
Herman signals its importance: 
In the Oamaru electorate of Waitaki county, there are 
11 cases of one elector having two votes; in the 
Kurow electorate of the same county 10 similar cases 
are apparent.4 . · 
Herman acknowledges the general lack of participation in past electoral 
committee elections has nullified any possible repercussions that the 
1. Amendment to 1970 Meat Board Regulations, 1972/2 Section 3A, p.636. 
2. Subcommittees of the Electoral Committee, Reports 1970, 1974. 
3. Subcommittee of the Electoral Committee, Report, 1974. 
4. P, Herman (1974), op.cit. p.66. 
102. 
plurality of votes may have had. Nevertheless, the implications could 
be greater in the event of controversial policy decisions which require 
and elicit maximum farmer interest in elections. The 1984 elections 
were a good example where in many cases the difference in votes was 
about 20 and in some cases less than five votes. In that instance, a 
plurality of votes could have made a considerable difference to the 
outcome. 
The 1969 subcommittee made equally significant recommendations for 
change regarding the communication between the committee and farmers, 
which resulted in amendments to regulations. It recommended greater 
liaison with provincial meat and wool sections o.f Federated Farmers and 
producers generally. It recommended the inclusion on the committee of 
two delegates from the Dominion Meat and Wool Council of Federated 
Farmers, incl~ding the chairman. 1 The regulations were changed in 
1971-72 to include one representative on the committee from the Dominion 
Meal and Wool Section of Federated Farmers; the chairman,.with full 
voting rights, except that he may not vote on the election of producer 
representatives, nor on the adoption of any a.nnua 1 r.eport or ba 1 ance 
sheet of the Meat and Wool Boards. 2 As Federated Farmers is the 
recognised political arm of producers, comprising a high percentage of 
all producers as members, and a strong communication network down to 
provincial and branch levels, this was a positive step to improve 
3 
communication between the electoral committee delegates and producers. 
The 1969 subcommittee was also concerned that many of the views put 
forward by delegates, particularly through remits, were not necessarily 
1. Subcommittee of Electoral Committee, Report, 1970. 
2. Amendment to 1970 Meat Board Regulations 1972/2 Section 3, p.636. 
3. The contribution of Federated .Farmers as an influence on the 
Board 1 s accountability to farmers has not been examined in this thesis. 
Useful analysis of the role of Federated Farmers can be found in: 
R.Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, Auckland, Oxford University 
Press, 1934., and P. Herman, A History of Federated Farmers, t~ellington, 
Victoria University, 1976. · Dhesis: MA, Political Science) 
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representative of the majority view of their electoral districts. Remits 
have been known to be scribb~·ed:on the back of flight tickets on the way 
to the meeting. 1 The subcommittee suggested all remits should have the 
signature of 10 electors as seconders or have the support of Meat and 
Wool Section within the appropriate province. This was not supported 
however by the later 1973 subcommittee and has not been pursued further. 2 
However it would seem a positive step to make the committee more 
responsive to farmers' views. 
(iii} 1973 - 1985 
While the number of seats contested and voter turnout 
remained high for some years following the 1972/73 wool acquisition 
debate, voter turnout averaging 57.56 percent between 1974 and 1980, 
farmer interest dropped back again in early 1980s with an average of two 
seats contested between 1981-83 and a voter turnout average of 46 percent. 
Farmer interest increased again in 1984 with the occurrence of a major 
issue in the meat industry similar to the wool acquisition debate 10 
years earlier. The number of contested seats rose to 14 with five 
seated members being replaced. 
While there has been only a marginal increase in farmer participa-
tion in elections, there are indications that the elections have become 
more effective in allowing farmers to influence the committee. One of 
the major improvements has been the degree to which elections have 
become more issue oriented. Both incumbent and challenging candidates 
have begun to air their views on particular issues more publicly as part 
of an election campaign. Prior to the 1984 committee elections, the 
views of those standing for seats in the Canterbury area were clearly 
outlined to farmers through campaign newsletters, and media coverage. 
1. Interview with Researc~ Fellow in Agricultural Economics Unit, 
Lincoln College, John Pryde, February 1985. 
2. Subcommittees of Electoral Committee, Reports, 1970, 1974. 
In the mid Canterbury district, candidate Brian Cameron who was 
challenging the incumbent delegate, Brian Lill, clearly stated that 
he was standing for election on the basis of his views on the meat 
marketing debate: 
You will probably be aware that my interest in this 
position has arisen primarily as a result of the 
decision by New Zealand Meat Producers Board to 
implement major changes in the industry; and in 1 particular the decision to acquire all sheepmeats. 
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He then went on to say that in his opinion, he did not think the removal 
of private enterprise and competition implied in the Meat Board proposal 
would provide the best long term solution to problems in the meat 
industry. Lill, while expressing his specific views on the Board's 
activities, gave this only a brief mention in a wide coverage of the 
activities of both Meat and Wool Boards at the time. 
As the meat acquisition issue was particularly controversial, 
similar to the wool acquisition debate, it is necessary to be cautious 
in generalising on the basis of this example. However a comment from 
a delegate at the 1984 committee meeting with the Board, indicated that 
issues could be the basis for further election campaigns. Thus during 
a discussion over port charges reforms, Southland delegate, Mr Aubrey 
Begg commented: 'This will be a good committee election issue for next 
year'. 2 
Nevertheless, even if elections are based on issues, it cannot be 
taken for granted that farmers will consistently vote on the basis of 
a candidate's view on a particular issue. During the 1984/85 elections 
at the time of the meat marketing debate, some farming areas kno0n 
to hold strong views on the issue, did not vote for the candidate 
supporting those views. 3 In that case it could only be assumed that they 
1. Electoral Committee campaign newsletters, June 1984. 
2. Electoral Committee meeting, 14 August 1984. 
3. Interview with Federated Farmers Chief Executive, Rob Mclagan, 
14 August 1984. 
voted for the candidate's personal attributes, more in line with the 
traditional electoral committee expectations. 
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While the increase in issue oriented elections would be seen by 
organisational theorists such as Moe as providing a more meaningful form 
of accountability, it has met with strong opposition from the Board and 
some government members who claim the committee is being run by minorities. 
This refers to the members of the Wool Action Committee which dominated 
the electoral committee in 1973, and the Meat Action Committee formed in 
1984 at the time of the meat marketing debate, some members of which were 
elected to the committee in 1984. Minister of Agriculture, Colin Moyle, 
expressed concern at the Meat Action Committee putting up a ticket of 
candidates in 1984 elections. 1 However, one of the key figures on the 
Meat Action Committee and a member of the electoral Committee for some 
time, former Labour M~ Aubrey Begg, claims that the Action Committee was 
not intended to be involved directly in putting up a party ticket for 
the electoral committee. Those associated with the Action Committee 
stood as candidates for the electoral Committee if they chose to, but 
were not promoted by the Meat Action Committee. Begg claims that four 
out of five electoral committee members in 1984 were members of the Meat 
Action Committee, however they did not have a majority. 2 
Begg believes it is essential for potential committee delegates to 
express their opinions on issues: 
Although farmers are traditionally supposed to elect 
members independently of their views on issues, 
obviously farmers will want to know a member's stand 
on a particular issue. It is not enough for a 
candidate to say, 1 I will read the accounts' which 
is the statutory requirement. Farmers a 1 so need to 
know what sort of things candidates will look for in 
the accounts. 3 
1. 11 Electing Producer Representatives", The New Zealand Meat Producer, 
Vol.13, No.l, Oct/Dec 1984. 
2. Interview with Electoral Committee member, Aubrey Begg, 
14 August 1984. 
3. Ibid. 
106. 
At the 1984 electoral Committee meeting during the questioning of 
the Board's annual ~eport, it was clear that delegates who were members 
of the Meat Action Committee domtnated the questions and remits. The 
highest number of questions was: asked by Begg (9) and Styles (6), both 
members of the Meat Actton Committee. Nevertheless, each committee 
delegate asked at least one question and the majority asked between one 
and four. 1 
Despite this apparent dominance of the Meat Action Committee on 
the electoral Committee, these members were in a minority, and any 
remits proposed would not be passed unless there was majority support. 
Thus at the March 1984 e:lectoral committee meeting, a remit was put 
forward by a member of the Action Committee, Styles: 'to ask the Meat 
Board to honour its solemn promise of November 4, 1982, to return the 
meat industry to private enterprise, enabling producers to have a choice 
of selling options'. This remit however was not supported by the 
majority, losing by 18 votes to 6 with one abstention. 2 
Delegates have also increased their representativeness through 
providing producers with more information and seeking their views. 
This need was highlighted by both the wool acquisition debate and the 
meat marketing debate, when it was clear the committee was not aware 
of farmers' views. At the 1984 electoral committee meeting delegates 
often relayed individual farmer requests or questions through to Board 
members. Members were also clear that their responsibility was to pass 
more information on to the farmer .. As mid Canterbury delegate, Brian Lill, 
1. Survey taken at August Electoral Committee meeting. There was 
some error as this calculation was based on the number of times a member 
stood up to ask a question, however on some occasions a member asked two 
questions at once, and at other times members were prevented from asking 
questions as it was asked by another member earlier. It was also noted 
at times that the person asking a question was doing so on behalf of 
another member possibly to prevent the impression that one member was 
dominating the proceedings. 
2. Electoral Committee minutes, March 20-21, 1984. 
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said: 'I will have to be able to give an answer to farmers in my area'. 1 
Obviously the degree to which each delegate communicates with 
members in his electoral district varies, and many farmers still do not 
know how their delegate~performs; the questions he asks, the remits he 
puts forward or how he votes. However it would seem that as farmers 
become more aware of issues, they will demand this communication with 
. their delegates. 
This development reflects a similar trend in the development of the 
American electoral college system which is: 
... no longer the irydependent body.· and supe~i or characters 
which they were intended to be. They are not left to 
exercise their own judgement; on the contrary they 
give their vote or bind themselves to give i~, 
according to the will of their constituents. 
However, while these improvements have made the committee more 
representative of farmers' interests, paradoxically this representative-
ness was limited by the Board's increasing commercial functions between 
1982-85. With the increasing commercial secrecy imposed by the Board, 
it became difficult for committee members to obtain information from the 
Board and more particularly to pass it on to producers. Greater proportions 
of meetings with the Board were conducted 1 in committee' so that while 
delegates may have received information from the Board they were unable 
to pass it on to producers. 
At the October special meeting of the committee many members 
expressed their uncertainty at how much of the information they received 
from the Board was able to be passed on to farmers, particularly when much 
of it was marked 'confidential 1 • While the Board's Public Relations 
Officer, Barrie Saunder~ pointed out that it was up to the committee to 
1. El ectora 1 Committee meeting, 1984. 
2. Senate Report, No.27, 19th Congress, Last session, 11 Resolutions 
Proposing Amendments to Constitution of USA 11 , Senate Select Committee, 
1826, quoted in Alan Clem, op.cit. p.4. 
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use its discretion unless he made it clear that information was not to 
be disclosed, he added 'so far you have had impeccable discretion', 
suggesting the Board was happy if the committee passed on as little 
information as possible. 1 
(iv) Summary 
The electoral committee modelled on the American Electoral 
College system was clearly not intended to encourage producer participa-
tion either in meaningful elections, or even less in contribution to 
policy. The committee was also unrepresentative, resembling more of an 
elite 'old boys' network'. 
Nevertheless there have been attempts by the committee itself 
since 1970 to improve its representative nature as well as encouraging 
greater communication with producers. This has resulted in a more 
representative and more democratic electoral committee, however limited 
to some extent as the Board began to function more as a commercial 
company than a political organisation. 
Ironically the developments made to the committee have been 
criticised by some as increasing unrepresentativeness as the committee 
has become subject to radical minorities who oppose Board activities, 
ie Wool and Meat Action committees. This claim however would seem to 
be a concern of those with vested interests in the continuation of the 
traditional electoral committee system, remote from producer views and 
therefore shielding the Board from producer scrutiny. 
L Christine Bartley, "Improve Communications Request'', Straight 
Furrow, 20 November 1985, p.7. 
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3. The Electoral Committee and the Board 
(i) 1922 - 1970 
The two formal functions of the committee have not changed 
since 1922. They are to elect producer representatives, and to consider 
the Board 1 s annual reports and balance sheets. The electoral tommittee 
initially met every August to select the Board producer representatives. 
These Board members had two year terms with three of the five seats 
coming up for election in one year and two seats the following year. 
Candidates for the Board must be nominated and seconded by sheepowners 
though they need not own sheep themselves. 
Initially the voting for producer representatives was carried out 
on a purely competitive basis. Delegates voted for the first two choices 
and those two candidates with the most votes were elected. A majority of 
votes was not necessary. However there were a number of disadvantages 
with this system, particularly in cases where there was a multiplicity 
of candidates, with each one commanding a fair measure of delegate support. 
In 1958 it was decided that successful candidates should be required to 
gain a majority of delegate's votes, so the system moved from being 
competitive to preferential voting. Delegates still voted for their first 
two choices, but if one delegate received a majority on the first ballot, 
his name was withdrawn from the list and the committee then merely took a 
single vote on remaining candidates. If no candidate received a majority 
on the first ballot then the least preferred candidate was eliminated and 
voting was conducted on the rest. 1 
In practice however, it was clear that the initially appointed Meat 
Board did not want the ~lectoral committee process to provide opposition 
to the existing membership. A later Board chairman, Sir Charles Hildendor~ 
commenting on the documents .of the first electoral committee meeting with 
the Board in 1923 noted: 
1. Herman (1974), op.cit. p.59. 
... one committee member, W G Sherrat of Gisborne wanted 
to know why nominations for the Board election had not 
been called for in advance of the meeting. The chairman 
had some difficulty in explaining this but it eventually 
appeared that the Board was pretty satisfied with its 
present membership and thought there was less likelihood 
of a change, if delegates did not have too long to think 
about the alternatives. The Board however did offer to 
change the system next year and said nominations for the 
Board would be called for and chosen at the same time as 
those for the Electoral Committee .1 
Hilgendorf also suggested some committee members were apathetic 
towards their duty of holding Board members accountable: 
Someone suggested that if nominations were called in 
advance a postal ballot by the Committee could elect 
the Board and a Committee need not come to Wellington 
at all .c 
This motion was not accepted but some delegates were obviously not 
interested in questioning the Board regarding the annual reports and 
balance sheet. 
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If the committee is viewed as part of an 'old boys' network' ,~this 
attitude can be seen as a greater desire of committee delegates to be 
loyal to the Board in order to have a greater chance of later election 
to the Board, than vigorously checking the Board's activities. In 
addition the Board frequently superceded the committee's role of 
electing Board members by appointing members itself where 'extraordinary 
vacancies' occurred. 
This situation aroused considerable criticism from both producers 
and particularly the Labour party who proposed an amendment to the Meat 
Export Control Act 1922, to allow direct voting, but it was not passed. 
As Oamaru MP) John MacPherson,, said in 1924: 
I think it is pretty well known throughout the country 
and in this House that the present method of appoint-
ment does not suit the wishe~ of the producers. It is 
certainly not democratic .... 
1. Hilgendorf, op.cit. pp.3-4. 
2. Ibid, p.4. 
3. NZPD, Vol.205, 1924, p.520. 
Similarly Kaiapoi MP, David Buddo, commented during a Parliamentary 
debate: 
In my own district, the method of electing the Board 
has caused a considerable amount of bad feeling. The 
Board is somewhat in the nature of a close corporation 
thanks to the adoption of something like the American 
presidential system of indirect election or election 
by delegates. There must have been some deep thinking 
to incorporate that in the system.l 
Past Farmers Union president, William Polson, said in 1929: 
... in spite of efforts over a series of years, only 
one alteration in personnel and that only temporary 
has been made. It is a life job once a man is 
elected to the Board. No new blood can get onto it, 
save by the consent of the Board. There is no 
opportunity for new2men getting onto the Board under the present system. 
Interestingly, Massey also appeared, outwardly at least, to 
agree with the arguments in favour of direct voting saying: 
I do not like a complicated system myself; I prefer 
the simple system by which electors know exactly 3 
what they are doing and whom they are voting for ... 
Nevertheless, he made no attempts to change the legislation. 
111. 
Figures showed that for the period 1922 - 1970, there were 13 
years where incumbents were returned unchallenged. In those years when 
there were nominations the average number was 2.5. The first signifi~ 
) 
cant election was not until 1944 when the three Board members who had 
finished their term, offered themselves for re-election and were all 
replaced. Prior to that only one member had been replaced, and he had 
been returned again after one season. Moreover, in the period prior 
to 1944, there were five appointments by the Board itself as a result 
of 'extraordinary vacancies' such as death or early retirement, thus 
ensuring the majority of new Board members were acceptable to the 
existing members. Until 1970, there was only a total of 12 existing 
1. NZPD, Vol.205, 1924, p.517. 
2. NZPD, Vol.225, 1929, p.942. 
3. NZPD, Vol.205, 1924, p.787. 
members voted off in 48 years, and many of the replacements which did 
take place were only temporary. 
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The electoral committee 1 s function to consider the Board 1 s annual 
report became more effective in early 1940s as delegates .began to 
question the Board more thoroughly, and submit remits for its 
consideration. The Board however is not legally bound to accept remits 
as its policy. Nevertheless it does provide a two way means of 
communication between the committee and the Board~ 
The Board can gain an impression of farmers• reactions 
to issues and can gauge what the general climate of 
producer opinion is on its activities and the state of 
the industry as a whole. At the same time, delegates 
are able to elicit information from and clarification 
on questions put before the Board.1 
As the committee began to act as a more effective check,the Board 
was forced to take it more seriously. Board chairman at the time, 
John Ormond)noted that after the war the Board was required to liaise 
more with a number of producer organisations, including the electoral 
committee. 2 The Board began to hold special meetings with the committee. 
Thus in April 1944, a special conference of the electoral committee was 
convened for the purposes of discussing with the delegates several 
matters of importance to the meat industry. 3 Similarly in 1945, a 
special committee conference was held to consider certain proposals for 
the reorganisation of the New Zealand Wool Council. 4 Perhaps as a result 
of the number of special meetings being held, the Board decided in 1947 
to hold twice yearly meetings of the electoral committee each covering 
three days; the first two at the March meeting devoted to the Meat Board, 
and the last day to the Wool Board with the reverse applying in August. 
1. Herman (1974), op.cit. p.64. 
2. NZMPB Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1945, p.3. 
3. NZPMB Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1944, p.3. 
4. NZPMB Annua 1 Re~ort and Statement of Accounts, 1945' p. 3. 
The Board also began to meet directly with producers. Board 
chairman in 1945, Gill Grigg.made a tour of most districts in the 
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Dominion contacting farmers and reporting upon the activities of the 
Board, answering questions, and generally talking over any matters of 
interest to producers. 1 Thus at a time of both electoral committee and 
producer discontent with Board policy, the Board chose to communicate 
directly with farmers in addition to using the indirect electoral 
Committee system. 
(ii) Changes Since 1970 
The two subcommittees of 1969 and 1973 recommended a number 
of changes be made to the system of election and many of these have been 
incorporated into the Meat Board regulations. The 1969 subcommittee 
considered that the existing method of voting for Board representatives, 
where two vacancies were balloted at the same time could lead to 
undesirable results, with a preferred candidate not being elected, or 
alternatively a weaker candidate being voted to office as a result of 
/ 
attempts by some electors to give added weight _to one of their two 
votes. The subcommittee recommended the regulations be amended so that 
where the committee elects one or more members for either of the two 
boards, the committee shall carry out separate ballots electing one 
producer representative at a time. The successful candidate for the 
first vacancy should not take part in balloting for the second vacancy 
with all balloting to be conducted on an elimination principle. This 
recommendation came into force in 1970. 2 
However support for this method of election is not unanimous. The 
main objection to the system of voting for one candidate at a time is 
1. NZMPB Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1945, p.3. 
2. Subcommittee of Electoral Committee, Report, 1970. 
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that voting forces tend to be split sometimes allowing a weaker candidate 
to come through, whereas in voting for two at a time, emphasis can be 
placed on who may contribute to more of a team effort, as well as allowing 
members or candidates to gauge their support. As past !lectoral Committee 
delegate and Wool Board membe~ Robert Johnstone> said: 'It's the only 
electoral system where you have to run twice to get first equal'. 1 
The regulations have also been changed so that no longer can the 
Board appoint a member in the case of an extraordinary vacancy. Now an 
extraordinary vacancy in the office of a producer's representative or in 
the case of the Wool Board, a director representing wool growers, may be 
filled at the ne~t meeting of the electoral commtttee in the manner pre-
scribed by regulations for the election of producers or wool growers' 
representatives. 2 This was a major step in limiting the potential for 
Board members to have members elected to the Board who agree with their views. 
The 1969 subcommittee also considered a remit from the electoral 
committee which suggested that candidates for the Meat and Wool Boards be 
invited to present their credentials to electoral Committee members prior 
to the annual meeting. It was argued that this would enable the committee 
to make some assessment of the candidate before he presents himself at the 
meeting at which the election takes place. The subcommittee agreed with 
this principle and recommended that: 
... candidates for the Meatand Wool Boards be sent a 
questionnaire designed to give information on their 
suitability for office, such a questionnaire to be 
filled in and circulated to the committee members 
at least two weeks prior to the elections.3 
This recommendation is now in pla~e. 
Partly as a result of these changes to the regulations, elections 
have tended to become more competitive since 1970. This was particularly 
1. National Party Conference, 27-28 July 1984. 
2. Amendment to Meat Board Regulations 1970, 1982/ 271, p.638. 
3. Subcommittee of Electoral Committee Report, 1970. 
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evident during the wool debate, and for some years after that, although 
declining again thereafter in the late 1970s and early 1980s despite 
the controversial meat marketing debate in 1983. Since 1970 there have 
been no contested elections in five out of 15 years (33.3 percent), 
which is in fact higher than prior to 1970 (27 percent). Where elections 
were contested however, the number of nominations averaged 3.5 which is 
higher than prior to 1970 .. In addition there have been four incumbent 
members defeated since 1970 which is one every 3.2 years, slightly more 
frequent than prior 1970 when there was one every 4.1years. 1 
With regard to the committee's statutory function of considering. 
the Board's annual reports, the subcommittees also considered a number 
of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of this function as a 
check on Board activities. The 1973 subcommittee considered whether 
the committee should have the right to reject the Board's annual report. 
It was decided that if necessary a 'motion of censure' of part or all of 
an annual report would give the committee sufficient authority. 2 
The 1973 subcommittee also considered the advantages of holding 
meetings of the committee in addition to the existing twice yearly 
statutory provisions. Recommendations from the submissions ranged from 
holding meetings twice yearly without any special meetings, to four times 
a year (two meetings to be without the Board) plus special meetings as 
required. The subcommittee finally recommended that the electoral 
committee continue to meet twice a year and hold special meetings when 
required, s·uch meetings to be called by the chairman of the electoral 
6ommittee after consultation with the deputy and Board chairman concerned, 
or on the demand of at least 13 committee members. This allowed more 
1. It could be said that in fact there were two more changes in 
Board membership over 1971-72 as although two vacancies were caused by 
retiring members standing down, in fact they felt compelled to stand 
down as a result of Board poJicy on wool acquisition. 
' 
2. Subcommittee of Electoral Committee~ Report, 1974. 
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room for the delegates themselves to initiate a meeting but reduced 
. . t . fl 1 m1nor1 y in uence. 
Informally, delegates since 1970 have sought to gain more informa-
tion independent of the Board. As a result they have been able to ask 
pertinent questions, leaving Board members lost for answers at times. 
An example of the committee taking its own initiative was at the 
beginning of the meat marketing debate in 1981 when it invited the 
Freezing Companies Association and the Meat Exporters Council to air 
their views at the committee meeting. Mr P Johnson (Deputy Chairman of 
the Meat Exporters Council) and Peter Blomfield (Executive Director of 
the Freezing Companies Association), presented papers and answered 
questions. Delegate_ G Shanks,suggested at the time that an address 
from the trade should become an annual event. 2 
There are some delegates who believe the committee should have its 
own secretariat to give it greater independence from the Board. 3 The 
1973 subcommittee decided there was insufficient support for such a move 
at that time, and it has not been considered since then. These improve-
ments in the committee's effectiveness in checking the Board created 
problems. Although the Board has compulsory powers over farmers, it 
also has cooperative elements; thus it has been described as a 'compulsory 
cooperative'. The creation of the Board was requested by farmers and its 
continuation depends on majority producer support. Since 1970 the Board 
has relied more on producer support to legitimise its increasing powers 
over producers, meat processors and exporters as a result of its marketing 
functions. 
The electoral committee may once have helped to secure producer 
support through its loyalty to the Board but since 1973 a number of 
1. Sl:lbcommittee of Electoral Committee~ Report_, 1974. 
2. Electoral Committee meeting minutes, March 1981. 
3. Interview with Aubrey Begg, op.cit. 
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committee members, particularly those associated with the Meat and Wool 
Action Committees, have actively sought to check the Board's activities 
and to co1T111unicate information to producers, independent of the Board. 
As the Board's public relations office~ Barrie Saunders, commented: 
the Board realised it was vulnerable and had to do 
something about it. We could not trust the 
committee as some members 1produced information biased against the Board. 
As a result the Board strengthened its direct link with farmers. 
Prior to 1982, the only formal direct links were the annual report and 
the Boa rd 1 s bi -monthly journa 1, "The Mew Zea 1 and Meat Producer" which 
producers received by subscription. In 1982, the Board put greater 
emphasis on public relations, "The New Zealand Meat Producer 11 became a 
free journal for all meat producers and a meat bulletin containing 
confidential inform~tion was sent to farming leaders. 
Even more significantly, the Board began a series of producer 
meetings around the country, which is now an annual event. These 
meetings as in 1945, appeared to be as much a promotion effort by the 
Board to justify its actions and mobilise farmer support, as to genuinely 
seek producer opinion. One electoral committee member described them as 
a 'supermarket presentation which merely confused farmers' .2 This ties 
in with Schmitter 1 s argument that interest groups are not merely passive 
recipients of already former members' interests, but may play an active 
role in identifying and forming those interests. 
Far from seeking policy guidance from producers, chairman Adam Begg 
made it quite clear at a producer meeting in mid Canterbury that producer 
influence over the Board was limited to elections through which the 
Board's policy could be judged. The day to day decision-making however 
1. Interview with Meat Board Public Relations Officer, Barrie 
Saunders, 23 May 1984. 
2. · Electoral Committee meeting, 14 August 1984. 
was to be left to the Board: 
We are a producer organisation, Mr Chairman as you 
a re we 11 aware, and our future is in the hands .of 
you people. Whatever you decide to do in the long 
run by voting for Board members will determine what 
the long term future of the Board is. We are not 
unmindful of that but our first priority is to do 
whatever is in your best interests.! 
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This attitude echoes the words of a past Board chairman during the 
1960s, Sir John Ormond: 
Board members like politicians everywhere must 
maintain their relations with their constituents, 
sometimes making hard decisions that may not 
prove to be popular but are best for the long 
term welfare of their industry. A Board member's 
job therefore is often an educating task informing 
and interpreting events in ord2r to elicit the 
continuing support of farmers. 
Ironically the Meat Board's exercise of monopoly powers which made 
it politically more vulnerable, also proved to be an asset in curbing 
the committee's effectiveness. One of the main problems for the committee 
when the Board became more involved in marketing,was the degree of 
expertise needed to comprehend the complex marketing decisions made 
essentia'lly by specialist Board staff with less input from producer 
representatives. 3 Often Board members and staff implied that it was 
impossible for the committee to understand some of the marketing decisions 
made by the Board. As Adam Begg said at one committee meeting: 'Most 
people don't know what we are talking about' . 4 
Secondly the Board argued that as it functioned more as a commercial 
company than a political organisation, decisions must be made on 
1. Meat Board public meeting with producers in mid Canterbury,. 
30 April 1984. 
2. Sir John Ormond, 11 Self Help in an Export Industry; the Case of 
New Zealand 1', Columbia Journal of World Business, 4;8 1-4 October 1969, 
p.82. 
3. The conflict between the relative influence of commercial staff· 
and producer representation in decision-making, particularly while the 
Board was cor:imerci ally active,, is an important aspP.ct which has not been 
fully examined hers. 1t could be argued that as 1 expert staff 1 have had 
greater input into commercial decisions, this has reduced the representa-
tive nature of the Board. 
4. Electoral Committee meeting, 14 August 1984. 
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commercial rather than philosophical or political grounds and it should 
not be subject to as much producer scrutiny. Barrie Saunders made it 
clear that the Board was subjected to far more scrutiny from shareholders 
ie producers than any normal commercial enterprise. 1 The commercial 
secrecy of many of the Board's activities was one of the main obstacles 
to the committee's continued effectiveness. 
As a result, although the committee has become a more effective 
political check on the Board, the Board has still been able to &ssert its 
author.ity. At three successive special committee meetings called by the 
Board in November 1980, November 1983 and October 1985 to explain major 
policy decisions regarding meat marketing, the committee criticised the 
Board for holding the meeting to inform them of a fait accompli instead 
of consulting the committee before the decision was made. 
The Board has also had added weight in its attempt to curb the 
committee's effectiveness through government backing. The 1972-75 Labour 
government was clearly not in favour of the committee's developments. It 
was for this reason that changes recommended by the 1973 subcommittee 
regarding amendments to regulationswerenot passed to government for 
consideration, for fear that if the regulations were amended in any way, 
the Labour government might bring in sweeping changes detrimental to the 
existence of both the electoral tommittee and the Board. 2 
In 1984 Moyle warned the committee against going beyond its statutory 
function and adopting a master-servant relationship in trying to make the 
boards answerable to it: 
I think I sounded a fair warning that the Electoral 
Committee is an electoral committee and that is its job, to elect the Meat and Wool Boards. Beyond 3 that I honestly don't think it has a useful function. 
1. Interview with Barrie Saunders, op. cit. 
2. Peacocke, op.cit. p.11. 
3. "Rural Report 11 , 15 August 1984. 
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Outwardly, Moyle's motivation for these statements appeared to be for 
producers' interests, which he cl aims could be better served by a direct 
electoral representative system. This would provide producers with a 
more effective means of holding the Board accountable than the e·lectoral 
committee which is influenced by minorities. 1 However from a corporatist 
viewpoint it would seem that the Labour government's real motivation for 
warning the electoral committee against becoming too effective as a check 
on the Board is that it does not want the Board to be subject to too much 
producer scrutiny when the government is attempting to reduce the degree 
of producer control in the industry. In this light Moyle views the 
committee's attempts to improve its effectiveness not as progressive, 
rather as 'vested interests or ultra conservative elements which 
frustrate the necessary reforms in the meat and wool industries' .2 Thus 
Moyle indicated he would not impose an alternative electoral system, 
claiming it was up to producers to devise a suitable system. The warning 
had been intended to subdue the minority on the committee to act in a 
more traditional manner. 3 Nevertheless, it would seem that although there 
have been attempts to make the electoral committee more effective, farmers 
could achieve these aims more effectively through directly electing the 
Board themselves. 
4. The Alternative Direct Electoral System 
There has been pressure for change from the indirect electoral 
committee system of accountability to a system of direct election such as 
a ward or regional system as is used in the dairy industry. This argument 
has been propounded from a number of different sources for a wide variety 
1. "Rural Report", 15 August 1984. 
2. Ibid. 
3. "Electing Producer Representatives", op.cit. p.6. 
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of reasons. Proponents of the direct system of election include on one 
hand those who see the committee as simply an 'old boys' network' per-
petuating the status quo, and on the other hand those who see the 
committee becoming too powerful. 
The Meat Board is not in favour of direct election and.this is to 
be expected from a corporate interest group. Board publicity office~ 
Barrie Saunders, reiterated the arguments of the first Board chairman in 
1922 that members would increasingly campaign for producer votes under a 
direct election procedure. Not only would that mean a less than national 
approach to decision-making, but with the Board's increasing commercial 
functions it would result in commercial decisions being dominated by 
1 political pressure. From this aspect it is clear the Board wanted as 
little producer participation as possible. 
Another argument specifically against the direct ward or regional 
system is that the quality of candidates may be reduced as: 
... the requirements for regi ona 1 representation v1oul d 
restrict choice and prevent well qualified people 
from outside the area offering themselves, conse-
quently the qua 1 ity could diminish and regi ona 1 
lobbying combined with group voting could result 
in unsuitable candidates being elected to the 
Boards.2 
Yet is it also true that there are some areas which have not had any 
representation for a number of years. 
In theory at least a direct electoral system would give farmers 
greater influence over both Board election and policy. As one current 
committee member, Bruce Jans,said: 
The Electoral Committee prevents the involvement of the 
most effectiv~ people - the farmers. A form of direct 
voting would not only put Board members under the spot~ 
light but would make farmers start to think more about 
their options.3 
1. Interview with Barrie Saunders, op.cit. 
2. Peacocke, op.cit. 'p.22. 
3. "Electing Producer Representatives", op.cit. p.6. 
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The success of this more direct system however is dependent on 
producers receiving adequate information. The whole communication net-
work has changed radically in the last decade and farmers are now more 
informed than ever before. The flood of journals, papers and a higher 
level of education among farmers is a more than sufficient basis to provide 
them with adequate knowledge to vote for members and to follow Board 
decisions. As Bruce Jans commented: 'Most of what the Electoral 
Committee heard in Wellington was already reported in the media'. 1 
In addition the Meat and Wool Section of Federated Farmers is 
potentially capable of performing a similar function to the committee in 
providing farmers with information. There is an overlap of membership 
between the two bodies at present and the Board is invited to two Meat 
and Wool Counci 1 meetings each year to answer questions. In many cases 
the electoral Committee relies on the council's meeting structure at 
provincial and local levels to communicate with farmers. Nevertheless, 
the council as an intermediary body between the Board and producer can 
also be seen to some extent as part of the 'old boys' network' and a 
training ground for future Board members and therefore may be more 
inclined to show loyalty to the Board rather than criticise it. 
Obviously another factor to consider is producer opinion of the two 
voting systems. If producers are more enthusiastic about direct election 
they may be more likely to participate and therefore enhance the effective-
ness of the system. Two national surveys of farmer preferences for an 
electoral system, conducted by Research Fellow with the Agricultural 
Economics Research Unit at Lincoln College, John Pryde, show majority 
support for the direct electoral system. The first of these studies was 
conducted in 1978 and showed 64 percent of farmers were in favour of 
direct election. As a result of some criticism of bias in the wording of 
the question favouring direct election, Pryde conducted a further modified 
1. 11 Electing Producer Representatives 11 , op.cit. p.6. 
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survey in 1982. 1 The results showed that 61.2 percent of farmers 
preferred to have a ward system. Perhaps more significantly, the younger 
the farmer, the more likely that he would support the ward system. 
Figures showed that 64.2 percent of farmers under 35, 61.2 percent between 
36 and 50 years, 63.5 percent between 51 and 60, and 49.7 percent of those 
over 60 supported direct election. 2 John Pryde argues that 'it is the 
opinions of the younger farmers we should be listening to•. 3 
5. Summary 
The indirect electoral committee system was clearly not intended 
to allow producers effectively to hold the Board to account for its 
actions. This allowed the Board at times to make decisions which com-
promised producer interests. However the emergence in 1970 of a number 
of committee members determined to increase the representative and 
democratic elements of the committee also to a lesser extent, required 
the Board to be more accountable to producers. 
Nevertheless the Board has managed to keep the upper hand curbing 
the growing effectiveness of the committee through withholding information 
1. The initial wording was: 
In the election of producer representatives for the Meat and Wool boards 
would you personally prefer to 
a) be able to exercise your own direct vote for selecting your 
representatives for those boards, or 
b) continue with the present indirect system (started 1922) of passing 
this job over to an electoral committee in Wellington to do it for you? 
(J Pryde, Survey of New Zealand Farmer Intentions, Expectations and 
Opnions - June - August, 1978, Lincoln College A9ricultural Economics 
Research Unit, 1978, p.56.) (Research Report 96) 
The modified question read: 
The members of the Meat and Wool boards are at present elected by the 
Electoral Committee of 25 members. Which of the following options would 
you prefer? 
1. New Zealand divided into wards, each Meat and Wool farmer having a 
direct postal vote to decide the Board's member for his or her ward; 
2. A continuation of the present system? 
(John Pryde, and P J Mccartin, Farmer Intentions and Opinions Oct-Dec, 
1982, Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics Research Unit, 1983, p.290. 
(Research Report, No.136) 
2. Ibid, p.228. 
3. Interview with John Pryde, op.cit. 
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which is 'commercially sensitive', and obtaining government backing in 
this objective. 
It appears that while the committee itself has made attempts to 
become more effective (many of which have been successful), it is limited 
by its indirect structure which does not encourage the Board to be either 
representative or democratic. Under these circumstances it would seem 
that a system of direct election of Board members would achieve more 
simply and effectively the reforms which have been, and are continuing 
to be, made to the electoral committee system. 
Direct election however conflicts with corporatism, and as long· as 
the Meat Board remains as a corporate interest group it is unlikely that 
this will replace the electoral committee system of election. Equally, 
with the imminent breakdown of the Board's corporate status in favour of 
a broader industry oriented Board or organisation, producers may no 
longer be entitled to a majority of representatives, and therefore the 
debate between direct election and the electoral committee system will 
be less relevant. 
CHAPTER v· 
CONCLUSION 
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In this thesis, an attempt has been made to determine the extent to 
which the Meat Board's decision-making process has taken account of 
producers' interests, from fts inception in 1922 to 1985. Producers have 
long held the view that the Board unquestionably ensures their control of 
the meat industry. For some producers and others however, questions were 
raised when the Board chose to exercise its monopoly marketing powers in 
1982; in particular the degree to which the Board was both politically, 
and equally importantly, commercially accountable to farmers, industry 
and the public. 
Much of the existing research in this area has focussed on the 
existing means for formal accountability through the electoral tollege, 
and possible improvements. However it appeared that an analysis of this 
formal level of accountability was inadequate, as there were greater 
underlying forces affecting the Board's abi 1 ity to take account of 
producers' interests. It has therefore been the intention of this thesis 
to determine the most comprehensive explanation of the degree to which 
the Board has been accountable to farmers. 
One possible explanation partially explored in this thesis, is out-
lined by organisational theori.sts Moe, Michels, and Olsen. Organisational 
theory claims that the primary motivation of all organisations is to main-
tain their existence, not necessarily to represent the interests of their 
members, nor to be accountable to them. Developing these ideas further, 
a more comprehensive possible explanation of factors affecting the way 
the Board has sought to maintain its existence and the implications for 
its accountability to producers is offered by the theory of corporatism. 
This theory explains the way in which a certain corporate interest group 
is favoured by government and how this in turn affects its relationship 
with other interest groups, and its own members. 
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This theory states that the corporate interest group has a favoured 
relationship with government, but in return government retains the right 
to impose conditions on such factors as selection of membership and 
policy. As a result, this corporate interest group is often required to 
coordinate the interests of various groups within the same sector. This 
in turn affects its accountability to members as their interests are often 
compromised with the interests of other groups. Assuming the Board could 
be identified as a corporate interest group, this theory provided a 
possible explanation of the way in which the inter-relationship between 
government, the Meat Board and other interest groups in the meat industry 
may have influenced the Board's accountability to producers. 
Applying this theory to the Meat Board, it has been argued in this 
thesis that government established the Meat Board in 1922 as a corporate 
interest group, favouring it with statutory powers to regulate the whole 
of the meat industry, particularly meat companies which were viewed 
suspiciously by farmers. While initially these powers were free of 
direct government influence (with the exception of World War II), this 
changed as the political :importance of producers declined relative to 
other sectors. Governments became increasingly reluctant to give producers 
unconditional favoured treatment. Although the Board remained the central 
institution in the industry, it was required to adopt the role of a semi-
governmental body adjudicating between the various interests in the 
industry, including meat companies, before formulating policy on behalf 
of the industry. 
While the Board maintained it was still primarily accountable to 
farmers, it did admit that increasingly it was required to take greater 
account of the 'national interest', particularly as it became more 
commercially active. In practice however, it could be argued that the 
Board took less formal account of the 'national interest' than of those 
other more politically influential interests in the meat industry, such 
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as vertically integrated meat companies. The Board's decision-making 
process then resembled that of a selected industry board in practice, 
despite the fact that formally it appeared very much a producer dominated 
board with very few governmentally imposed constraints on its membership 
or policy. This increasingly resulted in a compromise of producer 
interests. Past chairman of Federated Farmers Meat and Wool Section, 
Tim Plumme~ recognised the increasing dilemma of all producer boards: 
They (producer boards) are there to oversee their 
respective industries, and they must be in a 
position to react, adjudicate on 1the political processes which confront them ... 
In this light he advised producers to question their actions: 
We have the right to question their actions ... Farmers, 
not producer boards must maintain control of the meat 
and wool industries. Our role is to ensure that 
farmers' concerns are being listened to - to promote 
and gain action on trends, requirements and needs of 
the farmer.2 · 
The subtle informal pressure on the Board to take account of industry 
interests was formalised to some extent with the establishment of the 
Meat Industry Council (MIC) in 1983. This council incorporated a wide 
industry membership and received proposed legislative powers to formulate 
long term industry plans in association with the Board, and to monitor 
the performance of the Board and industry. While the MIC was not intended 
to usurp the Board's status as the central authority in the industry, it 
did imply less autonomy for the Board. The other major formal change 
suggested at that time was the need for governmental appointees to have 
greater commercial expertise, to allow them to more effectively check the 
Board's commercial performance. 
The advent of the Labour government in 1984 further increased the 
formal and informal constraints on the Board. Formally the Board was 
required to widen its membership base through the addition of a trade 
1. Victoria Smith, "Board Roasts Meat Exporters", Straight Furrow, 
8 July 1983, p.16. 
2. Ibid, p.16. 
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union representative. More significantly, the Labour government made it 
clear that it denounced the corporatist principle of one interest group 
receiving more favoured treatment from government than another, singling 
out the Board 1 s monopoly marketing powers as an example. ·While it has 
not yet formally removed the Board 1s monopoly powers, recent events have 
indicated the Board is powerless to exercise them in practice. In 
addition, the government has indicated that the section of legislation 
providing the Board with such wide powers is to be scrutinised, with the 
likely view of deleting it. 
These developments suggest the corporatist trend in the meat 
industry is breaking down. As Schmitter noted, one of the conditions 
necessary for corporatism is the willingness of government to place 
responsibility for industry decisions in the hands of a corporate interest 
group. If instead, a government wishes to retain greater responsibility 
for setting guidelines for the industry, as Labour clearly does, corpora-
tism can no longer exist. 1 
The butcbme of this breakdown in the Meat Board 1 s corporate 
status and government 1 s desire to direct the development of the meat 
industry, has serious implications for the Board 1 s accountability to 
producers. Where similar developments have taken place in other countries 
such as the UK, the primary role of the boards has become one of pro~iding 
a link between farmers and government, rather than providing a means for 
producers to control their industries. 2 In particular they came to be a 
vehicle for the administration of the government 1 s guaranteed price policy. 
It appears then that as a representative institution, the Meat Board is 
likely to become even less politically accountable to farmers, and 
increasingly accountable to government and the industry. 
1. See chapter 1, p.17. 
2. J.M~CurrieandA,Rayner, 11 The British Experience 11 , S,Hoos (ed), 
Agricultural Marketing Boards: An International Perspective, Cambridge, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979, p.30. 
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However the government's request that the Board's marketing opera-
tion be run on a competitive basis with other companies, should provide 
a clearer means of commercial accountability to farmers, government and 
industry. It has been suggested that the Board should join with other 
major cooperatives to form a strong national cooperative processing and 
marketing chain, however this also raises the question of whether the 
existing voluntary cooperatives could not achieve the same goals without 
the Board's involvement. More fundamentally, it raises the question of 
whether the Board can justify requiring compulsory membership and 
financial contribution from farmers under the changed circumstances. 
1. International and Domestic Comparisons 
The breakdown of the Meat Board's corporatist favoured relationship 
with government and the associated increase in direct governmental control 
follows a common trend for most producer or marketing boards worldwide. 
Authors Currie and Hoos state that while marketing boards were powerful 
in the interwar years, since World War II, the idea that producers should 
be masters of their own market has had considerably less appeal to govern-
ments. More recently, marketing boards have been established as a 
mechanism for implementing government policy eg Israel, and West Africa. 
Even in those countries where boards were established in the 1920s and 
30s, there have been more or less subtle changes in their autonomy. 1 
Until 1983 however, the Meat Board was unique in that any lessening 
of the Meat Board's autonomy was very subtle, being of an informal, rather 
than formal nature. There were very few formal government controls on 
membership or policy. The Board has consisted almost entirely of producers 
with the exception of two government representatives, traditionally from 
1. J .•. M.~:Cutrh~·'.c: with Siqney Hoos, 11 Marketing Boards: A Comparative 
Summary 11 , in Hoos (ed), op.cit. pp.289-290. 
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farming backgrounds and reluctant to challenge producer views. There 
have been no representatives from the meat trade, with the exception of 
1922 - 1957, when stock and station agents had one representative. 
Furthermore the Board's formal powers to regulate the industry were 
increased. 
By contrast, in the UK, those marketing boards which were formed at 
the same time. as the Meat Board in New Zea 1 and had their powers curtai 1 ed 
as early as 1949. Thi.s was encouraged by a number of public commissions 
including the Lucas report which warned of possible dangers of 'mono-
polies' and of the undesirability of compulsion. 1 As a result, the 
Marketing Act 19491 required a wider membership for the boards, including 
processors, marketers, and consumer representatives, though producer 
2 
representatives still held a monopoly. In addition the government 
officials were appointed rather than co-opted and they were entitled to 
make up a fifth of the total membership. In order to ensure these govern-
ment officials were able to effectively check the Board's activities they 
were re qui red to: 
... have had experience and demonstrated capacity in 
commerce and finance, administration, public affairs 
or organisation of workers, or have been specially 
conversant with the interests of consumers of the 
regulated product.3 
·Marketing boards also became subject to greater governmental policy 
directives. The Marketing Act specifies that if acts or omissions of a 
board have certain consequences, and those consequences are contrary to 
the public interest, the minister may issue an appropriate direction to 
1. D I Bateman, "Agricultural Marketing: A Review of the Literature 
0f Marketing Theory and of Selected Applications", Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol.27, No.2, 1976, p.212. 
2. It should be noted that unlike New Zealand, marketing boards in 
the UK are confined to domestic supplies, therefore more directly affect 
consumers. 
3. Currie and Rayner, 11 The British Experience", op. cit. p. 34. 
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the board. 1 Boards became increasingly out of favour with government, 
whose control over the establishment, amendment, and removal of marketing 
schemes increased. In 1954, the UK government refused to grant producers' 
request for a meat board, choosing instead to set up tbe1Meat and IJ.ivestock 
Commission which had the advantage of being an independent and publicly 
accountable agency. 2 
By comparison, until the 1970s, the Australian Commonwealth marketing 
boards were not subjected to the same government constraints as the UK 
marketing boards. However their membership while dominated by producer 
representatives, also included, where appropriate, processor and exporter 
representatives, employees and additional appointees with commercial and 
financial expertise. The Australian Meat Board was established in the 
mid 1930s, and had a membership of six producer representatives, two meat 
exporter representatives, one Commonwea 1th government official and an 
independent chairman. The Board had the power to purchase and sell meat 
but normally did not trade itself, and instead regulated overseas market-
ing by means of an export licensing system. 3 
During the 1970s however, a number of reforms were made to the market 
legislation which placed greater controls on Board membership and policy. 
Firstly the number and proportion of producer representatives ware reduced 
and they were appointed by government rather than elected by producers. 
Secondly, the marketing expertise was increased by the appointment of 
industry representatives with financial managerial expertise. Thirdly, 
provision was made for intervention in the Board's affairs by the Minister 
for Primary Industry.· Finally, the boards were given extended trading 
1. Phillip Giddings, Marketing Boards & Ministers, Farnborough, 
Hants, Saxon House, 1974, p.16. 
2. D,Bateman, op.cit. p.212. 
3. Keith 0 Campbell, Agricultural Marketing and Prices, Cheshire, 
Longman Cheshire Printing Ltd, 1973, p.117. 
powers. 1 In line with these changes the Australian Meat Board became 
the Australian Meat and Livestock 6orporation, comprising a chairman, 
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four producer representatives, one exporter, one government representa-
tive and two with special qualifications. 
Compared with the New Zealand Dairy and Wool Boards, the Meat Board 
retained greater formal powers and autonomy from government. The Dairy 
Board was formally subject to government directives and similarly the 
Wool Board has had government intervention in its affairs at times. The 
formal membership of boards and authorities such as the Kiwifruit 
Authority in the late 1970s also contrasted significantly with the Meat 
Board, comprising greater commercial expertise, and allowing a greater 
degree of competition in the industry. The Kiwifruit Authority has a 
membership of five producer representatives, two exporter representatives, 
and one government official. Regarding its policy, one industry 
commentator noted: 
It has been able to establish a very effective 
institutional structure involving coordination 
and cooperation among participants while 
retaining a strong element of competition ~nd 
regard for innovation and market dynamism. 
Since 1983 however, the Meat Board has been subject to greater 
government controls corresponding to earlier developments in other 
countries. These controls include a significant restriction on the 
Board's ability to exercise its regulatory powers. This corresponds to 
similar restrictions on the powers of the Wheat Board and Milk Board, as 
government has de-regulated marketing in these industries to some extent. 
1. Keith 0 Camp be 11, 11 Recent Changes in the Constitution and Powers 
of the Australian Marketing Boards 11 , (Agricultural Administration 6; 
187-197, 1979), in D Fowler et al, An Examination of Alternative Marketing 
Structures: A Literature Search, Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics 
Research Unit, Nov. 1984, pp.14-15. (Discussion Paper, 98) 
2. Rowland Woods, 11 The Prospects for New Zeal and Agri cul tu re in a 
Changing World 11 , 26 Sept. 1984. (Address to Wellington Branch of 
Institute of International Affairs) 
This parallels similar trends towards de-regulation in the UK, whilst 
contrasting with the most recent developments in Australia, where 
corporations, including the Meat and Livestock Corporation have been 
given greater powers to regulate and intervene in the marketplace. 1 
2. Future Structure for the Meat Industry? 
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In order to anticipate the future structure of the meat industry it 
is useful to draw on the overseas literature which proposes a number of 
alternative structures for industries which have previously been dominated 
by producer or marketing boards. Each of these alternatives and their 
possible applications to the meat industry will be examined. 
A substantial proportion of the literature suggests what while 
producer boards with monopoly powers may no longer be perceived as an 
ideal structure for agricultural industries, there is still a need for 
some form of direct or indirect centralised coordination of individual 
interests as opposed to complete decentralisation of decision-making. 2 
Working from this assumption, there are three possible structures 
commonly found in the literature. 
Firstly, the current producer marketing boards may provide the 
basis for a new 'societal' board. This concept originated with the 
prominent marketing board theorists, Izraeli and Zif, who claim the 
marketing board is part of an evolutionary process which began with the 
voluntary cooperative and led onto the compulsory cooperative; (the 
producer board) and now there is pressure around the world for the 
development of a 'societal' marketing board. This board would have a 
1. 11 Pl ans to Re carve the Meat Marketing Structure 11 , Fi nanci a 1 
Review, Thursday 7 July 1983, pp.12-13. 
2. See Currie and Hoos, op.cit. and l K.Warley (ed), Agricultural 
Producers and Their Markets, New York, Augustus Kelley, 1967. 
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more equal representation of processors, handlers, and to a lesser extent 
consumers. It would be established by legislation and would have the 
major advantage of institutionalising coordination among sectors by 
making cooperation compulsory with regard to certain functions, while 
still allowing for vertical and horizontal competition. Izraeli and 
Zif argue it would make an important contribution towards mitigating the 
tension between pressure for coordination and efficiencies in the complex 
marketing system on one hand, and the wish to preserve significant 
economic freedom, free enterprise and competition on the other. 
The main functions of the Board would include general policy issues 
and overall resource allocation. It would define the domain of action 
for the industry and initiate structures to enable achievements of policy 
goals. One of the goals would be to generate resources and 'increase the 
pie' for the benefit of all. It would encourage efficiency at the macro-
level through coordination and economies of scale; generating and 
promoting resources as well as providing benefits greater than those 
available to an individual sector. 1 
One of the major features of societal boards is that while govern-
ment would be represented on the Board to protect and promote the public 
interest, it would not otherwise directly initiate activities~ Rather it 
would transfer power and responsibility to sectors to coordinate their 
activities in response to the needs of the diverse groups in the industry 
concerned. The societal board is seen as an alternative to both direct 
government administration and private monopoly. 
The possible application of this concept to the meat industry has 
received some support. As was noted earlier, former National cabinet 
1. D. Izraeli and J, Zif, Societal Marketing Boards, New York, John 
Wiley and Sons, 1977, pp.12-13. 
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minister, Derek Quigley, supported the concept of a more representative 
group to deal with the interests of the entire meat industry: 
Obviously farmers have to be represented because they 
are a major group, but m~re people who can concentrate 
on marketing are needed. 
As another producer/journalist noted: 
We need a new membership for the Board - no longer 
can we producers claim we alone are responsible for 
producing a lamb, not when you come to consider the 
vast amount of government money poured into our 
industry, and it must appear extraordinarily 
condescending on our part not to include those who 
process our product, transport, and sometimes 
market them - we need a third each cockies, 
processors and marketers.2 
Another structure which departs from the concept of a marketing 
board is an independent industry body to promote marketing reform and 
development of the industry as a whole. This structure has had 
increasing support in the UK, where authorities and commissions represent-
ing a wide range of interests and exercising general supervision over 
marketing is preferred to the traditional producer controlled marketing 
boards. In some instances the marketing boards have remained in addition 
to these authorities and commissions, but with significantly reduced 
powers. These bodies perform general functions which may include 
providing market information, grading sales promotion, and possible 
rationalisation and market intervention. 3 
The New Zealand Meat Industry Council (MIC) set up on the recommend-
ation of a meat industry task force in 1983, is a comparable structure. 
Initially however, it was not envisaged by industry or government that 
the council would replace the Meat Board as the central industry 
institution, but rather that it would assist with planning and monitoring 
for the industry. Since Labour has been in power however, the MIC 1 s 
1. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), Vol.450, 1983, p.456. 
2. .11 Norwester 11 , New Zea 1 and Farmer, 14 July 1983, p. 78. 
3. D, J, Bateman, op.cit. p.211. 
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powers have increased in relation to the Board. The MIC was given the 
responsibility of facilitating sheepmeats marketing reform, which clearly 
included determining the future structure and functions of the Board. 
From these developments it is reasonable to envisage the MIC's powers may 
increase even further in relation to the Board, to the extent of 
replacing the Board as the central institution in the industry. This 
possibility was expressed by one electoral committee member who was 
concerned about the resulting loss of producer control: 
The government may consider they could dispense 
with one of the controlling organisations which 
could be the Board, and this would leave the 
MIC.l 
However the degree to which the council itself has been directed 
by the government suggests it is unlikely to remain as an industry-wide 
authority semi-independent of government control. Initially the Labour 
government outlined pol icy guidelines for the council, but gave it some 
flexibility to interpret this policy. However the government further 
eroded the council's autonomy by rejecting its proposed marketing 
structure for the Gulf and Mediterranean, claiming it was not 
sufficiently in line with the government's overall policy objectives for 
the industry. 2 Not only did that remove some of the credibility of the 
council as a semi-independent organisation, but it also suggested this 
government is unwilling to allow the various industry sectors to formulate 
their own compromise plan for the industry. Rather it intends to be 
\ 
involved in coordinating these interests. 
This attitude has the support of at least two agricultural industry 
commentators. It has been argued that any industry organisation with 
representatives from all sectors of the industry, eg producers, processors, 
1. Notes of Meat Bod.rd Annual· Me~ting vJith ElettbraJ Committee.,-, 
2@-21 March 1984. 
2. See chapter three for more detail, Dp.84-85. 
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marketers, trade unions and consumers will only act when the interests 
of all these are in harmony, and this is likely to be a rare occurence. 1 
The Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation experienced this difficulty. 
With a wide industry membership it was virtually powerless to act, unable 
to reach a consensus between the various interests for major marketing 
decisions. As a result, the Australian government has recently proposed 
the setting up of a meat and livestock industry selection committee to 
appoint members to the corporation on a more commercial basis, and to 
restrict its functions to commercial activities. Wider policy issues are 
to be determined by an Australian meat and livestock industry policy 
· 1 2 counc1 . 
Dr (now Professor) Zwart of Lincoln College has a 1 so argued that where a 
decision-making body has a wide representative membership, any decisions 
which are made are likely to be compromises which tend to protect those 
bodies represented at the cost of those not represented. This then 
becomes management or marketing by committees which often leads to poor 
decision-making and is not in the nation's long term interest. Zwart 
claims such bodies are really only useful as a forum for discussion, out-
lining the most general policy and settling grievances or other technical 
functions. 3 Rather than allow an industry council or committee to plan 
for the industry, Zwart maintains government should set clear guidelines 
for the direction of the industry. In the case of the meat industry this 
should include outlining the roles of slaughtering companies, meat 
exporting companies and the Meat Board. 4 
1. Bateman, op.cit. p.211. 
2. "Plans to Recarve the Meat Marketing Structure", op.cit. pp.12-13. 
3. Dr A. C. Zwart, 11 An Analysis :and Suggested Modifications: _to lt1he 
Meat Industry Task Force Report•; Lincoln College, Department of 
Agricultur~l Econ6mics and-Marketing, 1983. (Paper) 
4. Dr A.C. Zwart, Marketing Institutions for New Zealand Sheepmeats, 
Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics Research Unit, September 1983, 
p.20. (Discussion Paper No.71) 
Similarly Derek Quigley claimed that government should set down 
long term goals for the industry through its economic policies, 
particularly export strategies. Having set these guidelines however, 
government's brief should be limited to: 
... encouraging c:ooperation, removing constraints which 
limit the ability of various parties from performing 
to optimum capacity, to see that the appropriate 
information is disseminated, and to ensure that 
export standards are being maintained.1 
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In the light of these arguments, a third possible structure, is an 
~d·nucbody created by government to provide a framework for the coordina-
tion of interests across a range of sectors. This structure would 
contrast with previous industry organisations in that it implies a greater 
initial input from government in determining the structure and function of 
the organisation, but does not imply government intervention in the 
activities of the body once it is established. The UK government 
recently formed such a body: the Food From Britain organisation. This 
'super council' coordinates and promotes all kinds of British food at 
home and abroad. It exists over and above the various industry commissions 
and marketing boards. It has the widest possible powers and minimum 
interference from government. Its membership includes eight farmers or 
growers, a food manufacturer, a supermarket chief, a drinks manufacturer, 
a confectioner, a restaurateur and cooking writer, and an advertising 
executive. 2 
Similar organisations have been set up in New Zealand under the 
current Labour government: a Market Development Board and a New Zealand 
Food and Beverage Council. These organisations provide a way for govern-
ment to cooperate with individual exporters; to promote, finance and 
assist the coordination of different sectors. As the Minister of Overseas 
Trade Mike Moore said: 
1. 11 The Quigley Marketplace Formula: Government Sets the Guidelines 
and Steps Back 11 , National Business Review, 22 August 1983, p.36. 
2. S,Kay, 11 At Last the Supercouncil 11 , Farmers Weekly (1982), 96 (24), 
pp.44-45. 
A cooperative approach among export companies and 
government will enable large numbers of difficult 
markets to be cracked, where a single company•s 
resources would be insufficient.I 
The Market Development Board Act 1986, provides for 14 members; 11 to 
I' 
be appointed by the Minister of Overseas Trade from producer boards, 
manufacturers and tourism, as well as the Secretary of Trade and 
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Industry, Director General of Agriculture and Fisheries and Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs (see appendix 3). Its functions are to be both advisory 
and executive. While not a government department, it is clear that the 
Board is to be influenced by government: 
In the performance and exercise of its functions and 
powers under this Act, the Board shall give effect to 
the policy of government in relation to those 
functions and powers as communicated to it fr~m time 
to time by notice in writing by the Minister. 
Agricultural trade and marketing consultant, Rowland Woods) predicts 
the Market Development Board will have a significant role to play in the 
supervision of the meat industry. It could provide a framework for the 
separate sectors in the industry, to ensure quality control, and that 
the industry observes the statutory requirements of other countries. In 
addition, the Board should coordinate, rather than control commercial 
activities, measure certain resources and their availability to each 
sector, assist each sector with long term planning and market development 
and provide a general source of information. 3 
3. Future of the Meat Board? 
Although it appears certain that marketing boards will be super-
ceded as the central institution in agricultural industries by some 
alternative structure, it is not clear that in the short term at least, 
1. The Press, Monday 13 August 1984, p.4. 
2. The Market Development Board Act 1986. 
3. Interview with Rowland Woods, November.1984. 
marketing boards will be abolished, though their powers will be 
significantly reduced. Pressure for producer boards to be dismantled 
is likely to come from government, and more importantly, producers 
themselves. 
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It is generally observed that once marketing boards have been 
established, governments are reluctant to remove them without producer 
support, though clearly they can put pressure on producers to change 
their attitudes toward them, including the removal of favoured financial 
backing. Sieper notes that in Australia, while there has been questioning 
of marketing boards along with a majority of quangos, it is unlikely any 
moves will be made to abolish boards, unless producers request it: 
Some attempts to reform, rather than moves to abolish 
any of these institutions is the most that can be 
expected in this part of the world. In the field of 
statutory marketing, any assaults on their citadels 
will have to come from within.1 
Similarly in New Zealand, although recent moves by the Labour 
government to significantly reduce the Meat Board's powers marks a 
departure from the previous National government's formal favoured treat-
ment of boards, it is unlikely that this government will abolish the Meat 
Board, at least in the short term. As a senior Treasury official,, Jo:m 
Be rt ho l d; s a i d : 
It is unlikely that the government would act to make 
major changes to the structure of any of our primary 
sector industries against the will of the producers 
in those industries.2 
Nevertheless politicians and government officials have clearly encouraged 
producers to exercise their own bargaining power either individually or 
collectively through voluntary cooperatives rather than compulsory 
statutory organisations. 
1. E,Sieper, 11 Statutory Mar.keting in Agriculture: Some Uses and 
Abuses 11 , Australia, Australian National University, 1983. [Paper for 
AG.POC Conference Wellington, 22-26 August 1983) 
2. C.Bartley, 11 Vertical Integration Needed in Agricultural Industry 11 , 
Straight Furrow, 4 December 1985, p.9. 
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Berthold claims producers wi 11 eventually react against statutory 
boards as they become aware there is a lack of accountability of such 
organisations arising firstly from the fact that neither the provision 
of management for these organisations, nor the services they provide are 
contestable, so there is no key assurance of performance. Secondly, 
different market situations will require different balances between agency 
monitoring and transattion costs. The existence of a single solution will 
be suboptimal, because by definition, it cannot provide the range of 
solutions required. Berthold predicts that an increasing agribusiness 
approach in agriculture will mark a turn away from the assumption that 
individual growers or farmers are too small to deal with their product 
outside the orchard or farm gate, and so statutory control is needed. 1 
Minister of Overseas Trade~ Mike Moore,has emphasised the future 
importance of cooperatives, particularly for the meat industry: 
Producer cooperatives will play an even more enhanced role 
in the future. They too will be encouraged t~ adopt a more 
aggressive marketing approach to their trade. 
Moore has promoted the concept of one strong meat processing and marketing 
cooperative operating nationally to compete with the private companies. 3 
This could incorporate the Board's marketing arm which is to have none of 
the commercial advantages associated with the Board's formal marketing 
powers. It is argued a national cooperative would allow integration and 
larger economies of scale, thus advancing the market share of producers. 
However a national cooperative would also have the disadvantages of 
reducing competition and reducing the degree of producer participation 
which exists in smaller cooperatives. 4 
1. C. Bartley, "Vertical Integration Needed in Agricultural Industry", 
Straight Furrow, 4 December 1985, p.9. 
2. The Press, Monday 13 August 1984, p.4. 
3. Sarah Morton, "Moore Wants Meat to Return to Private Enterpri se 11 , 
Straight Furrow, 18 September 1985, p.14. 
4. D. E.Fowler et al, An Examination of Alternative Marketing 
Structures: A Literature Search, op.cit. p.58. 
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Given that the responsibility for change rests largely with producers 
in the various industries, evidence suggests that producers worldwide are 
beginning to question the ability of primarily political bodies such as 
compulsory .producer boards to further their economic interests. Instead, 
they are beginning to place greater emphasis on voluntary cooperatives 
1 
and marketing groups. 
Campbell notes that producers and others increasingly appear to regard 
the exe.rcise of political power and the exercise of bargaining power through 
grower-controlled institutions as alternative means of accomplishing 
economic objectives. In the USA, farmers instead of using the political 
processes to influence politicians to give them the sort of price supports, 
stabilisation measures or marketing reforms desired, have begun to consider 
the possibility of accomplishing these goals through collective marketing 
machinery under their own control. This is the result of increasing 
dissatisfaction with what has been achieved through direct administrative 
1. Warley distinguished between traditional voluntary cooperatives 
and marketing groups. Marketing groups, while legally cooperative, have 
a more strictly commercial orientation, and unlike voluntary cooperatives, 
they make no effort to 1 render a service 1 to any producer regardless of 
size, technical competence, financial status or amenability to market 
discipline. Rather they commonly practise selective membership, insist 
on an appropriate capital contribution and use vigorous trading agreements 
between the members and the organisation. Essentially they are groups of 
like minded, progressive (and possibly socially and economically homo-
genous) producers, who appreciate that self-help in marketing improvement 
entails the acceptance of a degree of marketing discipline far more 
stringent than practisediintraditional cooperatives, and combine together 
to market their products collectively. In a word their purpose is to 
create market power by being efficient producers and large scale sellers 
of products with the attributes of quality, volume and continuity which 
handlers, processors and distributors increasingly require. 
(T, K,Warley, 11 A Synoptic View of Agricultural Marketing Organizations in 
the UK 11 , in T. K,Warley (ed), Agricultural Producers and Their Markets, 
op.cit. p.333.) 
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pricing. 1 The personal involvement in economic decision-making helps to 
overcome their feeling of frustration and alienation. Farmers have placed 
greater emphasis on farmer bargaining power as a result of the well founded 
realization of the diminishing electoral power of agriculture and the 
greater urban and consumer orientation of 1egis1 atures: 'Farmers, it is 
said, wish to develop market power of their own, less vulnerable to 
political fortune•. 2 
In addition, Campbell claims some of the producer disenchantment 
with marketing boards·;worldwide, stems not so much from dissatisfaction 
with the results of or prospect of, political intervention, as from a 
questioning of whether state-wide, or country-wide marketing boards are 
likely to be satisfactory given the structural changes which are currently 
going on in agricultural markets: 
Not only are large and efficient producers making their 
appearance, but there is increasing concentration in 
wholesale, processing and retailing sectors. There is 
a rising volume of specification buying and evidence of 
concerted efforts to integrate production and marketing 
functions by contractual arrangements. Larger, more 
commercially oriented producers operating individually, 
or in concert with other like minded people in voluntary 
marketing associations have demonstrated to their own 
satisfaction that there are premiums to be achieved by 
direct decentralised negotiation with marketing firms. 
They claim that statutory boards through their lack of 
flexibility and their commitment to treat all producers 
alike can stand in the way of improvements i~ marketing 
which could be to the community's advantage.· 
1. There are no marketing boards in the USA, but there are marketing 
orders which have similar objectives. A marketing order is a regulatory 
program issued by the US Federal Secretary of Agriculture at the request of 
growers which 1 ega lly ob 1 i gates a 11 commodity producers and handlers to 
abide by order terms. These typically involve commodity quantity and 
quality and packing standards and conduct of research and market develop-
ment projects. Marketing orders are administered by a nominated committee 
of unsalaried grower and handler representatives who recommend regulatory 
policy to the Secretary of Agriculture. The main difference between 
marketing boards and marketing orders is that while a board can have 
considerable executive powers, a marketing order functions as an advisory 
committee only; regulations are issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
(See Fowler et al , 11 An Examination of Alternative Marketing Btructures ... 11 
op.cit. p.57.) 
2. Keith Campbell, 11 The State Marketing Board - Relic or Prototype?" 
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.17, No.3, December 1973, 
pp. 186-187. 
3. Ibid, pp.187-188. 
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Nevertheless while this change in attitude is becoming increasingly 
evident in the UK and USA, Campbell notes that Australian farmers generally 
are more cautious regarding change, with a majority still supporting the 
retention of marketing boards. 
Grassroots farmer reaction to the New Zealand Meat Board does appear 
to be changing slowly, although the official political lobby group, the 
Meat and Wool Section of Federated Farmers still favours the maintenance of 
a meat board which is accountable primarily to producers. It seems likely 
that producers will become increasingly disillusioned with the Meat Board 
as a means of improving their economic position, particularly as the 1'- 1 
Board's regulatory powers have been significantly reduced in practice. 
As the Meat Board's marketing operation is forced to operate on the same 
basis as other meat companies, farmers must question whether there is any 
longer a need for a compulsory statutory board, which they are required 
to contribute to financially. Farmers may perceive they can achieve their 
goals more effectively through forming their own cooperatives and marketing 
groups and ensuring greater accountability from existing cooperatives. A 
study of grassroots farmer perception of the Meat Board would be a useful 
corollary to this research. 
4. ,summary 
The available international literature suggests that some form of 
institutional framework is desirable for agricultural industries, to 
provide general supervision. Thi~ institutional framework is likely to 
consist of widely representative industry organisations such as commodity 
commissions or ad hoc bodies, rather than the highly centralised producer 
dominated boards. These bodies could be responsible for sponsoring 
research and development, devising and supervising a national grading 
system, generating, analysing and disseminating market views, encouraging 
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cooperation, and in some instances administering commodity schemes, and 
acting as buyers of the last resort. 1 
To some extent these developments are likely to apply to a number 
of agricultural industries in New Zealand under the present Labour 
government, and there are clearly factions of the National opposition who 
support these changes. This government has sought to de-regulate a number 
of agricultural industries including the milk, wheat and meat industries 
in an attempt to reduce the degree of centralised control over market 
forces. This has significantly reduced the powers of the producer boards 
concerned, though they have not been abolished. 2 On the other hand, the 
government recognises the need for some form of strong and effective 
framework to ensure the efficient development of the industries concerned. 
It also appears to want to initiate this framework to ensure it is in 
line with its overall policy direction. 
This government attitude has the support of trade and marketing 
consultant, Rowland Woods. He claims some institutional framework is 
necessary at the very least to establish consistent quality and health 
standards. It is also necessary to coordinate and underpin the establish-
ment of marketing priorities and strategies and to ensure satisfactory 
communications between the market and various elements in the chain from 
producer to consumer. He claims that in a small country like New Zealand, 
there are especially compelling reasons for coordinating activities, for 
cooperation, and for sharing basic services over as wide a base as 
possible. However coordination and cooperation, even on a wide scale do'not 
necessarily mean centra 1 control or even a 1 arge degree of central planning. 3 
1. T. K,Warley, ''A Synoptic View of Agricultural Marketing 
Organisations in the UK", in Warley (ed), op.cit. p.339. 
2. However there are indications that the New Zealand Wheat Board 
could be abolished in the near future. 
3. Rowland Woods, "The Prospects for New Zealand Agriculture in a 
Changing world", op.cit. 
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For the meat industry specifically, there has been a clear move 
away from monopoly control of the industry by the Meat Board, to a greater 
emphasis on an industry-wide body to provide general supervision. This 
supervision can be provided by either of the two existing bodies, the MIC 
or the Market Development Board, or a combination of the two. With the 
minimal functions required of such an organisation however, it seems 
likely one of these organisations would suffice. With the government's 
desire to set the guidelines for any overseeing body to ensure the 
development of the industry is in line with the government's broader 
policy directions rather than leave it to the vested industry interests 
to determine, it is probable that the Market Development Board will be 
the preferred choice. The Meat Board is likely to remain with its 
limited powers until a majority of producers agree they could achieve 
greater benefits through existing and new voluntary producer cooperatives 
and marketing groups. 
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APPENDIX 1 
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF MAJOR GROUPS IN THE MEAT INDUSTRY REFERRED TO IN THIS THESIS 
.Government 
Meat Industry Council~ ~ew Zealand Meat 
:;'\ (~IC) '\ Producers Board 
New Zea 1 and Meat Industry· 
A~oCijlti or\ (NZMr) 
New Zea 1 and Meat E1orters 
C¥u1cil (NZMEC) . 
Independent 
Exporters 
Association 
r 
Independent 
Exporters 
Meat Companies 
Marketing 
Cooperatives 
Joint Meat 
·rCqunci 1 
,JMC) 3 
Meat Workers 
(NZMPB) \ 
Jlec~r ~ee 
Federated~Meat and 
Meat and Wool Producers 
Hool Action 
.,,committees 
---} indicates representation 
1. NZFCA disbanded 1985, replaced by NZMIA · t 
2. MZMEC disbanded 1985, replaced by NZMIA ~ 
3. JMC disbanded 1982 
APPENDIX 2 
The functions of the Meat Industry Council under 1983 National 
government. 
1. To examine, comment and approve the strategies and plans, as 
set out in the Task Force report, which are developed jointly 
by industry and the Meat Board. 
2. To monitor industry and the Meat Producers Board performance 
in the execution of strategies and marketing plans, and to 
report annually to the Minister of Agriculture and to industry. 
3. To review regularly, and to cover in its annual reports to the 
Minister of Agriculture, the following matters: 
the criteria and methods by which licences are issued to 
exporters; 
the methods by which the number of licences to be issued 
for each market is determined and how these criteria are 
implemented; 
the methods of determining prices paid by exporters to 
the Meat Producers Board for product; 
the effects of national pooling of product on the industry 
and the necessity of continuing with national pooling; 
the circumstances under which it is permissible for 
farmers/processors/exporters to make 'outside pool 1 
contractual arrangements; 
the operation of the Meat Board Price Stabilisation Scheme, 
its relationship to any government price support scheme, 
and the effect of such schemes on the meat industry's 
performance; 
the criteria on which the industry's performance should be 
judged and the industry's actual (including Meat Producers 
Board) performance; 
1S9. 
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the coordination of industry/government negotiations 
and consultations on access to overseas markets; 
the effectiveness of the promotion of New Zealand meat 
and the gathering of market intelligence; 
the coordination of research with industry-wide application. 
4. To establish procedures for the settlement of disputes between 
exporters/processors and the Meat Producers Board. 
5. To establish qualitative criteria for the issuing of export/ 
distribution licences by the Meat Producers Board; and review 
the manner in which these licences are issued. 
6. National weight/grade pools should be established by the Meat 
Board. 
7. Provision should be made for 'outside pool 1 contractual arrange-
ments between farmers, processors, and exporters for specialist 
markets. 
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Director-General, Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington. 
Mr Harry Clark 
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